PRIMO EVANGLISTA, PETITIONER, VS. HIPOLITO CASTILLO, RESPONDENT.

This was an election contest for the office of vice-mayor of Mabini,
Batangas. The Court of First Instance declared the contestant the
winner by eighteen votes over the contestee, the latter appealed to the
Court, of Appeals, and the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal on the
ground that the trial court’s decision was unappealable. We are now
requested to review the Court of Appeals’ order of dismissal.

In the case of Lucena et al vs. Tan, (G. R. No. L-2296, September 14, 1949, 47 Off. Gaz., 1121; 84 Phil., 548), the Court said::

“Prima facie the proposed appeal will involve legal and factual questions.

“Now,
is that appeal authorized by law? Section 178 of the present Election
Code specifically allows appeals to the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals (as the case may be) from decisions of courts of first instance
in contests against the election of provincial governors, members of
the provincial board, city councilors and mayors. Vice-mayors and
municipal councilors are not mentioned.

“In Tajanlañgit vs.
Peñaranda ([1917]), 37 Phil., 155), we declared that, in view of the
provisions of the Administrative Code, decisions of the courts of first
instance in municipal election contests were final and not appealable.
The view was premised on the fact that the law directed that all
election contests shall be filed with the corresponding court of first
instance, which ‘shall have exclusive and final jurisdiction except as
hereinafter provided * * *”and the further fact that while expressly
providing for an appeal in contests of elections for provincial
governors, the law contained no provision permitting an appeal in
contests involving municipal officers.

“Such ruling was applied in subsequent cases. (De Guzman vs. Cuenca, 40 Phil., 203; De la Cruz vs. Revilla and Bustos, 40 Phil., 234; Municipal Council of Las Piñas vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 40 Phil., 279; Arevalo vs. Dalandan, 40 Phil., 475.)

“The present Election Code, unlike the law at the time the
above-mentioned, cases were considered, does not contain a provision
giving ‘exclusive and final jurisdiction to courts of first instance’.
But the difference should be immaterial, because this Court only
mentioned such final jurisdiction as one of the reasons for
holding that no appeal existed. There is the other reason which is
still goods the law does not provide for appeal in contests for
vice-mayor and councilor, although it expressly allows appeals in
contests for other positions.

“In Aguilar and Casapao vs.
Navarro (55 Phil., 898), we held.there was no appeal to this Court from
the order of a court of first instance denying a petition for authority
to correct the election returns, because section 480 of the Election
Law (at that time) enumerating the cases appealable to the Supreme
Court, did not include such controversial matter. We said, a
well-recognized principle of law’ is ‘that an appeal to a higher court
may only be taken when the law so provides’.

“On the other
hand, the American authorities seem to be of the opinion that in the
absence of statute ‘no appeal or error proceeding lies from the
judgment of a court in an election contest’. (18 American
Jurisprudence, 384; see also 29 Corpus Juris Secundum, 429, et seq.)
This is not a denial of equal protection of the laws because the
principle applies to all persons similarly situated. And as to due
process, this Court has held that the right of appeal is statutory and
is not. a necessary element of due process of law. (U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31, Phil., 218; Duarte vs. Dade, 32 Phil., 36.)

“We must, therefore; hold that no appeal to this Court lies from a
decision of the court of first instance in contests for vice- mayor or
municipal councilors.

“The decision in Marquez vs.
Prodigalidad, L-2099, (May 26, 1948), may be deemed an exception to
this holding. But herein petitioners do not fall within that exception,
because unlike the Marquez case the appealed, litigation involves
questions of fact, and does not revolve a round a question of
jurisdiction. Of course it must be understood that those justices who
dissented in the Marquez case do not, upon signing this decision,
repudiate the views announced in their dissenta”

In the case of Marquez vs. Prodigalidad, referred to in Lucena vs. Tan, supra, the Court, with Mr. Justice Feria and the witer of this opinion dissenting, made this rulings

“Creemos, portanto, que el articulo 178 del Codigo
Electoral Revisado, al disponer expresamente que son apelables las
decisions de los Juzgados de Primera Instancia ‘sobre protestas contra
la eligibilidad o la eleccion de gobernadores provinciales, vocales de
la junta provincial, consejales de ciudad y alcaldes,’ no ha tenido el
proposito de vedar en otras protestas la apelacion al Tribunal Supremo
sobre cuestiones puramente de derecho, particularmente sobre cuestiones
de jurisdiccidn, o de constitucionalidad de alguna ley, ordenanza,
trada u orden ejecutiva.”

