PHILIPPINE LABOR ALLIANCE COUNCIL (PLAC), PETITIONER, VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS-ORION CHAPTER, GERARDO ROSANA AND ORION MANILA, INC., RESPONDENTS.

It would be to frustrate the hopes that inspired the present
Labor Code^[1]
to minimize judicial participation in the solution of employer-employee
disputes if resort to the courts would remain unabated.  Nevertheless, in view of the certiorari
jurisdiction of this Tribunal,^[2] a
grave abuse of discretion may be alleged as a grievance thus calling for
remedial action.  So petitioner
Philippine Labor Alliance Council did hope to achieve in this certiorari
and prohibition proceeding against respondent Bureau of Labor Relations.^[3]
It would indict an order^[4]
for a certification election by respondent Bureau as tainted by a
jurisdictional infirmity in view of what it contended to be an existing duly
certified collective bargaining contract between it and private respondent
Orion Manila, Inc., the employer.  It
would thus ignore the withdrawal in the same order of such certification based
on a finding that there was a failure on the part of the majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit to ratify the collective contract, renewed
nine months before the termination of the previous agreement.  Apparently, the difficulty confronting it was
due to the disaffiliation of many of its members.  The order complained of recognized that there
was such a sentiment on the part of a sizable number of employees in the
collective bargaining unit, thus making patent the desirability of conducting a
certification election.  That was the
method to determine the exclusive bargaining representative followed even under
the previous labor legislation.^[5]
It would thus appear rather obvious that the attempt to impute arbitrariness to
respondent Bureau cannot be attended with success.  The petition must be dismissed.

It was a detailed narration of facts set forth in the petition,
starting with the allegation that there was a renewal of the collective
bargaining agreement with a union shop clause on March 9, 1974 between
petitioner union and respondent company to last for another period of three (3)
years incorporating therein new economic benefits to expire on December 31,
1977.^[6]
The claim was that at that time it was the only bargaining agent of the
respondent company unchallenged by any other labor organization.^[7]
Then came the assertion that on May 27, 1974, with due notice to all the
members of the petitioner union, and with more than 1,500 of them present, such
collective bargaining agreement was ratified by a unanimous vote.^[8]
It was then so certified by the former National Labor Relations Commission on June 4, 1974.^[9]
It was further alleged that at the time of such certification, there was no
pending request for union recognition by any other labor organization with
management.^[10]
Thereafter, on June 20, 1974,
respondent Federation of Free Workers, setting forth that its members represent
more than 60% out of 1,500 members, more or less, rank-and-file employees of
respondent company, sought a certification election.^[11]
Petitioner union, as could be expected, opposed such a move as in its view the
collective bargaining agreement entered into with the respondent company had
been certified.^[12]
It was sustained, the Secretary of Labor to whom an appeal was taken concurring
with the former National Labor Relations Commission affirming the dismissal of
such petition for certification, on the ground of the existence of a certified
collective bargaining agreement.^[13]
That did not end the dispute, as respondent Federation on January 15, 1975,
filed a complaint with the respondent Bureau of Labor Relations, the present
Labor Code having become effective, alleging that some employees, numbering 848
in all, in a resolution attached to the complaint disaffiliated from petitioner
union and affiliated with it, characterizing the certified agreement as having
been entered into allegedly to thwart such disaffiliation and seeking a
declaration of the nullity thereof.^[14]
After both petitioner union and respondent Federation of Free Workers had filed
their pleadings,^[15]
the Med-Arbiter, on March 20, 1975,
dismissed the complaint.^[16]
There was a motion for reconsideration, then an opposition.^[17]
On April 8, 1975, respondent Bureau of Labor Relations issued an order setting
aside the certification of the collective bargaining agreement and ordering a
certification election within 20 days from receipt of the order, upon the following
declaration:  “In the instant case,
it is not disputed that the collective bargaining agreement certified by the
National Labor Relations Commission was not ratified by the majority of the
employees within the bargaining unit. 
This is defective.  It is blatant
non-observance of the basic requirement necessary to certification.  * * * With respect to the complaint of the
confirmation of disaffiliation of the members of respondent Philippine Labor
Alliance Council, the same should be resolved in the most expedient and simple
method of determining the exclusive bargaining representative-the holding of a
certification election.”^[18]
There was a motion for reconsideration as well as a verified urgent petition
filed with the Secretary of Labor by respondent Company, but the order was
affirmed on July 31, 1975,
the motion to reconsider being denied.^[19]

