MA. MERCEDES C. GODINO, IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ENRIQUE L. GODINO, SR. AND NATIVIDAD C. GODINO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SPS. DON C.…

Godino versus Mejia

The Case

This is an appeal by spouses Don and Benigna Mejia from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City declaring a real estate mortgage void. The administratrix of the intestate estate of Natividad and Enrique Godino, Sr., Ma. Mercedes Godino, sued to annul the mortgage her mother Natividad had executed over two Alabang properties in favor of the Mejia spouses. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the rules on the conjugal character of property, the consent required to encumber conjugal property, the validity of waivers and quitclaims, and the survival of the principal loan even when the accessory mortgage is void.

Procedural History

The children first filed two complaints to annul the mortgage. The first, before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, was dismissed without prejudice for a defective certificate of non-forum shopping. The second, before Branch 204, was likewise dismissed without prejudice upon the instance of the plaintiffs. Ma. Mercedes then filed the present complaint as administratrix. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and later a writ of preliminary injunction stopping the foreclosure sale. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204, rendered its decision on February 27, 2012, declaring the real estate mortgage null and void but ordering the estate to pay the Mejia spouses the loan amount with interest. Only the Mejia spouses appealed, and the case reached the Supreme Court by ordinary appeal.

Facts

Natividad Godino was married to Enrique Godino, Sr. On November 16, 1984, during their marriage, Natividad purchased two parcels of land in Alabang, Muntinlupa City, covered by two transfer certificates of title issued in her name, described as married to Enrique Godino, Sr. Enrique, Sr. died on May 12, 1996.

On July 21, 1998, two years after her husband's death, Natividad executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the Alabang properties in favor of the Mejia spouses as security for a loan of 3,366,772.60 pesos. The mortgage was annotated on the titles. Natividad died intestate on May 24, 2002, and Ma. Mercedes was appointed administratrix of the estate.

When the children learned of the mortgage, they sued to annul it, claiming the properties were conjugal and the mortgage was executed without their consent. The Mejia spouses countered that the properties were Natividad's paraphernal property, that Enrique, Sr. had executed a quitclaim and waiver in her favor, and that the children were estopped. The trial court found the properties conjugal, found the quitclaim void, declared the mortgage void, but ordered the estate to pay the loan.

Issues

• Whether or not the Alabang properties are conjugal properties of Natividad and Enrique, Sr.
• Whether or not the nationality of Enrique, Sr. affects the property relations of the marriage.
• Whether or not the real estate mortgage executed by Natividad alone is valid.
• Whether or not the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights executed by Enrique, Sr. is valid.
• Whether or not the estate is liable for the principal loan despite the void mortgage.

Applicable Provisions

Article 160 of the Civil Code provides:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

This presumption governs the Alabang properties, which were shown to have been acquired during the marriage.

Article 80 of the Family Code provides:

In the absence of a contrary stipulation in marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence.

This provision makes the nationality of Enrique, Sr. immaterial, since Philippine law governs the property relations of the marriage.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

This provision requires the written consent of both spouses for any encumbrance of conjugal property, and without it the encumbrance is void.

Article 87 of the Family Code provides:

Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

This provision was invoked by the trial court against the quitclaim, though the Supreme Court resolved the quitclaim on other grounds.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Alabang properties are conjugal. While registration in the wife's name alone raises a presumption of paraphernal ownership, that presumption yields once evidence shows the property was acquired during the marriage. The deeds of absolute sale showed the properties were purchased on November 16, 1984, while Natividad and Enrique, Sr. were married. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the presumption is therefore that the properties are conjugal.

On the second issue, the Court held that the nationality of Enrique, Sr. is immaterial. Even assuming he was a Spanish national, Article 80 of the Family Code provides that Philippine law governs the property relations of the spouses regardless of nationality, and under the Civil Code their marriage was under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

On the third issue, the Court held that the mortgage is void. Being conjugal, the properties could not be encumbered by Natividad alone. Article 124 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the other spouse, and in its absence the encumbrance is void. The Court noted that as early as 1909 it had ruled that a wife may not mortgage conjugal property without the husband's consent.

On the fourth issue, the Court held the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights void. The Court found no consideration for it, and waivers and quitclaims are generally looked upon with disfavor. The Court also noted that the Mejia spouses contradicted themselves by claiming Enrique, Sr. owned nothing yet had waived his rights.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that although the accessory mortgage is void, the principal obligation subsists and must be paid by the estate.

Doctrine

Property acquired during the marriage is presumed conjugal under Article 160 of the Civil Code, and registration in the name of one spouse alone does not overcome that presumption once acquisition during the marriage is shown. The property relations of spouses are governed by Philippine law regardless of nationality under Article 80 of the Family Code. Any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property without the written consent of both spouses is void under Article 124 of the Family Code. A waiver or quitclaim must be supported by a credible and reasonable consideration, and is generally looked upon with disfavor. The nullity of an accessory mortgage does not extinguish the principal loan obligation.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court, declaring the real estate mortgage void and ordering the estate to pay the Mejia spouses the loan amount with interest.

Remember This

Memorize this line: conjugal property cannot be encumbered by one spouse alone, and without the written consent of the other the encumbrance is void, though the principal debt survives. Examiners use this case to test the conjugal presumption, the consent requirement under Article 124, and the rule that a void mortgage does not extinguish the loan.