THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO DE LA PEÑA, OSMUNDO RAMOS AND HON. RAMON SAN JOSE, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside certain resolutions of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. However, considering the allegations and the
ultimate purpose of the petition, the same will be regarded as one for mandamus,
in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Guzman vs. Lichauco (42
Phil. 291) and People vs. Concepcion (55 Phil. 485, 492).

Respondents, Pedro de la Peña and Osmundo Ramos, are accused, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 24746 to 24755 and 24824 to 24833 (20 cases) of said court, of
illegal procurement of search warrants, in violation of Article 129 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the information filed in case No. 24750—the language of
which is analogous to that of the information filed in the other nineteen (19)
cases, except as regards the names and addresses of the respective complaining
witnesses—it is averred:

“That on or about the 30th day of April, 1951, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the accused Pedro de la Peña, being then the Chief of the Special
Investigating Team, and the accused Osmundo Ramos being then an agent, of the
Military intelligence Service G-2, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
therefore public officers or employees, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, and pursuant to a common intent, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously procure a search warrant without a
just cause, by then and there applying for the same and filing a deposition of
witness in support of the application for search warrant before the Court of
First Instance, this City; and that by reason and on account of said application
and deposition the said accused succeeded in procuring from the said court a
search warrant against Ty Kong Tek of 142 V. Mapa St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, where
a search was actually made or caused to be made by the said accused, both
knowing fully well that the statements and allegations contained in the said
application as well as in the said deposition were false.” (Record, p.
4.)

At the joint hearing of said twenty (20) cases, before Branch IV of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, presided over by respondent Judge, Honorable Ramon
San Jose, the prosecution placed on the witness stand, the offended party in
said case No. 24750, namely, Ty Kong Tek, who testified that, while he was in
his house at 142 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, on March 1, 1951, at about
2:00 a.m., Pedro de la Peña, one of the respondents herein, and one of the
defendants therein, came, accompanied by several persons, including two Chinese
named Koa San and Tan Tek; that De la Peña and his companions, who were provided
with a search warrant, searched the house, stating that they were looking for
firearms and U. S. dollars, none of which were found in the premises; that they
found, however, two (2) books of account of Ty Kong Tek for the years 1948 and
1949; that at 6:00 a.m., De la Peña took Ty Kong Tek for investigation to Camp
Murphy, where he was urged to confess that he had been engaged in the exchange
business and had been handling U. S. dollars, which the witness refused to
admit; and that, later, in the afternoon, De la Peña arrested the son and a
nephew of the witness. At this juncture, the prosecution inquired whether he
knew why his son and nephew were arrested, but, the defense objected thereto
upon the ground that the question referred to an act subsequent to the issuance
of the aforementioned search Warrant and, hence, immaterial to the issue.
Although the prosecution explained that it sought to establish the motive of De
la Peña in securing the search warrant, respondent Judge sustained the
objection. Thereupon, the prosecution asked Ty Kong Tek whether he knew whether
or not his above mentioned son and nephew had anything to do with the reason for
the search made, in their house, by the party headed by De la Peña. The defense
objected to the question upon the same ground, and the court sustained the
objection.

Ty Kong Tek further stated, on the witness stand, that De la Peña
investigated him six (6) times at Camp Murphy; that, during the investigation,
De la Peña told Ty Kong Tek that, unless he admitted that he had dealt in U. S.
dollars and engaged in the exchange of money, said respondent would arrest the
son and a nephew of the witness, as they were in fact detained by De la Peña in
the afternoon of March 1, 1951; that, thereafter, one of the members of the
party led by De la Peña, who made a search in complainant’s house, namely, Koa
San,, approached the witness and told him that he, his son and his (witness’)
nephew would be released if he (Ty Kong Tek) gave him (Koa San) and De la Peña
the sum of P20,000. On motion of the defense respondent Judge ordered the last
statement of Ty Kong Tek stricken from the record.

Ty Kong Tek, likewise, declared that Koa San was sometimes present during’
the investigation of the former in Camp Murphyt; that after the first
investigation of Ty Kong Tek by De la Peña, the former was sent to his quarters
in said camp; and that Koa San then came to see Ty Kong Tek and talked to him.
This statement was, also, ordered stricken out, on the motion of the defense.
Moreover, the latter made of record its general objection to all questions
relative to events which occurred subsequently to the issuance of the search
warrant aforementioned. Although the prosecution explained that it was trying to
prove the unlawful motive with which the search warrant had allegedly been
obtained, respondent Judge hold that “anything that happened after that
(issuance of the search warrant) will be immaterial” (p. 28, t. s. n.)
Thereupon, on motion of herein petitioner, Jose G. Lukban, Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who, as Special Prosecutor, handled the
case for the Government, in collaboration with Assistant City Fiscal, Guillermo
Dacumos, respondent Judge suspended the hearing, in order that the prosecution
could bring the matter to this Court, for determination of the’ propriety of
introducing evidence of acts performed by the accused after the
issuance of the search warrant in question. Hence, the present case.

