PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND JESUS V. SAMSON, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of the Court of Appeals^[1]
dated April 18, 1977, affirming with modification the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Albay in Civil Case No. 1279,
entitled “Jesus V. Samson, plaintiff, vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
defendant,” for damages.

The dispositive portion of the trial
court’s decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering
the defendant to pay the plaintiff, the following sums:  P198,000.00 as unearned income or damages;
P50,000.00 for moral damages; P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 as
expenses of litigation, or a total of P273,000.00.  Costs against the defendant.”

The appellate court modified the above decision, to wit:

“However, plaintiff-appellee, who
has been deprived of his job since 1954, is entitled to the legal rate of
interest on the P198,000.00 unearned income from the filing of the complaint
(Sec. 8, Rule 51, Rules of Court).

WHEREFORE, with the modification indicated above, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant.”

The complaint filed on July 1, 1954 by plaintiff Jesus V. Samson,
private respondent herein, averred that on January 8, 1951, he flew as co-pilot
on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi with stops
at Daet, Camarines Norte
and Pili, Camarines Sur, with Captain Delfin Bustamante as commanding pilot of a C-47 plane belonging to
defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc., now the herein petitioner; that on
attempting to land the plane at Daet airport, Captain
Delfin Bustamante due to
his very slow reaction and poor judgment overshot the airfield and as a result,
notwithstanding the diligent efforts of the plaintiff co-pilot to avert an
accident, the airplane crash-landed beyond the runway; that the jolt caused the
head of the plaintiff to hit and break through the thick front windshield of
the airplane causing him severe brain concussion, wounds and abrasions on the
forehead with intense pain and suffering (par. 6, complaint).

The complaint further alleged that instead of giving plaintiff
expert and proper medical treatment called for by the nature and severity of
his injuries, defendant simply referred him to a company physician, a general
medical practitioner, who limited the treatment to the exterior injuries
without examining the severe brain concussion of plaintiff (par. 7, complaint);
that several days after the accident, defendant Philippine Air Lines called
back the plaintiff to active duty as co-pilot, and inspite
of the latter’s repeated request for expert
medical assistance, defendant had not given him any (par. 8, complaint); that
as a consequence of the brain injury sustained by plaintiff from the crash, he
had been having periodic dizzy spells and had been suffering from general
debility and nervousness (par. 9, complaint); that defendant airline company
instead of submitting the plaintiff to expert medical treatment, discharged the
latter from its employ on December 21, 1953 on grounds of physical disability,
thereby causing plaintiff not only to lose his job but to become physically
unfit to continue as aviator due to defendant’s negligence in not giving him
the proper medical attention (pars. 10-11, complaint).  Plaintiff prayed for damages in the amount of
P180,000.00 repre­senting his unearned income, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 as expenses, or a total of
P255,000.00.

In its answer filed on July 28, 1954, defendant PAL denied the
substantial averments in the complaint, alleging among others, that the
accident was due solely and exclusively to inevitable unforeseen circumstances
whereby plaintiff sustained only superficial wounds and minor injuries which
were promptly treated by defendant’s medical personnel (par. 5, answer); that
plaintiff did not sustain brain injury or cerebral concussion from the accident
since he passed the annual physical and medical examination given thereafter on
April 24, 1951; that the headaches and dizziness experienced by plaintiff were
due to emotional disturbance over his inability to pass the required up-grading
or promotional course given by defendant company (par. 6, answer), and that, as
confirmed by an expert neuro-surgeon, plaintiff was
suffering from neurosis and in view of this unfitness and disqualification from
continuing as a pilot, defendant had to terminate plaintiff’s employment (pars.
7, 9, answer).

Further, defendant alleged that by the very nature of its
business as a common carrier, it is bound to employ only pilots who are
proficient and in good mental, emotional and physical condition; that the
pilot, Captain Delfin Bustamante,
was a competent and proficient pilot, and although he was already afflicted
with a tumor of the naso-pharynx even before the
accident of January 8, 1951, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in passing
upon the fitness of pilots, gave Capt. Bustamante a
waiver of physical standards to enable him to retain his first class airman
certificate since the affliction had not in the least affected his proficiency
(pars. 16-17, answer).  By way of
counterclaim, defendant prayed for P10,000.00 as expenses for the litigation.

