AMADO A. YATCO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT.

This is an appeal taken by Amado A. Yatco, member of the Philippine Bar, from the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming an order issued by the Court of First Instance
of Manila in Criminal Case No. 35274 finding him guilty of contempt of court
and sentencing him to pay a fine of P50.00. 
Grounds invoked in support of his plea for a reversal of the appealed
decision are that (a) the contempt proceedings did not comply with the
requirements of Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, and that, (b) at any
rate, the facts of the case do not warrant his conviction for contempt.

The facts found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

“On the
strength of an informa­tion for theft of clothing materials, accused Pedro Viray was arraigned on May 4, 1956.  The
case was set for August 28, 1956.  On this date, defendant Amado
A. Yatco moved for its postponement alleging illness
on his part – which was granted for November
8, 1956.  This subsequent setting, however, was postponed due to complainant Agustina Tecson’s not having been
subpoenaed accordingly and again the trial was set for February 28, 1957, when
accused failed to appear in spite of his having been notified accordingly on
time by his bailors – which resulted in the for­feiture
of his bail-bond.

On May 5, 1957,
defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of forfeiture on the
alleged ground that his client was sick on that very date, February 28, 1957.  This motion was denied.  However, on March 9, 1957, the accused was permitted to file an ad­ditional
bail-bond raising the same to P2,000.00 and the court
granted the accused temporary liberty.

Defendant was subsequently notified on April 16, 1957, of the hearing set for July 29, 1957, the corresponding
notice having been signed by Attorney Alfonso Yatco, Amado Yatco’s son.

When, however, on July 29, 1957 the case was called for trial,
Alfonso Yatco appeared with accused Pedro Viray on latter’s
behalf and on behalf of his father, and moved for the postponement of the
hearing on the alleged ground that his father had a case in the Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal.  The trial court reminded Attorney
Alfonso Yatco that corresponding formal notice having
been served his father as far back as April 16, 1957, there was ample time for
the latter to have disengaged himself
from other commit­ments, and prepared for the trial, court adding that it was
not satis­fied with the reasons for his non­appearance and that it was going to
find him guilty of contempt for having, in disregard of the notice served him,
accepted other profes­sional engagement.

There was a proposal to have Attorney Alfonso Yatco
designated as counsel de oficio for the
accused so as to expedite the
hearing of that simple case but he demurred stating that it was his father who
was defense attorney, so the hearing was postponed for 10:30 that very morning,
that is, with
two hours allowance for appellant to appear and this was agreed to by Attorney
Alfonso Yatco.

It was at this juncture that complainant Agustina
Tecson complained in open court of the unnecessary
delay already caused by two previous postponements which have prejudiced her considerably in expenses and loss of
time for her going to and from San Quintin, Pangasinan to Manila, calling the attention of the trial
court to the obvious purpose of defense in annoying her and thus weakening her
case, so much so that the court informed accused Viray
to return at 10:30 that morning for trial.

But when the time struck, it was only Attorney Alfonso Yatco who appeared stating that the accused had gone to Pasig, Rizal
to contact appellant Yatco and this, without the
trial court’s permission – which said court resented labelling
accused’s act as highly con­temptuous.  However, at about 12:02 p.m. before the presiding judge could leave the rostrum, accused Pedro Viray appeared, still minus his counsel, the
appellant.  This much delayed appearance
the trial court considered as having been purposely done so as to prevent again
the trial from proceeding for lack of time, so much so that the court directed the bailiff to have the accused arrested – which was
effected.

There and there, forthwith, the trial judge issued an order the dispositive part of which is as follows:

“WHEREFORE, considering that Atty. Amado
A. Yatco has no right to accept a professional
engagement when this case was set for trial as far back as April, 1957, and it
is now 11:00 a.m. and he is not here, and considering that accused failed to
appear without giving notice to this Court, this Court hereby declare accused
Pedro Viray and Atty. Amado
A. Yatco in contempt of court, and pun­ishes said
Atty. Amado A. Yatco by
imposing upon him a fine of P50.00 which must be paid within two (2) days from
receipt of this order, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
accused Pedro Viray by an imprisonment of ten (10)
days.

“Let a warrant of arrest issue for accused Pedro Viray.”

On July 31, 1957, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration to
set aside the aforementioned order of July 29 on the alleged ground that the
circumstances leading to the issuance of that order constituted constructive
contempt and he was not, therefore, properly charged, even heard, under Section
3, Rule 64, Rules of Court and added that he had satisfactorily explained his
failure to appear before the said court on July 29, 1957, and that he had no
intention of disobeying the court’s order.”

We agree with the appellant that the charge against him and of
which he was found guilty is one for indirect contempt which, according to
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, may be punished only after a written
charge has been filed against the contemner and only
after the latter has been heard.  (Rivera vs. Arellano, 88 Phil. 744, Francisco vs. Enriquez, G.R.
No. L-7058, March 20, 1954
and L-10074, April 30, 1959).  We are of the opinion, however, that upon
the undisputed facts before us there was a written charge for contempt against
appellant, in connection with which he had been given full opportunity to purge
himself of said charge.

Whatever merit there might be in appellant’s contention that the
order of Judge Lucero of July 29, 1957 was issued without the benefit of a
written charge nor of a hearing has lost its force in view of the fol­lowing:  (a) the contents of said order sufficiently
apprised appellant of the fact that he was being charged with indirect contempt
consisting in his failure to ap­pear on the date set for the trial of the
criminal case in which he had appeared as counsel for the accused and in
connection with which he had been duly served with notice months before, and
(b) after the issuance of said order he filed a motion to have it reconsidered and set aside, in connection
with which motion he was given full opportunity to explain why he should not be held in con­tempt of court; (c) it was only after said
hearing that Judge Lucero issued another resolution dated August 1, 1957, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

“FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby maintains
its order of July 29, 1957, finding Atty. Amado A. Yatco guilty of constructive con­tempt and accused Pedro Viray of direct contempt, but reduces the imprisonment of
Pedro Viray to five (5) days such that he should be
released on August 3, 1957, but his release cannot be directed now in
view of the fact that the bond posted for his
provisional liberty has been withdrawn; and fines Atty. Amado
A. Yatco P50.00, which should be paid within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of this resolution, unless this case is appealed, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and upon his failure to do so
and if no appeal is interposed, the Court will issue the corresponding warrant
of arrest.

“For purposes of appeal, the bail bond of Atty. Amado A. Yatco is fixed at
P50.00.” (pp. 12-15, rec.).”

That appellant had ample opportunity to defend himself before
being finally convicted of contempt of court is evidenced by the fact that at the hearing held on his motion
for reconsideration and/or to set aside
the order of July 29, 1957, he personally appeared and argued in support
thereof, answering point by point all the questions addressed to him by Judge Lucero
concerning his failure to appear or the reasons why he did not appear on the
date set for the trial of the criminal case against his client.  In our view, there­fore, the requirements of
the law have been substantially complied with.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed, with
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.  

Villamor, J., abstains.