ARTHUR TARNATE, PETITIONER, VS. CARMELO C. NORIEL AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, LUCERIO FAJARDO, LUIS ISIP AND AURELIO INTERTAS, RESPONDENTS.
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Tarnate versus Noriel
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction filed by Arthur Tarnate against Carmelo C. Noriel, in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, together with Lucerio Fajardo, Luis Isip, and Aurelio Intertas. The dispute arose from a union election in which Tarnate and Fajardo were the leading contenders, and the question is whether probationary employees, specifically those classified as second helpers, may vote in the election of union officers and board members. The case matters because it fixes the statutory boundary between the right to join a labor union and the narrower right to vote in its elections, and it teaches that a clear Labor Code provision will be applied as written even against an appeal to the constitutional freedom of association.
Procedural History
The election of union officers was held on October 23, 1977. Forty ballots cast by employees classified as second helpers were challenged, and it was agreed that they would be segregated and counted only after the question of their membership was resolved. The Med-Arbiter later granted the motion of the Fajardo group to open and count the challenged votes. Respondent Director Noriel at first ruled that the probationary employees could not vote, apparently relying on the applicable Labor Code provision, but on a motion for reconsideration he reversed himself and allowed the votes to be counted. Tarnate then brought this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, and a restraining order was issued on November 27, 1978.
Facts
In the election of union officers on October 23, 1977, petitioner Arthur Tarnate and respondent Lucerio Fajardo were the two strong contenders. Petitioner received 308 votes and respondent Fajardo received 285 votes. Forty ballots cast by employees who classified as second helpers were challenged.
Those second helpers were included in the list of qualified voters upon the motion of the Fajardo faction and over the opposition of the Tarnate group. It was imposed as a condition that the challenged ballots would be segregated and would be counted only after passing upon the question of the membership of such second helpers. The Tarnate group finally agreed to allow them to participate in the election.
On October 27, 1977, after the election, the Fajardo group moved to have the challenged votes opened, and the Med-Arbiter granted the prayer. Respondent Director Noriel at first ruled that the probationary employees could not vote, but when a motion for reconsideration was filed he granted it and allowed the votes to be counted. Hence this suit for certiorari.
Issues
- Whether or not probationary employees are entitled to vote in the election of officers and board members of a labor union.
- Whether or not the Labor Code requirement of at least one year of service for purposes of membership in any labor union applies to bar the challenged ballots from being counted.
Applicable Provisions
The Labor Code provision on membership in a labor union provides:
Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, with at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in any labor union.
This is the provision the Court applies, and it is the basis for excluding the second helpers, who had not completed the required one year of service, from voting.
Article 244 of the New Labor Code, cited by the Solicitor General, provides:
All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including religious, medical or educational institutions operating for profit, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining.
This provision anchors the right to self-organization, which the Court acknowledges but holds does not override the specific statutory restriction on voting.
The constitutional guarantee invoked in the discussion provides:
The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
This guarantee is considered by the Court but is held not to defeat the clear command of the Labor Code provision.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that probationary employees are not entitled to vote in the election of union officers where they have not completed the required service. The condition imposed in the Labor Code requiring at least one year of service calls for application, and petitioner must therefore prevail.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that the reliance of petitioner on the applicable Labor Code provision is not in vain. It is definite and clear. At least one year of service is required for an employee to enjoy the benefits of membership in any labor union. There is no ambiguity, its validity has not been challenged, and it calls for application in the precise terms it was enacted. The Court quoted with approval the rule that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it, and that the law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. There is thus no statutory support for the challenged order of respondent Noriel.
The Court acknowledged the implication for freedom of association and found plausible the contention that barring probationary employees from voting for union officials would run counter to that right. It stressed that freedom of association is explicitly ordained and traces its origin to the Malolos Constitution. A more realistic appraisal of the labor situation, however, clarified matters. The right to join a labor union remains undisputed, but for purposes of electing union officers, the right of probationary employees could be restricted as provided in the Labor Code. The justification lies in the fact that management could, by the simple device of appointing probationary employees in the labor union expected to prevail in the choice of the sole collective bargaining agent, attain the result that would serve best its interests, not necessarily that of labor. At any rate, there being no attack on its validity, the provision must be given full force and effect.
Doctrine
A probationary employee must have at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, to be considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in any labor union, and until then may be restricted from voting in the election of union officers. The right to join a labor union remains undisputed, but the right to vote in union elections may be restricted as the Labor Code provides. Where a statutory norm speaks unequivocally, the courts have nothing to do except to apply it, and a valid, unchallenged provision must be given full force and effect even against an appeal to the constitutional freedom of association.
Disposition
The petition for certiorari was granted, the election of petitioner Arthur Tarnate was upheld, the restraining order issued on November 27, 1978 was lifted, and the decision was declared immediately executory, with no costs.
Remember This
Memorize this line: at least one year of service is required before an employee may be considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in any labor union, and the clear Labor Code provision prevails over the general appeal to freedom of association. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the right to join a union and the right to vote in its elections, and the rule that an unambiguous statute must be applied as written.