On March 25, 1958,
defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint is
essentially a Workmen’s Compensation claim, stating a cause of action not
cognizable within the general jurisdiction of the court.  The Motion to Dismiss was denied in the order
of April 14, 1958.  After the reception of evidence, the trial
court rendered on January 15, 1973
the decision, the dispositive portion of which has
been earlier cited.

The defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc. appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals as being contrary to law and unsupported by the
evidence.  It raised as errors of the
trial court (a) the holding that the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff
are attributable to the accident of January 8, 1951 which was due to the
negligence of defendant in having allowed Capt. Delfin
Bustamante to continue flying despite his alleged
slow reaction and poor judgment; (b) the finding that defendant was negligent
in not having given plaintiff proper and adequate expert medical treatment and
assistance for the injuries allegedly sustained in the accident of January 8, 1951; and (c) in ordering
defendant to pay actual or compensatory damages, moral damages and attorney’s
fees to the plaintiff.

On April 18, 1977,
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the lower
court but modified the award of damages by imposing legal rate of interest on the
P198,000.00 unearned income from the filing of the complaint, citing Sec. 8.
Rule 51 of the Rules of Court.

Its motion for reconsideration of the above judgment having been
denied, Philippine Air Lines, Inc. filed this instant petition for certiorari
on the ground that the decision is not in accord with law or with the
applicable jurisprudence, aside from its being replete with findings in the
nature of speculation, surmises and conjectures not borne out by the evidence
on record thereby resulting to misapprehension of facts and amounting to a
grave abuse of discretion (p. 7, Petition).

Petitioner raises the fundamental question in the case at bar as follows:  Is there a causal connection between the injuries
suffered by private respondent during the accident on 8 January 1951 and the
subsequent “periodic dizzy spells, headache and general debility” of
which private respondent complained every now and then, on the one hand, and
such “periodic dizzy spells, headache and general debility” allegedly
caused by the accident and private respondent’s eventual discharge from
employment, on the other?  PAL submits
that respondent court’s award of damages to private respondent is anchored on
findings in the nature of speculations, surmises and conjectures and not borne
out by the evidence on record, thereby resulting in a misapprehension of facts
and amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner’s submission is without merit.

As found by the respondent court, the following are the essential
facts of the case:

“It appears that plaintiff, a licensed aviator, was employed
by defendant a few years prior to January
8, 1951 as a regular
co-pilot on a guaranteed basic salary of P750.00 a month.  He was assigned to and /or paired with pilot Delfin Bustamante.

Sometime in December 1950, he complained to defendant through its
authorized official about the slow reaction and poor judgment of pilot Delfin Bustamante.  Notwithstanding said complaint, defendant
allowed the pilot to continue flying.

On January 8, 1951,
the two manned the regular afternoon
flight of defendant’s plane from Manila
to Legaspi, with stops at Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Pili, Camarines Sur.  Upon making a landing at Daet,
the pilot, with his slow reaction and poor judgment, overshot the airfield and,
as a result of and notwithstanding diligent efforts of plaintiff to avert an
accident, the airplane crash-landed beyond the runway into a mangrove.  The jolt and impact caused plaintiff to hit
his head upon the front windshield of the plane thereby causing his brain
concussions and wounds on the forehead, with concomittant
intense pain.

Plaintiff was not
given proper medical attention and treatment demanded by the nature and
severity of his injuries.  Defendant
merely referred him to its clinic attended by general practitioners on his
external injuries.  His brain injury was
never examined, much less treated.  On top of that negligence, defendant
recalled plaintiff to active duty as a co-pilot, completely ignoring his plea
for expert medical assistance.

Suffering periodic dizzy
spells, headache and general debility, plaintiff every now and then complained
to defendant.  To make matters worst for
plaintiff, defendant discharged him from his employment on December
21, 1953.  In consequence, plaintiff has been beset with
additional worries, basically financial. 
He is now a liability instead
of a provider, of his family.

On July 1, 1954,
plaintiff filed a complaint for damages. 
Defendant vainly sought to dismiss the complaint after filing an
answer.  Then, the judgment and this
appeal.”