From the very petition with its annexes, it is undisputed that
there was a finding in the challenged order by respondent Bureau of Labor
Relations of the non-ratification by the majority of the employees of the
certified collective bargaining agreement, thus calling for its
decertification.  It is also noteworthy
that in the comment of respondent labor union, considered as its answer, the
allegation that there was such a ratification was specifically denied.  It cannot be taken as having been
proven.  There is nothing in the
exhaustive memorandum of petitioner either that would justify the imputation
that respondent Bureau, in ordering decertification of the collective
bargaining agreement with petitioner to be followed by a certification
election, committed a transgression of the present Labor Code, much less one of
such grievous character as to taint its actuation with a jurisdictional
infirmity.  It is quite apparent
therefore that with due recognition of the ability and scholarship evident in
the pleadings of Attorney Fortunato Gupit, Jr. for the petitioner, the attempt to invoke our certiorari
jurisdiction cannot succeed.^[20]
So it was noted at the outset.

1.  It is indisputable that
the present controversy would not have arisen if there were no mass disaffiliation
from petitioning union.  Such a
phenomenon is nothing new in the Philippine labor movement.^[21]
Nor is it open to any legal objection. 
It is implicit in the freedom of association explicitly ordained by the
Constitution.^[22]
There is then the incontrovertible right of any individual to join an
organization of his choice.  That option
belongs to him.  A workingman is not to
be denied that liberty.^[23]
He may be, as a matter of fact, more in need of it if the institution of
collective bargaining as an aspect of industrial democracy is to succeed.  No obstacle that may possibly thwart the
desirable objective of militancy in labor’s struggle for better terms and conditions
is then to be placed on his way.  Once
the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, as in this case,
a certification election is the most expeditious way of determining which labor
organization is to be the exclusive bargaining representative.  It is as simple as that.  There is relevance to this excerpt from a
recent decision, Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v.  Bureau of Labor Relations:^[24]
“Petitioner thus appears to be woefully lacking in awareness of the
significance of a certification election for the collective bargaining
process.  It is the fairest and most
effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the
working force.  It is a fundamental
postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in an honest
election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is
controlling.  No better device can assure
the institution of industrial democracy with the two parties to a business enterprise,
management and labor, establishing a regime of self-rule.  As was pointed out by Chief Justice Castro in
Rivera v. San Miguel Brewery Corporation, Inc., ‘a collective bargaining
agreement is the law of the plant.’ To the same effect is this explicit
pronouncement in Mactan Workers Union v. Aboitiz:  ‘The terms
and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between
the parties.’ What could be aptly stressed then, as was done in Compania Maritima v. Compania Maritima Labor Union, is
‘the primacy to which the decision reached by the employees themselves is
entitled.’ Further, it was therein stated: 
‘That is in the soundest tradition of industrial democracy.  For collective bargaining implies that
instead of a unilateral imposition by management, the terms and conditions of
employment should be the subject of negotiation between it and labor.  Thus the two parties indispensable to the
economy are supposed to take care of their respective interests.  Moreover, the very notion of industrial
self-rule negates the assumption that what is good for either party should be
left to the will of the other.  On the
contrary, there is an awareness that labor can be trusted to promote its
welfare through the bargaining process. 
To it then must be left the choice of its agent for such purpose.’ To
paraphrase an observation of the recently-retired Chief Justice Makalintal in Seno v. Mendoza,
it is essential that there be an agreement to govern the relations between
labor marked by confusion, with resulting breaches of the law by either
party.  There is, it would appear, a
decidedly unsympathetic approach to the institution of collective bargaining at
war with what has so often and so consistently decided by this Tribunal.”^[25]

