PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, MARINCHO CASTILLO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, CARLOS CASTILLO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Castillo versus People

The Case

This is a criminal case in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Carlos Castillo and his son Marincho Castillo for murder before the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro. The question that matters on appeal is narrow but doctrinally rich: when does a shout become a conspiracy? The Court acquits the father because his words, uttered only after his son had already struck the fatal blow, could not have been the determining cause of the crime. For a reviewee, the case is the cleanest illustration of the rule on inducement as a mode of participation, and of the strict proof required before words alone can make a man a co-principal.

Procedural History

An Information for murder was filed against Carlos Castillo and Marincho Castillo in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro. Both entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, the court found them guilty as charged and sentenced them accordingly. Only Carlos Castillo appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeal therefore reaches the Court as an ordinary appeal from a judgment of conviction in a criminal case, and the entire judgment against him is opened for review.

Facts

Sometime in October 1959, Marincho Castillo was slapped in the face by Juan Vargas. The altercation arose because a cow belonging to Marincho had gone astray and destroyed some plants of Vargas. Unable to retaliate at that time, Marincho merely uttered these words: "You, Manong Joan, will have your own day."

About half past five in the afternoon of December 28, 1959, in the barrio of Hallbago, municipality of Pola, Oriental Mindoro, the appellant Carlos Castillo, holding a gun in his right hand, was talking face to face with Juan Vargas. Marincho came from behind and hacked the latter on the head. As Marincho was about to strike the victim a second time, the appellant said: "You kill him."

In the evening of the same day, Marincho, accompanied by the appellant, surrendered himself to the authorities. A post-mortem examination conducted by the municipal health officer of Pola revealed that the victim died instantaneously as a result of severe hemorrhage due to multiple wounds. The prosecution also sought to prove conspiracy through the witness Jose Ilagan, who claimed that on the afternoon in question he saw both men walking very fast toward the poblacion, the appellant with a revolver in his hand and his son carrying a bolo. The Court gave very little credibility to this testimony, because the incident between Vargas and Marincho had taken place in October 1959 while the fatal incident took place on December 28 of the same year, and because the fatal incident took place hardly twenty meters away from the appellant's house, a circumstance suggesting that it was Vargas who had gone or passed by the street near the appellant's house.

Issues

• Whether or not the appellant Carlos Castillo is guilty of murder by inducement simply because, after his son had already fatally boloed Vargas and was about to strike him a second time, he shouted "You kill him."
• Whether or not the alleged inducement was of such a nature and was made in such a way as to become the determining cause of the crime, and was uttered with the intention of producing the result.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a statutory text; it applies the settled doctrine on inducement as a mode of participation in a felony, as laid down in prior jurisprudence. The governing principle, as stated in the decision, is this:

In determining whether the utterances of an accused are sufficient to make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must appear that the inducement was of such nature and was made in such a way as to become the determining cause of the crime and that such inducement was uttered with the intention of producing the result.

This test bears directly on the case because the appellant's shout came after the fatal blow had already been struck, so the words could not have caused the killing.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appellant cannot be found guilty of murder by inducement merely because he shouted "You kill him" after his son had already fatally boloed Vargas and was about to strike a second time. The Court found the case very similar, if not on all fours, with People versus Caimbre, where practically the same words were uttered by one of the defendants but only after the actual assailant had already boloed his victim several times.

On the second issue, the Court applied the test it had laid down in Caimbre, itself a reiteration of rulings in People versus Alvarez, People versus Canare, People versus Omini, and United States versus Indanan. The appellant was armed with a revolver while talking with Vargas, but the firearm was not pointed at the latter. He uttered the words "You kill him" only after his son had already fatally boloed Vargas on the head. The Court concluded:

It appears, therefore, that the alleged inducement to commit the crime was no longer necessary to induce the assailant to commit the crime.

Upon that principle, the Court held that the appellant's guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Doctrine

To convict an accused as a co-principal by inducement, two elements must concur: the inducement must be of such nature and made in such a way as to become the determining cause of the crime, and it must have been uttered with the intention of producing the result. Words spoken after the assailant has already inflicted the fatal act cannot be the determining cause of the crime, because by then the inducement was no longer necessary. Mere presence at the scene, even while armed, does not by itself establish conspiracy where the firearm was not pointed at the victim and no prior agreement is shown. The doctrine ties directly to the quoted test: the causal and intentional character of the inducement is the heart of co-principalship by inducement.

Disposition

The appealed judgment was reversed and the appellant Carlos Castillo was acquitted, with one-half of the costs de oficio.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the inducement must be the determining cause of the crime, uttered with intent to produce the result; words after the fatal blow cannot induce what has already been done. Examiners use this case to test conspiracy by inducement, the distinction between co-principal by inducement and mere presence, and the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.