Continuing, the
respondent Court of Appeals further held:

“There is no question about the employment of plaintiff by
defendant, his age and salary, the overshooting
by pilot Bustamante of the airfield and crash-landing
in a mangrove, his hitting his head on the front windshield of the plane, his
intermittent dizzy spells, headache and general debility for which he was
discharged from his employment on December 21, 1953.  As the lower court aptly stated:

‘From the evidence adduced by the parties, the Court finds the
following facts to be uncontroverted:  That the plaintiff Jesus V. Samson, on
January 8, 1951 and a few years prior thereto, December 21, 1953, was a duly licensed
pilot employed as a regular co-pilot of the defendant with assignment in its
domestic air service in the Philippines; that on January 8, 1951, the defendant’s
airplane met an accident in crashlanding at the Daet Airport, Camarines Norte by
overshooting the runway and reaching the mangroves at the edge of the landing
strip; that the jolt caused plaintiff’s head to hit the front windshield of the
airplane causing him to suffer wounds and abrasion on the forehead; that the
defendant, instead of giving the plaintiff expert and proper medical treatment
called for by the nature and severity of the injuries of the plaintiff, simply
referred him to the clinic of the defendant’s physicians who are only a general
medical practitioners and not brain specialists; that the defendant’s
physicians limited their treatment to the exterior injuries on the forehead of
the plaintiff and made no exami­nation of the severe concussion of the brain of
the plaintiff; that the Medical Director and Flight Surgeon of the defendant
were not able to definitely determine the cause of the complaint of the plaintiff
as to the periodic attack of dizziness, spells and headache; that due to this
laxity of the defendant’s physician and the continuous suffering of the ailment
of the plaintiff complained of, he demanded for expert medical assistance for
his brain injury and to send him to the United States, which demand was turned
down and in effect denied by the defendant; that instead the defendant referred
the plaintiff to a neurologist, Dr. Victor Reyes; that from the time that said
accident occurred on January 21, 1953, he was ordered grounded on several
occasions because of his complaint of dizzy spells and headache; that instead
of submitting the plaintiff to expert medical treatment as demanded by him and
denied by the defendant, he was discharged from its employment on December 21,
1953 on the ground of physical disability, and that the plaintiff, at the time
when the defendant’s plane met the accident, up to the time he was discharged,
was regularly employed as a co-pilot and receiving a basic salary of P750.00 a
month plus extra pay for flying time, and bonuses amounting to P300.00 a
month.’

Even defendant-appellant itself admits as not controverted
the following facts which generally admit what have been stated above as not controverted.

“In the case at bar, the following facts are not the subject
of controversy:

‘(1) First, that
from July 1950 to 21 December 1953, plaintiff was employed with defendant
company as a first officer or co-pilot and served in that capacity in defendant’s domestic services.

(2)   Second, that on January 1951, plaintiff did
fly on defendant’s PI-C 94, as first officer or co-pilot, with the late Capt. Delfin Bustamante in command as
pilot; that while making a landing at the Daet
airport on that date, PI-C 94 did meet an accident as stated above.

(3) Third, that at
or about the time of the discharge from defendant company, plaintiff had
complained of “spells of dizziness,” “headaches” and
“nervousness”, by reason of which he was grounded from flight
duty.  In short, that at that time, or
approximately from November 1953 up to the date of his discharge on 21 December 1953
plaintiff was actually physically unfit to discharge his duties as pilot.

(4)   Fourth, that plaintiff’s unfitness for flight
duty was properly established after a thorough medical examination by competent
medical experts.’ (pp. 11-12, appellant’s brief)

hence, there can hardly be an issue, factual, legal or
medical.”

Taking exception from “the rest of the essential facts of
the case as found by the respondent court” PAL claims said facts are not
fully borne out by the evidence on record and insists that the injuries
suffered by private respondent during the accident on January 8, 1951 were
superficial in nature; that the “periodic spells, headache, and general
debility” complaint of every now and then by private respondent subsequent
to the Jan. 8, 1951 incident were due to emotional disturbances and that no
negligence can be attributed to Capt. Delfin Bustamante much less to PAL for the occurrence on January
8, 1951, hence PAL cannot be held liable for damages.

