🎧 Case Brief Lecture

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS NORTE (BRANCH II), RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. L-36388. March 16, 1988 March 16, 1988

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Commission on Elections versus Romillo

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus brought by the Commission on Elections against Judge Manuel Romillo of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch Two. The Commission asks the Supreme Court to annul two orders of the judge: one dismissing a criminal complaint for an election offense, and one denying reconsideration. The case matters because it teaches the bar candidate two things at once: how a penal election provision is construed, and the settled rule that a wrong reason given by a lower court will not by itself compel the Supreme Court to grant relief when the result reached is, in any event, correct.

Procedural History

The Commission on Elections filed four criminal complaints against Eden Asuncion for election offenses committed on Election Day, November 8, 1971, at a polling precinct in Laoag City. The complaints were filed with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for preliminary investigation, pursuant to the Election Code of 1971. After preliminary investigation, the respondent judge issued an order dated October 27, 1972, dismissing three of the cases for insufficiency of evidence and quashing the complaint in the fourth case, Criminal Case No. 120-II, on the ground that the mere presence of an unauthorized person in the polling place does not constitute an offense. The Commission moved for reconsideration, and the judge denied it in an order dated December 20, 1972. The Commission then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus, challenging that portion of the October order that quashed the complaint in Criminal Case No. 120-II, and the December order denying reconsideration.

Facts

On April 24, 1972, the Commission on Elections filed four criminal complaints against Eden Asuncion for election offenses committed on Election Day, November 8, 1971, at around ten in the morning, at Polling Precinct No. 58, Laoag City. The four cases were filed with the Court of First Instance for preliminary investigation pursuant to the Election Code of 1971.

The four cases were: one, for carrying a gun inside the polling place while voting was in progress; two, for unlawfully entering the polling place; three, for employing unlawful means or scheme to discover or read the contents of prepared ballots; and four, for conducting himself in a disorderly manner so as to interrupt the voting proceedings.

After preliminary investigation, the respondent judge dismissed three of the cases for insufficiency of evidence and quashed the complaint in the unlawful entry case, Criminal Case No. 120-II, holding that the mere presence of an unauthorized person in the polling place does not constitute an offense. That complaint alleged that while voting was going on, Eden Asuncion, who was not authorized to enter a polling place, did unlawfully enter the polling place of the precinct. The Commission's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issues

  • Whether or not Section 172 of the Election Code of 1971, in relation to the provisions classifying and penalizing election offenses, is penal in character, contrary to the ruling of the respondent judge.
  • Whether or not the quashal of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 120-II should be upheld notwithstanding the error in the judge's rationalization.

Applicable Provisions

Section 172, paragraph I of the Election Code of 1971 provides:

SEC. 172. Persons allowed in and around the polling place. - During the voting, no person shall be allowed inside the polling place, except the members of the board of inspectors and their substitutes, the watchers, the representatives of the Commission, the voters casting their votes, the voters waiting for their turn to get inside the booths whose number shall not exceed twice the number of booths and the voters waiting for their turn to cast their votes whose number shall not exceed forty at any one time. The watchers shall stay only in the space reserved for them it being illegal for them to enter places reserved for the voters or for the board, or to mingle and talk with the voters within the polling place.

This is the very provision the accused was charged with violating, and the Court reads it together with the classification and penalty provisions to conclude that it is penal in character.

Section 230 of the same Code provides:

Sec. 230. Election offenses and their classification. - Violation of any of the provisions, or pertinent portions of sections one hundred and seventy-two shall be serious election offenses.

This classifies a violation of Section 172 as a serious election offense, which answers the judge's claim that mere presence is not an offense.

Section 233 of the same Code provides:

SEC. 233. Penalties. - Any one found guilty of a serious election offense shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than six years and one day but not more than twelve years.

This fixes the penalty and confirms that the provision is penal, not merely regulatory.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge erred. From the tenor of Sections 172, 230 and 233, it is clear that Section 172, in relation to the other two, is penal in character, contrary to the ruling of the judge. The Court noted that these provisions have been carried over into the later election codes, appearing as Sections 137, 179 and 181 of the 1978 Election Code and as Sections 192, 262 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On the second issue, however, the Court held that while the judge may have erred in his rationalization, the quashal of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 120-II must still be upheld. The same reason the judge gave for dismissing the other three cases, insufficiency of evidence, applies with equal force. The dismissal order quoted the testimony of the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors of the precinct, who said that when he saw Eden Asuncion try to enter the voting booth, he stopped him and sent him out, and that he never saw him carrying a firearm, nor watched voters fill up ballots or read their contents, because when he tried to enter the booths the chairman called his attention and he went out. Under those circumstances, the Court said, it cannot be concluded that Eden Asuncion had violated Section 172. The secrecy and sanctity of the ballot sought to be protected by that provision had not been violated.

Doctrine

First, a provision of the Election Code that restricts who may enter a polling place is penal in character when read with the provisions classifying and punishing its violation; the mere presence of an unauthorized person inside the polling place during voting is itself the act punished, and the offense is complete upon the prohibited entry.

Second, the validity of a lower court's result does not rise or fall with the correctness of its reasoning. Where the court reaches the correct result for the wrong reason, the Supreme Court will not disturb that result if the record otherwise supports it. Here, the complaint was correctly quashed because the evidence showed no prima facie case that the accused actually entered the polling place, the chairman having stopped him at the threshold.

Third, the protective purpose of the provision is the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot; where that purpose has not been violated, no offense under the provision is made out.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari and mandamus was denied, with no costs, and the quashal of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 120-II stood.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a right result reached for a wrong reason will be affirmed, because the Supreme Court reviews outcomes, not rationalizations. Examiners use this case to test the penal character of election offenses under the Election Code and the rule that an erroneous ratiocination by a trial judge does not by itself warrant certiorari when the quashal is otherwise supported by the evidence.