REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. GUILLERMO S. SANTOS, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XI, AND CHUA SIU TING, RESPONDENTS.

The question at issue, squarely raised for the first time, in
this certiorari and mandamus proceeding, is whether or not the refusal of the
respondent Judge, the Honorable Guillermo S. Santos, of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, to give due course to the appeal of the petitioner,
Republic of the Philippines, from his order allowing the other respondent, Chua
Sin Ting, to take his oath as a Filipino pursuant to Republic Act No. 530, a
refusal based on the failure of the petitioner to “file an opposition to
the oath-taking” is justified.  Petitioner
Republic of the Philippines
assails it as constituting a grave abuse of discretion, and excluding the
government from the exercise of its right to appeal, respondent Judge
neglecting to perform the performance of a duty enjoined by law entitling
petitioner to the remedy of mandamus.  We
agree with petitioner.

The basic facts are not in dispute.  In a naturalization proceeding,^[1]
respondent Chua Siu Ting obtained a decision in his
favor rendered on September 16, 1961.^[2]
Thereafter, a petition was filed by him on July 8, 1964 for final hearing preparatory to oath-taking.^[3]  On November
4, 1964, respon­dent Judge issued an order allowing his
oath-taking.^[4] A
copy of such order was received by the Solicitor General on November 6, 1964 and within the reglementary period, petitioner filed a notice of appeal as
well as a record on appeal.^[5]
Then on December 12, 1964, at the hearing for the approval of petitioner’s
record on appeal, respondent Judge sustained the verbal oppo­sition of the
other respondent and dictated an order refusing to give due course to the
appeal in view of the government’s failure to file an opposition.  That action of respondent Judge is the basis
for this certiorari and mandamus proceeding.

In the resolution of the novel issue thus presented, what cannot
be ignored is the firm and unwavering adherence, so manifest in the decisions
of this Court, to the concept that Filipino citizenship being an inestimable
boon and a priceless acquisition, one who seeks to enjoy its rights and
privileges must not shirk the most exacting scrutiny as to his fulfilling the
qualifications required by law, which must be fully met and could be inquired
into at any stage of the proceeding, whether it be in the course of the original,
petition or during the stage leading to his oath-taking pursuant to Republic
Act No, 530.

Tested by such a criterion, whatever could be said in favor of
the action taken by respondent Judge, viewed solely from a procedural angle,
cannot justify his refusal to allow the appeal in this case.  In that sense, what was done by him
constituted a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari, and mandamus
lies.  While there is no case precisely
in point, two 1966 decisions, both rendered on the same day, are of a
persuasive character.

In the first case, Yong Sai v.
Republic,^[6]
an appeal was taken by the Republic from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Tacloban, allowing petitioner Yong Sai to take his oath as a naturalized Filipino
citizen.  His application fox citizenship
was favorably acted upon earlier in a decision by the lower court dated March 31, 1960.  No appeal having been taken from that
decision, petitioner Yong Sai, on May 21, 1962, filed a petition to
take his oath.  Again, he was successful.  Not only was an order to that effect granted,
but he took his oath the same day.  Hence
the appeal in that case.

His counsel filed a motion to dismiss such appeal, contending
that the two-year period having elapsed and he having taken the oath, the
original decision was no longer appealable.  Such a contention was rejected by this Court,
the opinion being penned by Justice Zaldivar.  Thus: “It is a settled rule that the
decision of the court of first instance in naturalization cases does not become
final until after the expiration of the period to appeal from the order of the
court authorizing the taking of the oath of allegiance as provided in Section 1
of Republic Act No. 530 and this, not withstanding that the applicant for
citizenship had already taken his oath of allegiance.  Likewise, it is a settled rule that an appeal
from the order of the court of first instance authorizing the taking of the
oath of allegiance, under Section 1 of Republic Act 530, subjects the entire
naturalization proceedings to scrutiny by the Supreme Court, so that any matter
pertinent to the determination of whether or not the applicant for
naturalization is really qualified to become a Filipino citizen, whether or not
the original petition had complied with all the requirements of the law, and
whether or not the procedural requirements in the lower court had been complied
with, may be reviewed on appeal by this Court if those matters are not touched
in the briefs or pleadings of the parties.”

In the other case, Lim v. Republic,^[7]
an appeal was likewise taken by the Republic from a lower court order allowing
petitioner Anacleto Lim to take his oath of
allegiance as a naturalized citizen.  In
this case, the judgment on his petition for naturalization was rendered on November 30, 1960.  A little over two years later, on December 7, 1962, he filed a motion
to introduce evidence in accordance with Republic Act No. 530 to enable him to
take the oath of allegiance.  He was
heard and the appealed order was rendered on January 19, 1963, petitioner taking the oath the same
day.  The appeal of the government was
duly perfected.  The lower court, while
on the belief that it was frivolous, nevertheless, approved the record on
appeal.  The lower court likewise
expressed surprise considering that the Solicitor General failed to make any
showing that petitioner did not comply with the legal requirement as to
naturalization that such an appeal would be interposed.

This Court sustained the government in an opinion by Justice J.
B. L. Reyes.  It stated that no surprise
should have been caused the lower court as time and time again, it has been
repeatedly ruled “that the applicant’s qualifications may be questioned at
the proceedings for his authorization to take the oath of allegiance * *
*.” It also considered the appeal meritorious as petitioner could not show
that his occupation was lucrative.