Petitioner claims absence of any causal connection between
private respondent’s superficial injuries and his alleged subsequent “periodic
spells, headache and general debility,” pointing out that these subsequent
ailments were found by competent physician, including an expert neuro-surgeon, to be due to emotional disturbances insights
the conclusions of Dr. Trajano V. Bernardo that respondent’s
complaints were “psychosomatic symptoms” on the basis of declarations
made by respondent himself, which conclusions are supported by similar
diagnosis made by Drs. Damaceno J. Ago and Villaraza
stating that respondent Samson was suffering from neurosis as well as the
report of Dr. Victor Reyes, a neurological specialist, indicating that the
symptoms were probably, most probably due to phychogenic
factors and have no organic basis.

In claiming that there is no factual basis for the finding of the
respondent court that the crash-landing caused respondent’s “brain
concussion x x
x, with concomittant
intense pain, for on the contrary, testimonial evidence establish the
superficiality of the injuries sustained by respondent during the accident of January
8, 1951,” petitioner quotes portions of the testimony of Dr. Manuel S. Sayas, who declared that he removed the band-aid on the
forehead of respondent and that he found out after removal that the latter had
two contussed superficial wounds over the supra
orbiter regions or just above the eyes measuring one centimeter long and one
millimeter deep.  He examined and found
his blood pressure normal, no discharges from the nose and ears.  Dr. Trajano V. Bernardo also testified that when he examined
respondent Samson three days after the accident, the wound was already healed
and found nothing wrong with his ears, nose and throat so that he was declared
fit for duty after the sixth day.

Petitioner goes further. 
It contends that there is no causal connection between respondent’s
superficial injuries sustained during the accident on January 8, 1951 and plaintiff’s discharge from
employment with PAL on December 21, 1953.  According to PAL, it was the repeated recurrence of respondent’s neurasthenic
symptoms (dizzy spells, headache, nervousness) which prompted PAL’s Flight Surgeon, Dr. Bernardo, to
recommend that plaintiff be grounded permanently as respondent was
“psychologically unfit to resume his duties as pilot”.  PAL concludes
that respondent’s eventual discharge from employment with PAL was effected for absolutely valid
reasons, and only after he was thoroughly examined and found unfit to carry out
his responsibilities and duties as a pilot.

We agree with the respondent court in finding that the dizzy spells,
headache and general debility of private respondent Samson was an after-effect
of the crash-landing and We find that such holding is supported by substantial
evidence, which We quote from the court’s decision, to wit:

“Defendant would imply that plaintiff suffered only
superficial wounds which were treated, and not brain injury.  It would, by the opinion of its company
doctors, Dr. Bernardo and Dr. Reyes, attribute the dizzy spells and headache to
organic or as psycholosomatic, neurasthenic or
psychogenic, which we find outlandishly exaggerated.

That plaintiff’s condition as psychosomatic rather than organic in
nature is allegedly confirmed by the fact that on six (6) separate occasions
after the accident he passed the required CAA physical examination for airman’s
certificate.  (Exhs.
78, 79, 80, 81, 83 and 92).  We noticed,
however, that there were other similar physical examinations conducted by the
CAA on the person of plaintiff the report on which were not presented in
evidence.  Obviously, only those which
suited defendants cause were hand-picked and offered in evidence.

We hesitate to accept the opinion of the defendant’s two
physicians, considering that Dr. Bernardo admittedly referred to Dr. Reyes
because he could not determine the cause of the dizzy spells and headache and
the latter admitted that ‘it is extremely hard to be certain of the cause of
his dizzy spells,’ and suggested a possibility that it ‘was due to postraumatic syndrone, evidently
due to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in hitting the forehead against
the windshield of the plane during the accident.’ Judgment are not based on
possibilities.

The admitted difficulty of defendant’s doctors in determining the
cause of the dizzy spells and headache cannot be a sound basis for finding
against the plaintiff and in favor of defendant.  Whatever it might be, the fact is that such
dizzy spells, headache and general debility was an after-effect of the
crash-landing.  Be it brain injury or psychosomatic,
neurasthenic or psychogenic, there is no gainsaying the fact that it was caused
by the crash-landing.  As an effect of
the cause, not fabricated or concocted, plaintiff has to be indemnified.  The fact is that such effect cause his
discharge.

We are prone to believe the testimony of the plaintiff’s doctors.