It will at once be noted from a comparison of the two decisions that in Marquez vs. Prodigalidad only questions of law were involved while in Lucena vs.
Tan both questions of fact and of law, so it was presumed, would be put
in issue. It will also be noted that, the later case was excluded from
the rule laid down in the earlier one because of the presence in the
Lucena case of factual controversies. To determine, therefore, which of
the two adjudications is to govern the instant appeal, we only have to
see whether the case at bar is affected with questions of fact.
Briefly, the facts are these:

Primo Evangelista, contestee in the court below, and Hipolito
Castillo, contestant, were candidates for vice-mayor of the
aforementioned municipality in the general elections held on November
11, 1947. The election returns gave Evangelista 1,283 votes and
Castillo, 1,267. Accordingly the municipal board of canvassers
proclaimed Evangelista elected with a plurality of sixteen votes over
his opponent.

In impugning the election, the protestant alleged frauds,
irregularities, and other violations of the Election Law in Precincts
1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9. And upon trial the Court made these
conclusions:”Of the total votes of 1,267 adjudicated to the contestant
by the board of canvassers as shown in the election returns for the six
precincts in the municipality of Mabini, a total of 5 votes should be
deducted; namely, PE-1, PE-4, HC-9, HC-11, and HC-16, leaving a total
of 1,262 votes. On the other hand, of the total votes of 1,286
adjudicated to the contestee by the board of canvassers as shown in the
election returns, a total of 39 votes, shall be deducted; namely, 1-P,
1-Q, 1-EE, 4-Q, 4-R, 4-H, 6-D, 7-A, 9-V, one vote illegally cast by
Albino Maramot, one excess vote in Precinct No. 4, one excess vote in
Precinct No. 6 and the 27 ballots which have been found to have been
written by one or two hands; and after deducting these 39 votes from
the total votes in favor of the contestee are 1,244. Therefore, the
contestant has received a plurality of eighteen (18) votes over the
contestee. Accordingly, the contestant Hipolito Castillo is hereby
declared vice-mayor elect of the municipality of Mabini, Batangas.”

Roughly, the court below found that some ballots were intentionally
marked, some had been prepared by more than one person, and others,
which had not been counted in favor of the protestant by the board of
canvassers, should, in the opinion of the court, have been so counted.
On the other hand, certain ballots credited to the protestee by the
board, of canvassers and objected to by the protestant were held valid
and properly canvassed for the protestee.

That most or all of these findings are essentially findings of fact
is so manifest as to obviate discussion. This being so, the controlling
doctrine, as far as this case is concerned, is that announced in Lucena
vs. Tan, supra.

The similarity between the present case and the case just mentioned
is implicitly admitted by the protestee’s counsel. In the Court of
Appeals they suggested that the motion to dismiss the appeal be held in
abeyance on the theory “that the question of law raised in the case of
Dominador Lucena vs. Hon. Judge Tan, G.R. No. 2296, (is) now
pending decision in the Supreme Court,” insinuating that the
decision.in that case would be decisive of the case at hand.

There was an incident in the Court of First Instance which properly
could have been the subject of a special action, or appeal under the
Lucena-Tan doctrine. We refer to the dismissal of the protesters
counter-pretest which alleged frauds in Precinct No. 2, frauds which,
it was averred, redounded to the protestee’s detriment and to the
protestant’s benefit. The court dismissed that counter-protest upon the
objection of the protestant, who contended that the counter-protest did
not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction of the
counter-protest on the trial court in that the counter-protest failed
to allege that the counter-protestant had filed a certificate of
candidacy for the office in dispute.

But, although this matter is prominently stressed in the brief of
the appellant in his appeal by certiorari, it seems to be a fact that
he did not appeal to the Court of Appeals from the order dismissing his
counter-protest. He appealed only from that part of the decision
pertaining to the adjudication of contested ballots by the Court of
First Instance on the basis of which the protestant was pronounced the
vice-mayor-elect with a plurality of eighteen votes. The clear
inference we draw from the pleariinss and the briefs before us is that
the protestee and appellant was not keenly interested in the recounting
of the ballots in Precinct No. 2 and took no steps to challenge the
order quashing his counter-protest. Furthermore, there is no showing or
allegation that if allowed the counter-protest could by any possibility
have changed the result of the decision..

It is our opinion that the decision of the Court of Appeals should
be affirmed, with costs against the appellant. It is so ordered.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.