DEMETRIA OBIEN DE ALMARIO, PETITIONER, VS. FIDEL IBAÑEZ JUDGE OF THE FIRST INSTANCE OF LAGUNA, MANUEL PAKALINAWAN, MARIA PAGKALINAWAN, AND JOVITO PAGKALINAWAN, RESPONDENTS.

Certiorari and mandamus to annul an order of the respondent judge denying the
admission of the testimony of new witnesses and to order him to admit said
testimony and render a new decision in civil case No. 7637 of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna.

In the early part of 1943 said civil case was commenced by Luis D. Almario
against Manuel Pagkalinawan and others to annul a certain deed of sale of a
parcel of land executed by the former in favor of the latter and to recover
damages. After due trial, and on January 28, 1944, Judge Felix Bautista Angelo
rendered judgment dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. The
plaintiff appealed the case to the then Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon, and
pending the filing of the briefs the battle for the liberation of the
Philippines supervened. After the liberation, and before the re-creation of the
Court of Appeals, the case reached this court, which on July 15, 1946, ordered
that a new trial in the lower court be held in view of the loss of the
stenographic notes and the statement of counsel for both parties that they would
raise factual issues in their briefs.

In the meantime the plaintiff Luis D. Almario having disappeared during the
latter part of the war, he was declared an absentee and trusteeship proceedings
of his estate were instituted. His wife, the herein petitioner Demetria Obien de
Almario, was appointed trustee and substituted as party plaintiff in said.
case.

When the case was called for new trial as ordered by this court, the
plaintiff offered as part of her evidence the testimony of new witnesses who did
not testify during the original trial but whom the plaintiff sought to present
in lieu of the original plaintiff, Luis D. Almario, who had disappeared. Upon
the objection of counsel for the defendants, the respondent judge refused to
admit the testimony of the said witnesses on the ground that the new trial
ordered by this court “is only for the purpose of enabling ‘the parties, thru
their counsel, to discuss in their briefs the facts proven in the former trial
and [that] the original decision of this court from which appeal has been taken
has not been vacated.” In other words, the respondent judge took the view that
his task was only to retake the testimony of the witnesses who testified during
the original trial and forward it to the appellate court without rendering a new
decision.

Was that view of the respondent judge correct? The question involves an
interpretation of the pertinent provisions of Act No. 3110, which provides an
adequate procedure for the reconstruction of the records of pending judicial
proceedings destroyed by fire or other public calamities. Sections 6, 7, 30, and
64 of said Act provide as follows:

“SEC. 6. Testimony of witnesses taken in civil cases shall be reconstituted
by means of an authentic copy thereof or a new transcript of the stenographic
notes. If no authentic copy can be obtained and the stenographic notes have also
been destroyed, the cases shall be tried de novo as if called for trial
for the first time.

“SEC. 7. If a civil case has already been decided, the decision shall be
reconstituted by means of an authentic copy. In case an authentic copy cannot be
found, the Court shall make a new decision, as if the case had never been
decided.”

“SEC. 30. When it shall not be possible to reconstitute a destroyed judicial
record by means of the procedure established in this Act or for any reason not
herein provided for, the interested parties may file their actions anew, upon
payment of the proper fees, and such actions shall be registered as new actions
and shall be treated as such.”

“SEC. 64. If an authentic copy of the transcript of the stenographic notes of
the testimony taken cannot be filed, the Supreme Court shall direct the proper
stenographer to make another transcription. And if the stenographic notes taken
by the stenographer has also been destroyed, the Supreme Court shall direct the
proper Court of First Instance to proceed to hear the case anew, which shall
then be considered as ready for a hearing in said Court of First
Instance.”

In the case of Madalang vs. Court of First Instance of Romblon
(1926), 49 Phil. 487, the entire record was destroyed by fire after the case had
been decided by the Court of First Instance and while a motion for new trial was
pending therein. The record was reconstructed in accordance with the provisions
of Act No. 3110 by means of authentic copies of the pleadings, of the
documentary evidence, and of the decision of the trial court, “minus the
transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimony of the witnesses for both
parties, the flame having been destroyed by fire, together with the original
stenographic notes. In view of the impossibility of reproducing said oral
evidence, the court ordered a new trial for the presentation and reception of
the testimony of the witnesses.” During the new trial fhe defendant Madalang,
after having introduced the same witnesses who had testified in the original
trial, attempted to present additional witnesses. The adverse party objected to
the admission of the testimony of the additional witnesses and the trial court
sustained the objection.

