THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DAVID LEAL, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, DAVIL LEAL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in its criminal case 22762 finding David Leal
guilty of the crime of murder, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Godofredo Nicolas in the sum of P6,000,
the present appeal was taken.

We have, with painstaking care, meticulously examined the entire
record of this case.  We are completely satisfied
that the findings of fact made by the Court of First Instance are essentially
correct.

The sequence of events that led to the death of the victim
Nicolas is not complicated.  At about
9:30 o’clock on the night of March 23, 1966, Godofredo
Nicolas and his brother Nari Nicolas were at a
sari-sari store situated along the national highway in barrio Bued, in the municipality of Calasiao,
Pangasinan. 
Jose Cajeton, Jr., who suffered a humiliating
manhandling at the hands of Nari Nicolas one hour
earlier, and the appellant David Leal, who was a very intimate friend of Cajeton, drove up in a jeep to that sari-sari store.  They sought the two brothers and beckoned
them from the store.  When the Nicolas
brothers reached the jeep, Cajeton, without any
warning, boxed Nari, while Leal pulled out his
dagger.  Sensing that Leal was going to
use his dagger on him, Godofredo fled.  Leal gave chase.  Godofredo had
covered a distance of about 40 to 50 meters from the jeep when he slipped and
fell to the ground, face and body up, with both hands supporting his body, his
buttocks about eight inches high from the ground.  Godofredo was
precisely in this position when Leal caught up and lunged his one-foot long
dagger into the former’s left chest, causing a
perforation of the heart with consequent massive bleeding, resulting in his
death.

These happenings were the subject of the testimony of Nari Nicolas and Celso Zarate who, the court a quo observed
correctly, were friends of David Leal, and therefore had no reason to prevari­cate.  This is, likewise, corroborated by the
statements made by Wilfredo Flores in
the reinvestigation of this case before Fiscal Ruiz.  Although at the trial Flores recanted,
stating that what he had said at the reinvestigation was taught to him by the
father of Godo­fredo Nicolas, the court a quo
discounted this recantation, on the ground that the father of Godofredo Nicolas was not present when the crime was
committed, and, therefore, was not in a position to teach Flores what to say at
the reinvestigation.  Moreover, the
testimony of Flores in the said reinvestigation was replete with details and
circumstances which only an eyewitness like him could accurately and vividly
narrate.

What we feel compelled to discuss at length is the contention of
the defense that the offense was not accompanied by treachery.  This contention, in our view, has merit.  According to paragraph 16 of article 14 of
the Revised Penal Code, “(t)here is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employ­ing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to him­self arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.” Philippine jurisprudence would indicate that treachery is
absent when means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to insure
the execution of the offense are not consciously adopted; and that treachery
must be present from the commencement of an attack, so that even if before the
termination of the assault, an accused person employs means, methods or forms
of a treacherous character, the qualifying circumstance of alevosia
is not necessarily present.  A continuous
attack cannot be broken up into two or more parts and made to constitute separate,
distinct and independent attacks, so that the element of treachery may be
injected therein and considered as a qualifying or aggravating circumstance.

In the case at bar, the evidence does not indicate that the
appellant employed means, methods or forms to specially insure the killing of
the deceased.  Treachery was not present
when the chase was begun; the chase was a continuous one.  The deceased had negotiated only a distance
of about 40 to 50 meters in his flight when he slipped.  There was no interruption in the continuity
of the chase.

It is, therefore, our considered view that alevosia
was not present when the appellant inflicted the fatal wound on his
victim.  The crime committed by him is,
therefore, only that of homicide.

The crime of homicide is punished by article 249 with reclu­sion
temporal.  Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances present, we are of the opinion that the proper penalty that
should be imposed on the appellant is an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and
one (1) day of prision mayor to 16
years of reclusion temporal. 
Following our ruling in People vs. Pantoja,^[1]
the indemnity to be paid by the appel­lant to the heirs of the deceased should
be raised to P12,000.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the court a quo
is modified.  The appellant David Leal is
hereby found guilty of homicide, and sentenced to imprisonment of from 8 years
and one (1) day of prision mayor to 16
years of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Godofredo Nicolas in the sum of P12,000, and
to pay the costs of this appeal.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

^[1] L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 473.