How meaningful has been the right to appeal from lower court
orders allowing oath-taking in assuring full compliance with all the requisites
of the law to warrant naturalization is evident from other decisions of this
Court.  Thereby it has enabled the
government to scrutinize most carefully on appeal the crucial question of
whether or not petitioner had shown to its satisfaction his claim to be enrolled
in the ranks of citizens even if such an inquiry is pursued only at this late
stage.

Ching Leng v.
Republic,^[8]
dealt with an appeal by the state against an order of the lower court allowing
after hearing appli­cant to take the oath of citizenship.  As pointed out in the opinion, it suffices to
defeat the oath-taking that applicant has “committed any act prejudicial
to the interest of the nation or contrary to any government announced policies
no conviction being deemed necessary.

In Tan Hoi v. Republic,^[9] an
appeal was taken from the order permitting petitioner to take his oath,
opposition being based on his committing an act prejudicial, to the interest of
the nation which was overruled, notwithstanding evidence that during the
hearing, one of his children was in Hongkong and had
never been in the Philippines The appeal was successful as the “in­escapable
conclusion is that petitioner has failed to comply with all the requirements to
entitle him to take the oath of allegiance.”

In Go Kay See v. Republic,^[10]
an appeal was taken by the provincial fiscal of Isabela
against an order of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
ordering the issuance of a certificate of naturalization.  The opposition was based on the applicant
failing to pay the annual registration fee during the two year period contrary
to act requiring aliens to register annually with Bureau of Immigration.  The order was set aside.

In Ong So v. Republic,^[11]
no opposition was interposed at the hearing for naturalization, but while
petitioner was presenting his evidence under Republic Act No. 530, the
government filed an opposition on the ground that petitioner (1) had not
enrolled all his children of school age in qualified schools and (2) he did not
have a lucrative employment.  An order
was issued allowing him to take the oath, and on the same afternoon of its
issuance, he did so.  The government
appealed and was sustained by this Cote: t on both
grounds of its opposition.

In Pe v. Republic,^[12]
the appeal by the Republic of the Philippines covered not only two orders of
the Court of First Instance of Manila denying its opposition to a motion of
petitioner to take his oath of allegiance as well as another order authorizing
his oath-taking, but likewise sought the reversal, of the decision granting the
petition for naturalization as well as the nullification of the oath of
allegiance taken by petitioner.  The
appeal prospered on all counts.

In Go Im Ty
v. Republic,^[13]
an appeal was taken from an order allowing petitioner to take her oath of
allegiance.  In the original petition for
naturalization, the government did not appeal. 
That was held immaterial, as the case “is open for review, in its
entirety by this Court regardless of whether or not objection had been made in
connection with a particular point during the proceedings in the court
below.” The certificate of naturalization granted to her was cancelled.

In the last case, Chua Tiong Seng v. Republic,^[14]
the government appealed an order allowing petitioner to take his oath of
allegiance.  It was sustained notwithstanding
the fact, as did happen in the other cases earlier cited, that there was no
previous appeal from the decision granting the petition for naturalization, on
a showing that petitioner did not have a lucrative occupation.

It would follow then that the mere failure on the part of this
petitioner in this case to file an opposition to the motion for oath-taking
cannot and does not constitute a waiver precluding an appeal.  That has been the settled law as far back as
1950.^[15]
What was said by Justice Tuason in Yay Chin v. Republic,^[16]
possesses relevance.  Thus: “It was
not the duty of the Government to specify the grounds of its opposition.  It is not bound in naturalization proceedings
by the pleadings relative to the presence or absence of qualifications.  Without objection by the Government, it is
the duty of an applicant for citizenship affirmatively to esta­blish all the
legal requirements, and the court motu proprio may and should deny his application if from
his evidence he is found lacking in any of those requirements.” This is so
in all stages of the proceeding.  For the
government, it is almost never too late.

It is thus undeniable that the right of the government to appeal
is deemed of such importance and is impressed with such significance that the
“attempt to render [it] nugatory” has invariably met: with the
condemnation that it so richly deserves.^[17]
So this Court has consistently and invariably ruled.  We do so again.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted setting
aside the order of respondent Judge refusing to give due course by the appeal
of the Republic of the Philippines and respondent Judge is directed to approve
petitioner’s record on appeal and to elevate the said record together with the
oral and documentary evidence presented before him for review by this Court in
the due course of such appeal.  Without
pronouncement as costs.

Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, JBL, Dizon,  Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Case No. 40209, Court of First Instance of Manila.

^[2] Petition,
paragraph 6.

^[3] Ibid,
paragraph 7.

^[4] Ibid,
paragraph 8.

^[5]  Ibid, paragraphs 9 and 10.

^[6]
L-20483, September 30, 1966.

^[7]
L-21193, September 30, 1966.

^[8]
L-6268, May 10, 1954.

^[9]
L-15266, September 30, 1960.

^[10]
L-17318 December 27, 1962.

^[11] L-20145,
June 30, 1965.

^[12]
L-20375, January 31, 1966.

^[13]
L-17919, July 30, 1966.

^[14]
L-21422, December 18, 1967.

^[15]
Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, December 26, 1950 and Jesus Uy Yap v. Republic, L-4270, May 8, 1952.

^[16]  93 Phil. 215, 217 (1953).

^[17] Ong So v. Republic, 20415, June 30, 1965; Lim v. Republic, L-20149, September 29, 1966 and Lim v.
Republic, L-21193, September 30, 1966.