In denying the petition for mandamus in that case, this court applied
sections 6 and 7 of Act No. 3110. It will be recalled that section 6 provides
that if no authentic copy of the transcript of the stenographic notes can be
obtained and the stenographic notes have also been destroyed, the case shall be
tried de novo as if called for trial for the first time; and section 7
provides that if the case has already been decided, the decision shall be
reconstituted by means of an authentic copy, and if an authentic copy cannot be
found, the court shall make a new decision as if the case had never been
decided. After quoting said sections the court interpreted them in this
wise:

“It appears from section 7 above quoted that a new judgment can be rendered,
as if the case had never been decided, only when the original decision cannot be
reconstructed by means of an authentic copy. So that if an authentic copy of the
original decision exists, the latter must be reconstructed by means thereof. If
this is so, the reconstruction of the oral evidence introduced at the original
trial of civil cases, when no authentic copy thereof exists, or when the
stenographic notes have been destroyed and it is impossible to secure another
transcript of the same, the testimony of the witnesses who testified at the
original trial shall be taken again; because, as the original decision is
reconstructed by means of an authentic copy of the same, it is not necessary to
render a new one, and the reconstruction of the oral evidence is only for the
purpose of permitting the court of appeal to review it and determine whether the
appealed decision is in accordance therewith.

“Consequently, Act No. 3110 in providing in its section 7 that if an
authentic copy exists the decision shall be reconstructed by means thereof, it
was the intention that in the reconstruction of the oral evidence, provided in
section 6, only the testimony of the same witnesses who testified at the
original trial must be taken again and not the testimony of additional
witnesses, because neither the literal meaning of the verb “reconstitute,” used
in said law, nor the spirit, nor the object of the same warrants a different
interpretation. (Page 490.)

Relying upon said decision the herein respondents contend that the new trial
ordered by this court was limited to the reception of the testimony of the
witnesses who testified in the original trial; that all that the respondent
judge had to do was to forward the reconstructed oral evidence to this court in
order that the original decision rendered by Judge Bautista Angelo might be
reviewed on appeal; and that, therefore, the petition for certiorari and
mandamus should be denied.

The facts of the Madalang case differ from those of the present in these
respects: (1) In that case the witnesses who testified in the original trial
were present and available and in fact did testify in the new trial; whereas in
the present case one of the principal witnesses for the plaintiff, namely, the
original plaintiff himself, Luis D. Almario, had disappeared and his whereabouts
was unknown when the case was called for new trial. (2) In that case the
stenographic notes were burned while the case was still pending on a motion for
new trial in the trial court, and apparently the judge who had tried and decided
the case originally was the same judge who ordered and conducted a new trial;
whereas in the present case the stenographic notes were lost after the case had
been elevated on appeal and the new trial ordered by this court was to take
place before another judge who did not hear and decide the case originally.
These variations between the respective facts of the two cases are in our
opinion substantial enough to produce different results, as we shall presently
explain.

It will be noted that Act No. 3110 provides separate procedures for the
reconstitution of civil cases pending in the Courts of First, Instance and for
the reconstitution of those pending in the Supreme Court on appeal. (Cf.
sections 6 and 7 and section 64.) Different sections of the Act cover different
stages in which the cases were found at the time the records were destroyed.
Thus, section 4 covers the stage where a civil case was pending trial in the
Court of First Instance at the time the record was destroyed or lost; section 6
evidently refers to the stage where the trial had been concluded but the case
had not been decided at the time the stenographic notes were destfoyed or lost;
section 7 covers the stage where the case had been tried and decided but was
still pending in the Court of First Instance at the time the record was
destroyed or lost; and 64 covers the stage where the case was pending in Supreme
Court (or Court of Appeals) at the time the record was destroyed or lost.

