THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALEJANDRO CALMA ALIAS “EAGLE,” DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court, of First Instance of Rizal
finding defendant-appellant Alejandro Calma, alias “Eagle,” guilty of the crime
of homicide, and sentencing him to a prison term of from 17 years, 4 months and
1 day to 20 years, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P3,000, and to
pay the costs. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter has
remanded it to Us on the ground that only questions of law are involved in the
appeal.

The record discloses that defendant-appellant was charged with the crime of
murder in an information which reads as follows:

“That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1952, in the municipality of Caloocan,
province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and known
premeditation, in the dwelling of Mariano Inocencio, who is 56 years old and the
father-in-law of the accused, armed with a .45-cal. pistol, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot Mariano Inocencio on the different
parts of his body, thus inflicting upon the latter three (3) gunshot wounds, and
as a result thereof, Mariano Inocencio died instantly.

“All contrary to Law, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and known
premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of insult or disregard of
the respect due the offended party because of his age and that the crime was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the alternative circumstance
of relationship, the offended party being the father-in-law of the
accused.”

When the defendant was read the information on arraignment, he entered a plea
of not guilty. When his case was called for hearing, after several
postponements, the following proceedings took place in the trial courts:

“ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:

If Your Honor please, after conferring with the accused in this case I found
out that he had already entered a plea of not guilty. But after we have
discussed with the Fiscal the circumstances and the facts on record, I suggested
that because it is not clear that the accused had premeditated the killing of
the victim, I suggested that the information be amended to homicide in which
case my client will be willing to change his plea from not guilty to guilty.

“COURT:

What do you say Fiscal?

“FISCAL:

I move, If Your Honor please, that the information in Crim. Case No. 3651 be
amended from murder to homicide.

“COURT:

Motion granted.

“ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:

In view of the amendment to homicide of the information, the accused would
beg this Honorable Court for permission to allow him to withdraw his former plea
of not guilty and permit him to plead guilty.

“COURT:

Permission granted.

“COURT TO ACCUSED:

Your lawyer informed the Court that you are asking that you be allowed to
withdraw your former plea of not guilty and change it with that of guilty. What
do you say about that?

“ACCUSED:

Yes, Your Honor,

“COURT:

In view of the plea of guilty of the accused…

“ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:

Yes, Your Honor.

“COURT:

Decision, x x x.”

In view of the plea of guilty entered by the accused, the court thereupon
rendered the judgment appealed from. Against this judgment the defendant has
prosecuted this appeal claiming that there was no valid amended information and
arraignment and a plea thereto of guilty entered by the accused and that the
lower court erred in imposing the maximum penalty for homicide and in not
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The Solicitor General joins the counsel
for the appellant in the request that the proceedings be declared annulled and
the case remanded to the court below for the amendment of the information,
arraignment thereon, etc.

The record does not show that an amended information was filed by the fiscal
or that amendments were inserted in the body of the original information rend to
the accused. It is clear, however, from the amendment of the crime charged from
that of murder to that of homicide, as announced by the fiscal. and approved by
the court,, that the two qualifying circumstances of murder expressly alleged in
the information, namely, treachery and evident premeditation, were meant to be
suppressed from the information. The most proper course for the fiscal and the
court to follow was to have the information then and there amended by the fiscal
by making the suppressions or changes on tne original information read to the
accused, or an amended information filed, and then to have said amended
information read to the accused for his plea thereon. But the irregularity
comitted in the case at bar seems to be a technical one, which should not be
permitted to prejudice the accused and upon which the Rules frown. The prejudice
to the accused of remanding the case for the filing of an amended information
and his arraignment thereon would arise from the further delay of the
proceedings in violation of the right of an accused to a speedy disposition of
his case. In any case, there seems to be no question that the understanding
between the prosecution and defense and court at the time of the trial was that
the allegations of treachery and evident premeditation were to be considered
eliminated so that the defendant-appellant would be charged with homicide and
that he was pleading guilty thereto. This understanding is not questioned and
was taken as correct by the defendant-appellant until the judgment was rendered,
when he was sentenced to a term which the amended information could not have
justified.

We find that the accused by his plea of guilty has admitted the commission of
the crime of homicide attended by the aggravating circumstances of insult or in
disregnrd of the respect due the offended party on account of his age and of
dwelling. At the same time we should consider his plea of guilty as a mitigating
circumstance, which should compensate one of the above aggravating
circumstances. The defendant-appellant should therefore be sentenced for
homicide with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance. The judgment
appealed from is hereby modified, and the defendant-appellant hereby sentenced
to a penalty which shall not be less than 8 years and one day of prision
mayor and not more than 17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the sum of P3,000,
and to pay the costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion,
and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.