Dr. Morales, a surgeon, found that blood was coming from
plaintiff’s ears and nose.  He testified
that plaintiff was suffering from cerebral concussion as a result of traumatic
injury to the brain caused by his hitting head on the windshield of the plane
during the crash-landing (Exhibit “G”).

Dr. Conrado Aramil,
a neurologist and psychiatrist with experience in two hospitals abroad, found
abnormality reflected by the electro-encephalogram examination in the frontal
area on both sides of plaintiff’s head (Exhibits “K”,
“K-1”).

The opinion of these two specialist renders unnecessary that of
plaintiff’s wife who is a physician in her own right and because of her
relation to the plaintiff, her testimony and opinion may not be discussed here,
although her testimony is crystallized by the opinions of Dr. Ador Dionisio, Dr. Marquez, Dr. Jose O. Chan, Dr. Yambao and Dr. Sandico.

Even the doctors presented by defendant admit vital facts about
plaintiff’s brain injury.  Dr. Bernardo
admits that due to the incident, the plaintiff continously
complained of his fainting spells, dizziness and headache everytime
he flew as a co-pilot and everytime he went to
defendant’s clinic no less than 25 times (Exhibits “15” to
“36”), that he complained of the same to Dr. Reyes; that he promised
to help send plaintiff to the United States for expert medical assistance
provided that whatever finding thereat should not be attributed to the
crash-landing incident to which plaintiff did not agree and that plaintiff was
completely ignored by the defendant in his plea for expert medical
assistance.  They admitted that they
could not determine definitely the cause of the fainting spells, dizziness and
headache, which justifies the demand for expert medical assistance.”

We also find the imputation of gross negligence by respondent
court to PAL for having allowed Capt. Delfin Bustamante to fly on that fateful day of the accident on
January 8, 1951 to be correct, and We affirm the same, duly supported as it is
by substantial evidence, clearly established and cited in the decision of said
court which states as follows:

“The pilot was sick.  He
admittedly had tumor of the nasopharynx (nose).  He is now in the Great Beyond.  The spot is very near the brain and the
eyes.  Tumor on the spot will affect the
sinus, the breathing, the eyes which are very near it.  No one will certify the fitness to fly a
plane of one suffering from the disease.

” x x x.  The fact First Pilot Bustamante
has a long standing tumor of the Nasopharynx for
which reason he was grounded since November 1947 is admitted in the letter (Exh. 69-A) of Dr. Bernardo to the Medical Director of the
CAA requesting waiver of physical standards. 
The request for waiver of physical standards is itself a positive proof
that the physical condition of Capt.
Bustamante is short of the standard set by the
CAA.  The Deputy Administrator of the CAA granted the request relying on
the representation and recommendation made by Dr. Bernardo (See Exh. 69).  We noted,
however, that the request (Exh. 69-A) says that ‘it
is believed that his continuing to fly as
a co-pilot, does not involve any hazard.’ Underscoring ours.) Flying
as a First Officer entails a very different responsibility than flying as a
mere co-pilot.  Defendant requested the
CAA to allow Capt. Bustamante to fly merely as a
co-pilot and it is safe to conclude that the CAA approved the request thus
allowing Bustamante to fly only as a co-pilot.  For having allowed Bustamante
to fly as a First Officer on January 8,
1951, defendant is guilty of gross negligence and therefore should
be made liable for the resulting accident.

As established by the evidence, the pilot used to get treatments
from Dr. Sycangco. 
He used to complain of pain in the face more particularly in the nose
which caused him to have sleepless nights. 
Plaintiff’s observation of the pilot was reported to the Chief Pilot who
did nothing about it.  Captain Carbonel of the defendant corroborated plaintiff of this
matter.  The complaint against the slow
reaction of the pilot at least proved the observation.  The observation could not be
disregarded.  The fact that the complaint
was not in writing does not detract anything from the seriousness thereof, considering
that a miscalculation would not only cause the death of the crew but also of
the passengers.

One month prior to the crash-landing, when the pilot was preparing to land in Daet, plaintiff warned him that they were not in the
vicinity of Daet but above the town of Ligao.  The plane hit outside the airstrip.  In another instance, the pilot would hit the Mayon Volcano had not plain­tiff warned
him.  These more than prove what plaintiff had complained of.  Disregard thereof by defendant is
condemnable.

