THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by
the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and the holding of the
position of a secret agent to
the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for
the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.  We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an
information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: “The undersigned
accuses MARIO MAPA Y MA­PULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with
Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as
follows:  That on or about the 13th day
of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his
possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6)
rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or
permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities.  Contrary
to law.”

When the case was called
for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: “May counsel stipulate that the accused was found
in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an
agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary.” After counsel
sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity
of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he
explicitly specified such
question to be “whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm.”

Upon the lower court
stating that the fiscal should examine the documents so that he could pass on
their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: “Does the
accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition
mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in
the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?” The accused, now the appellant, answered
categorically: “Yes, Your Honor.”
Upon which, the lower court made a statement: “The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao
also affirms that the accused admits.”

Forthwith, the
fiscal announced that he was “willing
to submit the same for decision.” Counsel for the accused on his part
presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment “as secret agent
of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste,” then Governor of Batangas,
dated June 2, 1962;^[1] another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to
proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon
City on a
confidential mission;^[2]
the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent;^[3] a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the
effect that the accused “is
a secret agent” of Gov. Leviste.^[4]
Counsel for the accused then stated
that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was “willing to submit
the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor
is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm.” The exhibits were admitted and the parties
were given time to file their respective memoranda.

Thereafter on November
27, 1963, the lower
court rendered a decision convicting
the accused “of the crime
of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs.  The firearm and ammunition confiscated from
him are forfeited in favor of the Govern­ment.”

The only question being
one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. 
The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that
except as thereafter specifi­cally allowed, “it shall be unlawful for any
person to * * * possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition.”^[5] The next section provides that
“firearms and ammunition regularly and law­fully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails,” are not covered “when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of
their official duties.”^[6]

The law cannot be any
clearer.  No provision is made for a secret agent. 
As such he is not exempt.  Our
task is equally clear.  The first and
fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. 
“Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.”^[7] The conviction of the accused must
stand.  It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would
rely on People v. Macarandang,^[8] where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the
appointment “of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance
of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him
within the cate­gory of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member
of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879.” Such reliance is misplaced. 
It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and
explicit mandate of a statutory provision. 
To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what
was held in People v. Maca­randang, it no longer
speaks with authority.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Exhibit 1.

^[2]
Exhibit 2.

^[3]
Exhibit 3.

^[4]
Exhibit 4.

^[5]
Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.

^[6]
Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.

^[7]
Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24 Phil. 504, 513.

^[8]
L-12088, December 23, 1959.