RUSTAN SUPERVISORY UNION, MAHADI LIMBAO, LOLITO PEPITO, ARTURO SOLIS, WINSTON BALABAT AND ISIDRO BALCITA, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. MOISES DALISAY, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT…

An original action for certiorari
and prohibition challenging the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte to issue the injunction orders complained
of.

Petitioner union is a legitimate labor organization and
individual petitioners are the union’s principal officers.  On September
23, 1970, the union wrote respondent company that a great number of
the supervisory personnel of respondent’s plant had affiliated with it and
presented a set of proposals for incorporation into a collective bargaining
agreement.  On October 25, 1970, after its ultimatum letter of
October 12, 1970 for union
recognition had been unheeded by respondent, the union declared a strike and
picketed the company premises.  Several
conferences were thereafter held at the Iligan City
Labor Office between the parties’ representatives to no avail.  Petitioner alleges that the company refused
to negotiate with it while respondent claims in its answer that “it is
petitioners who refused to negotiate in good faith.”^[1]

On November 13, 1970, respondent company as plaintiff filed with
respondent court a complaint for actual, moral and exemplary damages with
preliminary injunction against the union and its principal officers as
defendants (petitioners herein) alleging inter alia
that “defendant union, its officers, members and the defendants
herein have stationed themselves in front of the gates of plaintiff’s plant in
such a coercive, violent and intimidating manner as to prevent, as they have in
fact, prevented, the incoming and outgoing of plaintiff’s trucks and heavy
equipment as well as the delivery of some 120 tons of abaca and trim waste
paper at petitioner’s plant.  On the same
date, respondent court issued ex parte and
without hearing any witness in open court, upon a P5,000.00-bond, its order and
writ of November 13, 1970, enjoining “defendants singly and collectively
from stationing themselves in front of the gates of plaintiff’s plant and
preventing the incoming and outgoing of plaintiff’s truck and heavy equipment,
and from preventing plaintiff from delivering to its plant in Baloi, Lanao del Norte, the goods
or materials mentioned above, and such other goods and raw materials as may be
necessary for plaintiff’s business which may be delivered to plaintiff from
time to time from the wharf at Iligan City to its
plant in Baloi, Lanao del
Norte, until further orders from this Court.”

On November 16, 1970, petitioners filed with respondent court an
urgent motion to dissolve or lift the writ of preliminary injunction, informing
respondent court that they were engaged in an industrial dispute with
respondent company, which was guilty of unfair labor practice in refusing to
negotiate with them as the duly selected bargaining unit, by virtue of which
they had struck and picketed the company’s premises since October 25, 1970, and
therefore impugning respondent court’s jurisdiction to issue the injunction
which in effect enjoined their concerted strike and picketing activities.  Petitioners further assailed the validity of
the ex-parte injunction issued without their having
been given the benefit of due notice and hearing as required by section 9 of
the Industrial Peace Act (Rep. Act 875).^[2]

Respondent court, in its order of November 20, 1970, however,
denied dissolution of the injunction, ruling that “(T)he defendant movant maintained that there is an alleged labor dispute
existing between the defendant labor union and the plaintiff corporation but
the lawyer of the movant admitted that he has not
filed a case in the Court of Industrial Relations and neither has he filed a
notice of strike in the Department of Labor regarding the matter.”
Respondent court further ruled out the industrial court’s jurisdiction
notwithstanding the existence of picketing in the premises, stating that
“(I)f this is so, then a mere allegation on the existence of a labor dispute
is enough to base jurisdiction on the Court of Industrial Relations.  This view is not shared by this Court for the
reason that jurisdiction of the Court can not be made to depend upon the pleas
or defenses by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss.  If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction
will depend entirely upon the defendant.”

Hence, this petition filed by the union.  Respondent company filed its answer, seeking
to sustain the jurisdiction of respondent court, on the principal grounds that
its action was an ordinary complaint for damages with preliminary injunction
and that petitioner union was “never engaged in legitimate labor
activities.” Upon the filing of a P200.00-bond by petitioners, the Court
issued its writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the
order and writ of preliminary injunction of November 13, 1970 issued by respondent court.

The Court finds merit in the petition.