2.  A different conclusion
could have been reached had there been no decertification.  The contract-bar rule could then be invoked
by petitioner.  It is, as pointed out by
Justice Fernandez in Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions v. National Labor
Relations Commission,^[26]
“a principle in labor law that a collective bargaining agreement of
reasonable duration is, in the interest of the stability of industrial
relations, a bar to certification elections.”^[27]
Even then, as was pointed out in the just-cited Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions decision, it “is not to be applied with rigidity. * * * The
element of flexibility in its operation cannot be ignored.”^[28]
In this controversy, however, such a principle is not applicable.  The collective bargaining agreement entered
into by petitioner with management on March
9, 1974 was decertified in the challenged order of April 8, 1975.^[29]
The power to decertify by respondent Bureau is not disputed.  It was the exercise thereof that is now
assailed.  If done arbitrarily, there is
valid ground for complaint.  The due
process clause is a guarantee against any actuation of that sort.  It stands for fairness and justice.  That standard was not ignored.  It suffices to read the petition to disprove
any allegation of such failing, whether in its procedural or substantive
aspect.  Petitioner was heard by
respondent Bureau before the order of decertification was issued on April 8, 1975.  The denial of its motion for reconsideration
came also after it had an opportunity to present its side.  Procedural due process was thus observed.  Nor was there any denial of substantive due
process in the sense of such decertification being an act of arbitrariness and
caprice.

In the order of April 8,
1975, it was specifically pointed out:  “In the instant case, it is not disputed
that the collective bargaining agreement certified by the National Labor
Relations Commission was not ratified by the majority of the employees within
the bargaining unit.  This is
defective.  It is blatant non-observance
of the basic requirement necessary to certification.  To allow it to remain uncorrected would allow
circumvention of what the law specifically ordained.  We cannot countenance irregularities of the
highest order to exist in our very own eyes to be perpetuated.  With respect to the complaint of the
confirmation of disaffiliation of the members of respondent Philippine Labor
Alliance Council, the same should be resolved in the most expedient and simple
method of determining the exclusive bargaining representative – the holding of
a certification election.”^[30]
In the order denying the motion for reconsideration dated July 31, 1975, it was first noted:  “On January 20, 1975, FFW and 848 Orion employees filed with
the Bureau a petition for the annulment of the 1974 collective bargaining
agreement and for the confirmation of the disaffiliation of the 848 employees
from PLAC and their affiliation with FFW. 
The petition alleged, among others, that the new agreement was concluded
about ten months before the expiry date of the old purposely to defeat the
rights of the covered employees to choose their bargaining representative at
the proper time appointed by law.  It
appears, indeed, that there was no urgency for the premature renegotiations
considering that the new agreement provides for a 50-centavo salary increase
effective yet on January 1, 1976.”^[31]
Then, there was further clarification of the decision reached as to the holding
of a certification election being the appropriate mode of solving the
dispute:  “With the decertification
of the collective agreement, the representation issue comes back to the
fore.  Petitioner wants this resolved by
ruling on the affiliation and disaffiliation of the union.  The Bureau holds, however, that certification
election can better resolve the issue. 
Parenthetically, it should be stated that a certification election can
still be held even if the collective agreement were certified, considering the
peculiar facts of the case.  Good policy
and equity demand that when an agreement is renegotiated before the appointed
60-day period, its certification must still give way to any representation
issue that may be raised within 60-day period so that the right of employees to
choose a bargaining unit agent and the right of unions to be chosen shall be
preserved.”^[32]

3.  There is, finally,
another insuperable obstacle to the success of this petition.  There is no need for a citation of
authorities to show how well-settled and firmly-rooted is the doctrine of the
well-nigh conclusive respect for the findings of facts of administrative
tribunals, leaving to the judiciary, in the ultimate analysis, this Tribunal,
to set forth the correct legal norm applicable to the controversy.  With specific reference to the agencies at
present dealing with labor relations, there is this excerpt from Justice Aquino’s opinion in Antipolo
Highway Lines, Inc. v. Inciong:^[33]
“A dispassionate scrutiny of the proceedings in the NLRC does not sustain
petitioners’ view that they were denied due process and that the NLRC committed
a grave abuse of discretion.  (See Maglasang v. Ople, L-38813, April
29, 1975 per Justice Fernando).  We found
no justification for setting aside the factual findings of the NLRC, which like
those of any other administrative agency, are generally binding on the courts (Timbancaya v. Vicente, 62 O.G. 9424, 9 SCRA 852).”^[34]

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and
prohibition is dismissed.  The
restraining order issued by this Court in its resolution of September 8, 1975 is hereby
lifted.  No costs.

Antonio, Aquino, and Concepcion, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., concurs, with the observation that nothing herein modifies the general
rule that while a bargaining which may be changed, the effectivity
and enforceability of a valid collective bargaining contract cannot be affected
thereby.

^[1]
Presidential Decree No. 442 (1974).

