PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DANTE SEVILLA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE PRESIDING JUDGE HON. JORDAN H. REYES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISULAN, SULTAN KUDARAT, AND LOIDA L. LEAL. …
INTING, J.:
The facts of the case are as follows:
As testified to by petitioner Dante Sevilla (Sevilla) in the Regional Trial Court, he is a Master Teacher at Laguilayan National High School in Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. At about 2:45 in the morning of April 24, 2009 he was at the gymnasium of Barangay Dukay, Esperanza as he was invited to be one of the sponsors of the family disco in preparation for the 50th Foundation Anniversary of the Barangay. At around 2:45 in the morning, in the gymnasium, accused Loida Leal grabbed her pistol, pointed it at Sevilla who was seated on a chair, and immediately shot him. Sevilla was hit at the lower portion of his right armpit with the bullet exiting at the left portion of his back. According to him, accused was four (4) meters, more or less away when she fired the gun.
Sevilla was brought to the Ala Tamondong Hospital along the National Highway where he was treated by one Dr. Ocsio and stayed for almost seven hours. His bill amounted to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but it was paid by the wife of Mayor Romulo Latog of Esperanza who happened to be the cousin of the accused. He was later transferred to St. Elizabeth Hospital in General Santos City where he was confined for thirteen days and was billed Fifty-Three Thousand Pesos (P53,000.00). This time it was the accused who paid for the hospital bill.
Ebenezer Sevilla, petitioner Sevilla’s cousin testified that at the time of the incident he was standing at the left side of petitioner Sevilla; and that he saw accused Loida Latog Leal shoot petitioner Sevilla from a distance of three to four meters. According to him, he asked the accused why he shot petitioner Sevilla; but accused just kept quiet.
Cyrine Grace Sevilla, petitioner’s daughter was also presented in court and testified that she and her uncle had so far bought medicines amounting to Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00); and that the bill at St. Elizabeth Hospital was paid by Erna, the niece of accused.
PO1 Donato Guillermo testified that he was assigned to investigate the incident; that he interviewed Mr. Dodong Sua-an (Sua-an), a companion of accused; that Sua-an told him that about 3 in the morning of April 24, 2009, while he and the accused were going out of the gymnasium but before they could reach the gate, the accused pulled a gun from her waist and fired towards the place where petitioner was seated; and that he accordingly took the gun and turned it over to Barangay Captain Love Latog. PO1 Guillermo further testified, however, that he did not put into writing his investigation; that there is also no record in their office showing that Sua-an went there; and that he knows that the incident was entered in the blotter of the Police Station.
The last witness presented by the prosecution was Dr. Nerio Ocsio, the doctor on duty at the time that petitioner was brought to the hospital. In his medical abstract[4] his findings were as follows:
PERTINENT PE FINDINGS:V/S BP 80/60 mmhz RR: 34/cm Hr: 170/cm CHEST AND LUNGS: Unequal Chest Expansion H1 GSW o rightmaxilla (point of entry) with powder burns at the rim of entry. xxx.
A part of the transcript of stenographic notes5 dated February 22, 2011 reads:
Q: A: Q: A: Q: A:
On cross examination:
xxx Q: A: Q: A: xxx xxx Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: xxx
After having presented its fifth and last witness, the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting evidence, the defense, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that there is lack of evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is the assailant or the person who shot complainant Dante Sevilla.
The RTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence and reasoned:
In the instant case, and as said elsewhere, the complainant and his cousin, the corroborative witness Ebenezer Sevilla testified that he was shot by the accused who was between 3 to 5 meters away from him. However, the Court cannot just close its eyes and completely ignore the findings of Dr. Ocsio that “powder burns” are found in “the rim of entry” of the gun shot wound, the import of which is that he (complainant) was either deliberately or accidentally shot by an assailant who fired his gun, the muzzle of which was 24 inches or less away from him. Based on the foregoing and consonant to the rule that in gun shot wounds the burning, powder tattooing, and smudging are prominent when the muzzle of the gun fired is 24 inches or less away from the victim and disappear or are absent when the muzzle of the gun fired is beyond 24 inches away from the victim, it is cystal clear that the accused Loida Latog Leal could not have been the assailant or the person who shot the complainant. On this score, the accused is entitled to an acquittal on grounds of reasonable doubt. Or, put differently, the identity of the assailant of the complainant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
Sevilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration filed but the RTC denied it in its Order dated June 21, 2012[6].
Thus, Sevilla comes to this Honorable Court on his own via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the RTC’s granting of the Demurrer of Evidence in effect acquitting the accused Loida Latog Leal. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED COULD NOT BE THE ASSAILANT IN AS MUCH AS THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED THAT HE WAS (4) TO FIVE (5) METERS FROM THE ACCUSED WHEN THE LATTER SHOT HIM, CONTRARY TO THE MEDICAL ABSTRACT WHICH INDICATE POWDER BURNS AT THE RIM OF ENTRY;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE CASE ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED/PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMMIT THE CRIME.
On the other hand, in respondent Loida L. Leal’s Memorandum, she poses the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DANTE SEVILLA THE COMPLAINING WITNESS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, CAN ON HIS OWN, APPEAL BY WAY OF THE INSTANT PETITION THE ORDER OF THE SAID COURT DATED FEBRUARY 23, 2012 GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND THE ORDER OF THE SAME COURT DATED JUNE 21, 2012 DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 23, 2012, AND;
II.
GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER DANTE SEVILLA CAN APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDERS DATED FEBRUARY 23, 2012 AND JUNE 21, 2012, WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ISSUED THE SAID ORDERS WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is without merit.
“Only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order granting the demurrer to evidence in a criminal case.” [7]
Petitioner Sevilla erred in coming to this Honorable Court via a petition for certiorari on his own without the intervention of the Office of the Solicitor General or the City Prosecutor, praying:
[T]hat the order dated February 23, 2012 and June 21, 2012 be annulled and set aside and an (sic) ORDER the honorable Court a qou(sic) to reinstate the case and order the accused/private respondent to present her evidence and accordingly decide the same in accordance with the evidence presented.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.[8]
The case of Delgado and Pasico v. Gonzalez and Buenaflor[9] pronounced:
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that the Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Likewise, the Solicitor General shall represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings, thus:
Section 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1)
The rule, however, does not leave the petitioner helpless. Petitioner Sevilla can appeal the demurrrer but only as to its civil aspect. We note the case of People v. Santiago[10]:
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant. (Underscoring Ours)
A perusal of the facts herein would show that petitioner Sevilla mainly comes to this Court to seek reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case, specifically praying that the RTC’s decision be reversed.
Indeed, there was a mention of the civil aspect of the case, but it was only as a mere inclusion when petitioner quoted the case of Salazar v. People, viz:
xxx. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court. (Anamer Salazar vs. People of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 151931, 2003 Sep 23)
If the demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise does not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated. (supra).
There was having been no pronouncement that the private respondent’s the (sic) act from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, the Public Respondent should not have dismissed the case.[11]
Aside from the foregoing, petitioner did not make any other discussion as to private respondent Leal’s civil liability. Thus, since what petitioner seeks from this Honorable Court is the review of the court a quo’s Decision as to the criminal responsibility of private respondent Loida Leal, We are constrained to declare that he is not the proper party to raise such issue before this Court.
“[A]n acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy.”[12]
Assuming arguendo that petitioner on his own can file the instant petition for Certiorari, the same would still fail. Private respondent Leal’s acquittal can no longer be questioned, for to do such would place her in double jeopardy as proscribed by the Constitution.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as “an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue.” The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt[13].
“It is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy[14]” (Underscoring Ours).
The Regional Trial Court in the case at bar granted the demurrer to Evidence filed by respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted; and the above-entitled case is ordered dismissed without prejudice on the part of the private complainant to file separate civil action for damages against the accused whose civil liability may be established only by preponderance of evidence. Accordingly, on grounds of reasonable doubt the accused Loida Latog Leal is hereby acquitted of the crime of Frustrated Homicide she is charged before this court.
Records would show that petitioner Sevilla was granted the full opportunity to make his case and present all the pieces of evidence and witnesses he may produce. However, the court a quo, in keeping with the accused’s presumption of innocence as laid down by the Constitution, found for the accused (private respondent Leal), as the evidence presented created a doubt upon the mind of the court a quo as to the guilt of Leal; specifically, petitioner Sevilla testified that he was shot from a distance of about four meters, yet there were powder burns at the rim of entry of the gunshot wound which by theory could only be present if the gun was fired from a shorter distance, thus implying that someone else shot petitioner from a shorter distance. With this in mind, the court a quo acquitted Leal based on reasonable grounds.
The elements of double jeopardy are doubtlessly present in this case. A valid information for frustrated homicide was filed against private respondent Leal, which resulted to the institution of a criminal case against her in court. She pleaded not guilty during arraignment and after the prosecution presented his evidence, the case was dismissed.
The lower court’s judgment is already considered as adjudication on the merits and thus it could no longer be appealed. The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham[15].
Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.[16] “The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.”[17] The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice[18].
As clearly seen, petitioner cannot claim that he was not allowed the opportunity to make his case against the accused, nor was there a proof that the trial was merely a sham.
A survey of the records including the RTC Decision would show that there was no grave abuse on its part in coming up with the assailed Decision. It was not clearly proved that the respondent judge exercised his power in a despotic or arbitrary manner by reason of passion or hostility. Respondent judge justified his decision by citing pertinent laws and jurisprudence. The worst that respondent judge could have committed was an error of judgment, not error of jurisdiction, and the same is not reviewable by certiorari.
The same quoted case of Bangayan vs Bangayan[19] declares:
Even if the trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against the petitioners, it only committed an error of judgment, and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by a petition for certiorari because double jeopardy had already set in.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court dated February 23, 2012 and June 21, 2012 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Camello, J. Ch., and Perez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-30.
[2] Rollo, pp. 21-31.
[3] Rollo, p. 41.
[4] Rollo, p. 67.
[5] Rollo, pp.68-104.
[6] Rollo, p. 41.
[7] Bangayan, Jr. V. Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777, October 19, 2011.
[8] Ibid.
[9] GR No 184337, August 7, 2009.
[10] GR No. 80778, June 20, 1989.
[11] Rollo, p. 153.
[12] Bangayan , Jr. v. Bangayan G.R. 172777, October 19, 2011.
[13] Choa v. Choa, GR No. 143376, November 26, 2002.
[14] Benjamin Bangayan Jr. v. Sally Go Bangayan, GR No. 172777, October 19, 2011.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.