Respondents herein maintain that the alleged illegal procurement of the
aforementioned search warrant may be established only by proof of acts either
preceding, or coetaneous with, the commission of offense charged, not by acts
performed subsequently thereto. Upon the other hand, petitioner herein contends
that the motive of the accused may be established by posterior acts, such as,
for instance, an attempt to extort money as a condition precedent to the release
of the complainant.

It is clear to our mind that said attempt to extort money, even if effected
after the issuance of the search warrant, but prior to the release of the
complainant, is relevant to the question whether or not said was illegally
procured, owing to the obvious tendency of the aforementioned circumstance, if
proven, to establish that the accused was prompted by the desire to get money
from said complainant. The relevancy would be more patent if a similar attempt
had been made in the other nineteen (19) cases or in some of them. It is,
likewise, apparent that evidence of the intent of the party who obtained said
warrant or warrants is not only relevant, but very material, where the accused
are charged with having “willfully, unlawfully and feloniously procured” said
process, “pursuant to a common intent,” as alleged in the information filed in
the cases under consideration.

Respondents insist, however, that:

“* * * Our Supreme Court, in the case of People vs. Sy Juco, 64
Phil. 667, ruled that—malicious procurement of a search warrant under Article
129 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by a public officer who procures
search warrant without just cause, and that such just cause consist of
such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant and
not to facts subsequent (Italics ours).” (Respondent’s memorandum, p.
2)

This statement is misleading. The accused in the Sy Juco case, cited by
respondents, was not charged with illegal procurement of a search warrant. The
main issues in said case was the validity of a search warrant based upon
affidavits showing, on the face thereof, that the statements therein contained
were hearsay. This Court answered the question in the negative. Referring to the
need of a probable cause, as a condition essential to the issuance of a valid
search warrant, we declared:

“* * * It has likewise been held by this court that by probable
cause are meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of
the warrant, that are in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely
upon them and aet in pursuance thereof.” (64 Phil., 667, 674)

The words “facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the
warrant” had no relation whatsoever with, and were not meant to qualify, the
evidence admissible to prove the illegal procurement of a search warrant, in
violation of Article 129 of the Revised Penal Code, which was not in issue in
the case. Said expression merely referred to the norm that should guide a
Judge in determining whether or not the process should be ordered
issued. It is not concerned, either with the liability of the person
procuring the warrant, or with the competency of the evidence to
establish his guilt.

In this connection, it may not be amiss to stress, once more, the need of
adhering to the policy enunciated in the case of Prats & Co. vs.
Phoenix Insurance Co. (52 Phil., 807, 816-817) from which we quote:

“In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most
effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where trivial
objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor. The
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or
technical objections to the form of the questions should be avoided. In
a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance,
in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty
whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad
faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule
safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof
offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the
heat of the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may
possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair
and logical connection is in fact shown.’ When such a mistake is made and the
proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds
itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the
error without returning the case for a new trial— a step which the Court is
always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a
court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or
relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant,
because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty upon
final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material. from
the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is
prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the
material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.” (Italics
supplied.)

Inasmuch as the prosecution was entitled to introduce the evidence in
question and respondent Judge was, consequently, “under obligation by reason of
his office” to admit said evidence, “and in refusing to do so * * * he failed to
perform his judicial duty”—in the language used by this Court in the case of
People vs. Concepcion (supra)—it follows that said respondent Judge
should be, as he is hereby, ordered—in line with the rule laid down in said
case_ to allow petitioner herein to prove the motive of the accused in obtaining
the search warrant in question, even if the evidence therefor should refer to
acts posterior to the issuance of said process, and that the resolutions of the
lower court sustaining the objections to the questions above referred to,
propounded by petitioner herein, and directing that portions of the testimony of
Ty Kong Tek be stricken from the record, should be, as said orders are hereby,
reversed and set aside, with costs against respondents, Pedro de la Peña and
Osmundo Ramos.

It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Acting C. J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.