To bolster the claim that Capt. Bustamante
has not suffered from any kind of sickness which hampered his flying ability,
appellant contends that for at least one or more years following the accident
of January 8, 1951, Capt. Bustamante continued to fly
for defendant company as a pilot, and did so with great skill and proficiency,
and without any further accident or mishap, citing tsn.
pp. 756-765, January 20, 1965.  We have painstakingly perused the records,
particularly the transcript of stenographic notes cited, but found nothing
therein to substantiate appellant’s contention. 
Instead, We discovered that the citation covers the testimony of Dr.
Bernardo on the physical condition of Bustamante and
nothing about his skills or proficiency to fly nor on the mishaps or accidents,
matters which are beyond Dr. Bernardo’s competence anyway.

Assuming that the pilot was not sick or that the tumor did not
affect the pilot in managing the plane, the evidence shows that the
overshooting of the runway and crash-landing at the mangrove was caused by the
pilot for which acts the defendant must answer for damages caused thereby.  And for this negligence of defendant’s
employee, it is liable (Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA
308).  At least, the law presumes the
employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees.

Defendant would want to tie plaintiff to the report he signed about
the crash-landing.  The report was
prepared by his pilot and because the latter pleaded that he had a family too
and would have nowhere to go if he lost his job, plaintiff’s compassion would
not upturn the truth about the crash-landing. 
We are for the truth not logic of any argumentation.

At any rate, it is incorrect to say that the Accident Report (Exh. 12 & 12-A), signed by plaintiff, exculpated Capt. Bustamante from any fault. 
We observed that the Report does not categorically state that Capt. Bustamante was not at fault.  It merely relates in chronological sequence
what Capt. Bustamante and plaintiff did from the takeoff
from Manila to the landing in Daet which resulted in an accident.  On the contrary, We may infer the negligence
of Bustamante from the following portion of the
Report, to wit:

“x
x x.  I felt his brakes strong but as we neared the
intersection of the NE-SW runway, the brakes were not as strong and I glanced
at the system pressure which indicated 900 lbs. per sq. m.”

It was during the above precise instance that Capt. Bustamante lost his bearing and disposition.  Had he maintained the pressure on the brakes
the plane would not have overshot the runway. 
Verily, Bustamante displayed slow reaction and
poor judgment.  (CA decision, pp. 8-12).

This Court is not impressed by, much less can We accept
petitioner’s invocation to calibrate once again the evidence testified to in
detail and plucked from the voluminous transcript to support petitioner’s own
conclusion.  It is not the task of this
Court to discharge the functions of a trier of facts
much less to enter into a calibration
of the evidence, notwithstanding petitioner’s wail that the judgment of the
respondent court is based entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures.  We are convinced that respondent court’s
judgment is supported by strong, clear and substantial evidence.

Petitioner is a common carrier engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public, as defined in Art.
1732, New Civil Code.  The law is clear
in requiring a common carrier to exercise the highest degree of care in the
discharge of its duty and business of carriage and transportation under Arts.
1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code. 
These Articles provide:

Art. 1733.  Common carriers,
from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is
further expressed in Articles 1734, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth
in articles 1755 and 1756.

Art. 1755.  A common carrier
is bound to carry the passenger
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

Art. 1756.  In case of death
of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.

The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of common
carriers is for the safety of passengers as well as for the members of the crew
or the complement operating the carrier, the airplane in the case at bar.  And this must be so for any omission, lapse or neglect thereof will
certainly result to the damage, prejudice, nay injuries and even death to all
aboard the plane, passengers and crew members alike.

Now to the damages.  The
Court of Appeals affirmed the award of damages made by the trial court, stating
that “the damages awarded plaintiff by the lower court are in accordance
with the facts, law and jurisprudence.” The court further observed that
“defendant-appellant is still
fortunate, considering that the unearned income was reckoned with only up to 1968 and not up to the present as
plaintiff-appellee is still living.  Whatever mathematical error
defendant-appellant could show by abstract argumentation, the same must be
compensated by such deficiency of the damages awarded to plaintiff-appellee.”

As awarded by the trial court, private respondent was entitled to
P198,000.00 as unearned income
or com­pensatory damages; P50,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation, or a total of
P273,000.00.