1.  On the very face of the
complaint, for all its artful wording and meticulous avoidance of any reference
to petitioner union’s strike and picketing activities, and carrying of union
placards in front of the company’s premises, it is quite clear, particularly
from the fact that the union and its principal officers were impleaded as principal defendants, that there existed a
labor dispute between the parties, which pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of Industrial Relations rather than to respondent court.  This is the teaching of Phil. Communications
Workers Federation vs. Nolasco,^[3]
where the complaint in the regular court of first instance alleged that the
striking union’s pickets “prevented non-striking employees from entering
the compound and performing their work therein” – whereas here, respondent
company, evading any reference to the union’s pickets, alleged in its complaint
below that “defendant union, its officers, members and defendants named
herein have stationed themselves in front of the gates of
plaintiff’s plant” to prevent the entry and egress of the company’s trucks
and heavy equipment and the delivery of goods and raw materials to its
premises.

2.  Respondent court should
have placed itself on guard, therefore, in the face of the complaint’s
allegations strongly indicating the existence of a labor dispute beyond its
jurisdiction, more so, when it was informed in petitioner’s urgent motion for
dissolution of injunction that the union was on strike because of the company’s
alleged refusal to bargain collectively which constitutes unfair labor practice
under section 4 (a) (6) of the Industrial Peace Act – and was made known to it
precisely to deter its hand from maintaining its injunction.  For while in regular civil actions, the
question of jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint, the
rule differs in labor disputes in that the Court has set the criterion that
“whether the acts complained of in the petition for injunction arose out
of, or are connected or interwoven with, the unfair labor practice case
[presents] a question of fact that should be brought to the attention of the
court a quo to enable it to pass upon the issue whether it has
jurisdiction or not over the case,”^[4]
and “the court is duty bound to find out if there really is a labor
dispute by reception of evidence.”^[5]
And such ex-parte injunctions, even if proper,
should be automatically vacated after five days under section 9 (d) of Republic
Act 875, and the hearing for determination of the existence of a labor dispute
that divests the lower court of jurisdiction, as emphasized by Mr. Justice
Reyes in his concurring opinion in the very case of ALU vs. Ramolete5 cited
by respondent court, should not be deferred beyond the statutory five-day
period thereby “maintaining an injunction beyond the maximum period
authorized by law even if the court had jurisdiction to issue it x x x (and) nullifying a statutory
provision expressly designed to protect labor.”

3.  The Court stressed the
exclusive jurisdiction of the industrial court as against the regular courts
over unfair labor practices in Veterans Security Free Workers Union vs. Cloribel^[6]
thus:  “(I)t has long been accepted
as dogma that cases involving unfair labor practice fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, by virtue of the explicit
provisions of Section 5(a) of the Industrial Peace Act that said Court ‘shall
have jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor practices and is
empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice.  This power shall be exclusive
and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that
has been or may be established by an agreement, code, law or otherwise.’ The
strike and picketing restrained by the questioned orders of respondent judge
arose out of unfair labor practices of respondent company in allegedly refusing
to bargain in good faith and dismissing for union activities the union
officials and members, which are the very subject-matter of the unfair labor
charge filed by the union in the Industrial Court.  These were facts expressly alleged by
petitioner in its Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, asking respondent judge to
set aside the questioned orders and raising respondent Court’s lack of
jurisdiction.  The very complaint of
respondent in the case below, for all its artful wording, was sufficient on its
face to apprise respondent Court that the matter presented before it involved
an unfair labor practice case falling within the Industrial
Court’s exclusive competence and
jurisdiction.  x x
x.”

4.  Respondent court’s stated
reasons for denying dissolution of the injunction, to wit, that petitioner
union had not filed a case in the industrial court nor a strike notice with the
Labor Department constituted grave error. 
As emphasized by the Court in the Veterans Security Free Workers Union
case, supra, “It is settled doctrine that labor disputes arising
out of unfair labor practices committed by any of the parties do not present a
question of concurrent jurisdiction between the Court of First Instance and the
Industrial Court, but that jurisdiction over such matters is vested exclusively
in the Court of Industrial Relations.  As
succinctly restated by Mr. Justice Sanchez in Phil. Communications Workers vs. Nolasco, supra, ‘CIR’s
jurisdiction stays even if no unfair labor practice case has been filed with
CIR.  It is enough that unfair
labor practice is involved.'” As to the lack of strike notice, it is
equally settled doctrine that in strikes arising out of and against a company’s
unfair labor practice, a strike notice is not necessary in view of the strike
being founded on urgent necessity and directed against practices condemned by
public policy, such notice being legally required only in cases of economic
strikes.