If no authentic copy of the transcript of the stenographic notes can be
obtained and the stenographic notes have also been destroyed, the case “shall be
tried de novo as if called for trial for the first time.” (Section 6.)
It is to be assumed that section 6 refers to the stage where the court had not
yet rendered its decision at the time the stenographic notes were destroyed,
because another provision (section 7) is made when a decision had been rendered
at the time the stenographic notes were destroyed. In the situation covered by
section 6 the case is tried de novo as if called for trial for the first time,
and naturally there is no restriction of the witnesses whose testimony may be
taken. In the situation covered by section 7 where a decision had been rendered,
the case may or may not be tried de novo, depending upon the
circumstances. If the decision can be reconstituted by means of an authentic
copy and the stenographic notes have not been destroyed, there is no need for
reopening the trial. If the decision cannot be reconstituted by means of an
authentic copy but either the stenographic notes or the transcript thereof is
intact, neither is there any need for reopening the trial; the court will simply
make a new decision as if the case had never been decided. If the decision can
be reconstituted by means of an authentic copy but neither the stenographic
notes nor an authentic copy of the transcript thereof can be found, as in the
Madalang case (supra), a new trial is required.

What then is the scope of such new trial? Is the case to be “tried de
novo as if called for trial for the first time,” as provided in section 6?
Or may it be limited to the same witnesses who testified in the original trial?
And will the original decision which has been reconstituted stand, or will the
court have to render a new decision after the new trial?

Section 7 is not specific on these points. But since the law is procedural or
adjective and is only a means to an end—an aid to substantive law—it should be
interpreted and applied to accomplish that end. Thus, as in the Madalang case,
if the decision of the trial court is intact but because of the lack of the
stenographic notes or of the transcript thereof the testimony of the witnesses
have to be retaken, and if all of said witnesses are available and the judge who
heard them before is the same judge who is to retake their testimony, there is
no reason of law or justice to hear new or additional witnesses, because the
loss of the record of the testimony of the original witnesses does not and
cannot give rise to any necessity.or justification for calling new or additional
witnesses whose testimony would necessarily render the reconstituted decision
inapplicable and, therefore, its reconstitution of no avail. Hence, as was
decided in the Madalang case, the trial court may propperly limit the parties to
the same witnesses who testified in the original trial; and if said witnesses
should testify In the new trial to substantially the same facts as those
testified to by them in the original trial, as they are supposed to do, and as
the same judge who heard them before will require them to do, there is no need
to render a new decision. But if the said witnesses or some of them should
testify differently from the facts they testified to in the original trial, the
court would have to make new findings of fact and render a new decision. As thus
qualified and explained, the decision of this court in the Madalang case is
correct and need not be disturbed.

But that case is not applicable to the instant case, Which, as already noted
above, presents substantially different facts. In the instant case one of the
principal witnesses for the plaintiff, namely, the original plaintiff himself,
Luis D. Almario, cannot testify in the new trial, he having disappeared, and it
would be unjust to deny to his successor in interest as party plaintiff the
right to substitute his testimony with that of another witness or witnesses who
may have knowledge of the same facts to which he testified in the original
trial. Another difference is that the judge who heard the original witnesses and
decided the case is not the same judge before whom the new trial is held and is
therefore totally ignorant of what the original Witnesses had testified to. He
would not be in a position to instruct the witnesses who testified in the
original trial to limit their testimony to the points to which they had
testified before. These two circumstances, which did not obtain in the Madalang
case, render untenable the theory of the respondent judge that his task is only
to retake the testimony of the witnesses who testified during the original trial
and forward it to the appellate court without rendering a new decision.

In the present case it is imperative that the trial should render a new
decision in conformity with the facts established in the new trial. That is
contemplated and authorized by section 64 of Act No. 3110, which is the
provision applicable to the reconstitution in the Supreme Court (or Court of
Appeals) of civil cases under appeal. While the Supreme Court may limit the
scope of the new trial as the circumstances warrant, the order of new trial
issued in this case was couched in general or unrestricted terms, and the facts
and circumstances now disclosed before us do not warrant any limitation or
restriction.

During our deliberation a suggestion was made that if the petitioner desires
to call new or additional witnesses she should bring a new action under section
30 of Act No. 3110 The court, however, is of the opinion that said section is
not applicable because it refers to a situation where the entire record of the
case including the pleadings is destroyed and it is not possible to reconstitute
it by means of the procedure established in said Act or for any reason not
provided for therein. It is not necessary for the plaintiff herein to file a new
action and pay the proper fees, since the pleadings have been reconstituted and
only the oral evidence is missing.

The writ prayed for is granted without any finding as to costs.

SO
ORDERED.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, and
Tuason, JJ., concur.
Feria, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., did not take part.