The trial court arrived at the sum of P198,000.00 as unearned
income or damages by considering that respondent Samson “could have
continued to work as airline pilot for fifteen more years, he being only 38
years at the time the services are terminated by the defendant (PAL) and he would
have earned P120,000.00 from 1954 to 1963 or a period of ten (10) years at the rate of one thousand per
month P750.00 basic salary plus P300.00 extra pay for extra flying time and
bonuses; and considering further that in 1964 the basic pay of defendant’s
pilot was increased to P12,000.00 annually, the plaintiff could have earned
from 1964 to 1968 the sum of P60,000.00 in the form of salaries and another
P18,000.00 as bonuses and extra pay for extra flying time at the same rate of
P300 a month, or a grand total of P198,000.00
for the entire period.  This claim
of the plaintiff for loss or impairment of earning capacity is based on the
provision of Article 2205 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides that “damages may be recovered for loss or impairment of
earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury”.  This provision of law has been construed and
interpreted in the case of Aureliano Ropato, et al. vs. La Mallorca
General Partnership, 56 O.G., 7812, which rules that law allows the recovery of
damages for loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or
permanent personal injury.” (Decision, CFI, pp. 98-99, Record on Appeal)

The respondent appellate court modified the above award by
ordering payment of legal interest on the P198,000.00 unearned income from the
filing of the claim, citing Sec. 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner assails the award of the total sum of P198,000.00 as
unearned income up to 1968 as being tenuous because firstly, the trial court’s
finding affirmed by the respondent court is allegedly based on pure speculation
and conjecture and secondly, the award of P300.00 a month as extra pay for
extra flying time from 1954 to 1968 is likewise speculative.  PAL likewise rejects the award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 on the ground that private respondent’s
action before the trial court does not fall under any of the cases enumerated
in the law (Art. 2219 of the New Civil Code) for which moral damages are
recoverable and that although respondent action gives the appearance that it is
covered under quasi-delict as provided in Art. 21 of
the New Civil Code, the definition of quasi-delict in
Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code expressly excludes cases where there is a
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, as in the case under
consideration, where an employer-employee relationship existed between PAL and
private respondent.  It is further argued
that private respondent action cannot be deemed to be covered by Art. 21,
inasmuch as there is no evidence on record to show that PAL “wilfully cause(d) loss or injury to (private respondent) in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy x x.” Nor can private respondent’s action be considered
“analogous” to either of the foregoing, for the reasons are obvious
that it is not.” (Memorandum of petitioner, pp. 418-421, Records)

Having affirmed the gross negligence of PAL in allowing Capt. Delfin Bustamante to fly the
plane to Daet on January 8, 1951 whose slow reaction
and poor judgment was the cause of the crash-landing of the plane which
resulted in private respondent Samson hitting his head against the windshield
and causing him injuries for which reason PAL terminated his services and
employment as pilot after refusing to provide him with the necessary medical
treatment of respondent’s periodic spells, headache and general debility
produced from said injuries, We must necessarily affirm likewise the award of
damages or compensation under the provisions of Art. 1711 and Art. 1712 of the
New Civil Code which provide:

Art. 1711.  Owners of
enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death
or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even
though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a
fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment.  The employer
is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or
disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the
employment.  If the mishap was due to the
employee’s own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the
employer shall not be liable for compensation. 
When the employee’s lack of due care contributed to his death or injury,
the compensation shall be equitably reduced.

Art. 1712.  If the death or
injury is due to the negligence of a fellow-worker, the latter and the employer
shall be solidarily liable for compensation.  If a fellow-workers intentional or malicious
act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be
answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due
diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff’s fellow-worker.

The grant of compensatory damages to the private respondent made
by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court by computing his basic
salary per annum at P750.00 a month as basic salary and P300.00 a month for
extra pay for extra flying time including bonus given in December every year is
justified.  The correct computation
however should be P750 plus P300 x 12 months = P12,600 per annum x 10 years =
P126,000.00 (not P120,000.00 as computed by the court a quo).  The further grant of increase in the basic
pay of the pilots to P12,000 annually for 1964 to 1968 totalling
P60,000.00 and another P18,000.00 as bonuses and extra pay for extra flying
time at the same rate of P300.00 a month totals P78,000.00.  Adding P126,000.00 (1964 to 1968
compensation) makes a grand total of P204,000.00 (not P198,000.00 as originally
computed).