5.  Even assuming for the
nonce respondent court’s jurisdiction over the case below, however, respondent
court failed to heed the controlling statute as embodied in section 9 of the
Industrial Peace Act.  The issuance of
injunctions in connection with labor disputes is governed by the statutory
restrictions therein provided and not by the Rules of Court.^[7]
And injunctions in labor disputes are not favored and may issue only after a
strict and rigorous compliance with the statutory requisites.^[8]
It will be readily seen that the injunction order and writ of respondent court
must be overturned for the same failure to comply with the statutory restrictions
as in the Philippine Communications Workers case, viz:  “For one, there is the absence of a
showing that the court heard the testimony of witnesses required in Section
9(d) to support the allegations of the complaint and testimony in opposition thereto.  Then, the court did not make any ‘finding of
fact’ as to the existence or non-existence of the facts required to be shown
under the afore-quoted Section 9(d) and also under Section 9(f) of the
Industrial Peace Act.  Nor was notice
given ‘to the chief of those public officials of the x x
x city x x x charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property,’
also a prerequisite in said Section 9(d) heretofore mentioned.  And finally, the record is barren as to
whether or not complainant exerted ‘every reasonable effort to settle such
dispute by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery
of mediation or by voluntary arbitration,’ another condition exacted by law –
this time Section 9(e) of the Industrial Peace Act – before a restraining order
or injunction may be granted.  Failure to
comply with even one of these requirements will suffice to deny the issuance of
the writ.”^[9]

6.  It has likewise long been
settled that where the acts complained of by the company are directly interwoven
with the unfair labor practice charged against it by the union, “the main
case does not come under the jurisdiction of the [regular] trial court, even if
it involves violence, intimidation and coercion as averred in the
complaint,” as in the case below, for the industrial court’s jurisdiction
is exclusive.^[10]
If the purpose of the action is to obtain some injunctive relief against
certain acts of the union members, the same can be obtained from the Industrial
court which is given ample powers to act thereon.^[11]

7.  The labor dispute between
the parties must therefore be settled and any injunctive relief must be sought
at the industrial court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and to which the case must properly be brought at the instance of
either party.  This jurisdictional
question has long received the Court’s attention and Mr. Justice Castro,
speaking for the Court in Regal Mfg. Employees Ass’n.
vs. Reyes^[12]
indicated that actions for damages brought by the company against the union as
a result of the union’s concerted activities must await the prior resolution of
the industrial court which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the labor
dispute.  The proper course for regular
courts to observe in such cases was thus stated:  “(U)nder the
environmental circumstances obtaining, the respondent court should have
dismissed the original petition for injunction outright, or, later, dismissed
the amended petition for injunction, without prejudice, or, in the very least,
suspended action thereon in so far as the question of damages is concerned,
until the CIR shall have finally decided the two labor disputes pending before
it.” The fact that in the case at bar, the labor dispute has not yet
reached the industrial court at the instance of either party does not affect
the cited ruling.  The company may well
take the initiative, as already indicated, of seeking injunctive relief as well
as the damages claimed by it in the industrial court – as it must, if it has
basis for its allegations of violence, intimidation and coercion on the union’s
part.

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the
preliminary injunction heretofore issued by the Court is hereby made
permanent.  Respondent court is hereby directed
to dismiss the case for damages with preliminary injunction before it, Civil
Case No. 1637, without prejudice.  With
costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Answer, par. 9.

^[2]
Petition, Annex H.

^[3]
24 SCRA 321 (July 29, 1968).

^[4]
United Pepsi-Cola Sales Org. vs. Cañizares,
102 Phil. 887, cited in Phil. Comm. Workers vs. Nolasco,
supra, fn. 3.

^[5]
ALU vs. Ramolete, 13 SCRA 582 (Mar. 31, 1965).

^[6]
31 SCRA 297 (Jan. 30, 1970); see also LMM vs. Abiera,
36 SCRA 437 (Dec. 19, 1970) and Espanilla vs.
La Carlota Sugar Central, L-23722, Mar.
31, 1971.

^[7] Paflu vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854; Cueto
vs. Ortiz, 108 Phil. 538 (May
31, 1960).

^[8]
Security Bank Employees Union vs. Security Bank
& Trust Co., 23 SCRA 503 (April
30, 1968).

^[9]
24 SCRA 321, at pp. 330-331; see also Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa
Peter Paul vs. Victoriano, 102 Phil. 1181,
(Jan. 14, 1958); Cruz vs. Cinema, etc., Free Workers, 101 Phil. 1259,
(July 31, 1957); and Paflu vs. Barot, 99 Phil. 1008 (1956).

^[10]
National Garment & Textile Workers Union vs. Caluag,
reaffirmed in Regal Mfg. Employees Assn. vs. Reyes, 24 SCRA 352 (July
29, 1968).

^[11] Lakas ng Pagkakaisa
sa Peter Paul vs. Victoriano,
supra, fn. 9.

^[12] Supra,
fn. 10.