^[2]
Cf. San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, L-39195, May 16, 1975, 64 SCRA 56.

^[3]
The private respondents are Federation of Free Workers-Orion Chapter, Gerardo Rosana and Orion Manila, Inc.

^[4]
Petition, Annex S.

^[5] Cf.
Republic Act No. 875 (1953).

^[6]
Petition, par. 2.

^[7] Ibid,
par. 3.

^[8] Ibid,
par. 4.

^[9] Ibid,
par. 5.

^[10] Ibid,
par. 6.

^[11] Ibid,
par. 7.

^[12] Ibid,
par. 8.

^[13] Ibid,
par. 9-12.

^[14] Ibid,
par. 13.

^[15] Ibid,
pars. 14-18.

^[16] Ibid,
par. 19.

^[17] Ibid,
pars. 20-21.

^[18] Ibid,
par. 22.

^[19] Ibid,
pars. 23-27.

^[20]
For that matter, the pleadings filed by Attorney F. F. Bonifacio,
Jr. for respondent labor union and those submitted by Assistant
Solicitor-General Reynato S. Puno,
assisted by Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz are equally illuminating.

^[21]
Cf. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., Inc. v. Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions, L-18782, Aug. 29, 1963, 8 SCRA 700; Itogon­-Suyoc Mines Inc. v. Baldo,
L-17739, Dec. 24, 1964, 12 SCRA 599; Citizens Labor Union–CCLU v. Court
of Industrial Relations, L-24320, Nov. 12, 1966, 18 SCRA 624; Lakas ng Manggagawang
Maka­bayan v. Court of Industrial Relations,
L-32178, Dec. 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 600; Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions (PAFLU) v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-33781, Oct. 31, 1972,
47 SCRA 390; Fede­ration of Free Workers v. Paredes,
L-36466, Nov. 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 75; Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v.
Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., L-33987, Sept. 4, 1975, 66 SCRA 512.

^[22]
According to Article IV, Section 7 of the Constitution:  “The right to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.” The
very same language was used in Article III, Section 1, par. 6 of the 1935
Constitution.

^[23]
Cf. Freeman Shirt Manufacturing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
110 Phil. 962 (1961); Elegance Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
L-24096, April 20, 1971, 38 SCRA 382; Caltex Filipino
Managers and Supervisors Association v. Court of Industrial Relations,
L-36023, April 11, 1972, 44 SCRA 350; Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Unions, L-25246, Sept. 12,
1974, 59 SCRA 54; Basa v. Federacion
Obrera, L-27113, Nov. 19, 1974, 51 SCRA 93;
United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries v.
Noriel, L-40810, Oct. 3, 1975, 67 SCRA 267;
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor
Relations, L-42115, Jan. 27 1976, 69 SCRA 132; U.E. Automotive Employees and
Workers Union v. Noriel, L-44350, Nov. 25,
1976.

^[24]
L-42115, January 27, 1976,
69 SCRA 132.

^[25] Ibid,
139-140.  The Rivera decision, L-26197,
July 20, 1968, is reported in 24 SCRA 86, at 91; Mactan
Workers Union, L-30241, June 30, 1972, in 45 SCRA 577, at 581; Compania Maritima v. Compania Maritima Labor Union,
L-29504, Feb. 29, 1972, in 43 SCRA 464; Seno v. Mendoza, L–20565, Nov.
29, 1967, in 21 SCRA 1124.

^[26]
L-38955-56, October 31, 1974,
60 SCRA 450.

^[27] Ibid,
457.

^[28]
69 SCRA 132, 138.

^[29]
Annex S of Petition.

^[30] Ibid,
3.

^[31]
Annex X of Petition, 2.

^[32] Ibid,
3.

^[33]
L-38532, June 27, 1975, 64
SCRA 441.

^[34] Ibid,
447.  Cf. Confederation of Citizens Labor
Unions (CCLU) v. National Labor Relations Commission, L-38955-56, Oct.
31, 1974, 60 SCRA 450; Firestone Filipinas Employees Association v. Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines, L-37952, Dec. 10, 1974, 61 SCRA
339; Fire­stone Pilipinas Employees Association v.
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines, L-37952, Feb. 25,
1975, 62 SCRA 529; San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor,
L-39195, May 16, 1975, 64 SCRA 56; Jacqueline Industries v. National
Labor Relations Commission, L-37034, Aug. 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 397.