As to the grant of moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 We also
approve the same.  We have noted and
considered the holding of the appellate court in the matter of bad faith on the
part of PAL, stated hereunder, this wise:

“None of the essential facts material to the determination of
the case have been seriously assailed: 
the overshooting of runway and crash-landing into the mangroves; the
hitting of plaintiff’s head to the front windshield of the plane; the oozing of
blood out of his ears, nose and mouth; the intermittent dizzy spells, headaches
and general debility thereafter for which he was discharged from his
employment; the condition of not to attribute the cause of the ailment to the
crash-landing imposed in bad faith for a demanded special medical
service abroad; and the
resultant brain injury which defendant’s doctors could not understand nor
diagnose.”

x x x

“The act of defendant appellant in unjustly refusing
plaintiff-appellee’s demand for special medical
service abroad for the reason that plaintiff-appellee’s
deteriorating physical condition was not due to the accident violates the
provisions of Article 19 of the Civil Code on human relations “to act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” (CA
Resolution, pp. 151-152, Records)

We reject the theory of petitioner that private respondent is not
entitled to moral damages.  Under the
facts found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court and under
the law and jurisprudence cited and applied, the grant of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 is proper
and justified.

The fact that private respondent suffered physical injuries in the
head when the plane crash-landed due to the negligence of Capt. Bustamante is undeniable. 
The negligence of the latter is clearly a quasi-delict
and therefore Article 2219, (2) New Civil Code is applicable, justifying the
recovery of moral damages.

Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an
employer-employee relationship between it and private respondent arising from
the contract of employment, private respondent is still entitled to moral
damages in view of the finding of bad faith or malice by the appellate court,
which finding We hereby affirm, applying the provisions of Art. 2220, New Civil
Code which provides that wilfull injury to property
may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that,
under the circumstances, such damages are justly due.  The same rule applies to breaches of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

The justification in the award of moral damages under Art. 19 of
the New Civil Code on Human Relations which requires that every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, as applied
by respondent court is also well-taken and We hereby give Our affirmance thereto.

With respect to the award of attorney’s fees in the sum of
P20,000.00 the same is likewise correct. 
As pointed out in the decision of the Court of Appeals, “the
plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees because he was forced to litigate in
order to enforce his valid claim (Ganaban vs. Bayle, 30 SCRA 365; De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz, 22 SCRA 33;
and many others); defendant acted in bad faith in refusing plaintiff’s valid
claim (Filipino Pipe Foundry Corporation vs. Central Bank, 23 SCRA 1044); and
plaintiff was dismissed and was forced to go to court to vindicate his right (Nadura vs. Benguet Consolidated,
Inc., 5 SCRA 879)”.

We also agree with the modification made by the appellate court
in ordering payment of legal interest from the date judicial demand was made by
Pilot Samson against PAL with the filing of the complaint in the lower
court.  We affirm the ruling of the
respondent court which reads:

“Lastly, the defendant-appellant claims that the legal rate of
interest on the unearned compensation should be computed from the date of the judgment in the lower court,
not from the filing of the complaint, citing a case where the issue raised in
the Supreme Court was limited to when the judgment was rendered in the lower
court or in the appellate court, which does not mean that it should not be
computed from the filing of the complaint.

Articles 1169, 2209 and 2212 of the Civil Code govern when interest
shall be computed.  Thereunder
interest begins to accrue upon demand, extrajudicial or judicial.  A complaint is a judicial demand (Cabarroguis
vs. Vicente, 107 Phil. 340).  Under
Article 2212 of the Civil Code, interest due shall earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this
point.” (CA Resolution, pp. 153-154, Records).

The correct amount of compensatory damages upon which legal
interest shall accrue from the filing of the complaint is P204,000.00 as herein
computed and not P198,000.00.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of
the appellate court is hereby affirmed with slight modification in that the
correct amount of compensatory damages is P204,000.00.  With costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, (Chairman), and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., in the result.

^[1]
Eighth Division, Agcaoili, J., ponente;
Pascual and Climaco, JJ.,
concurring.