RONALD ALLAN POE A.K.A. FERNANDO POE, JR., PROTESTANT, VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, PROTESTEE.

Poe versus Arroyo

The Case

This is the Presidential Electoral Tribunal's decision in the election protest filed by Fernando Poe, Junior against Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the candidate proclaimed by Congress as the duly elected President of the Philippines in the May 2004 elections. The protestant died while the protest was pending, and his widow, Jesusa Sonora Poe, known to the public as Susan Roces, sought to intervene and substitute for him. The case matters because it is a matter of first impression: the Tribunal had to decide not only who truly won, but whether a deceased protestant's widow may take his place in a presidential election protest. It is the leading authority on the survival of an election protest after the protestant's death, and on who is a real party in interest in such a contest.

Procedural History

The case began as an original election protest filed directly with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the body composed of all fifteen members of the Supreme Court sitting pursuant to the Constitution. The protestant filed his protest seasonably on July 23, 2004. The protestee filed her Answer with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. The parties then exchanged motions on their respective positions. On December 14, 2004, the protestant died. On January 10, 2005, his widow filed a Manifestation with Urgent Petition or Motion to Intervene as a Substitute for the Deceased Protestant. The protestee filed her Comment, the movant filed her Reply, and the Tribunal resolved the matter in this decision. There was no trial court or Court of Appeals below; the Tribunal is the court of first and last instance for presidential election protests.

Facts

In the May 10, 2004 presidential elections, the Congress, acting as the National Board of Canvassers, proclaimed Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the duly elected President. She obtained 12,905,808 votes, against 11,782,232 votes for the second placer, the movie actor Fernando Poe, Junior. She took her oath of office before the Chief Justice on June 30, 2004.

Refusing to concede, Poe filed an election protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Arroyo answered with a counter protest. While the parties exchanged motions, on December 14, 2004, the protestant died at St. Luke's Hospital of cardio-pulmonary arrest, secondary to cerebral infarction.

On January 10, 2005, his widow, Jesusa Sonora Poe, filed a motion to intervene and substitute for her deceased husband. She claimed that the death of the protestant did not oust the Tribunal of jurisdiction, that the protest was imbued with paramount public interest, and that she sought only to pursue the process of ascertaining the true will of the electorate. She expressly conceded that as a mere substitute she could not succeed to the presidency. The protestee opposed, arguing that a public office is personal and not transmissible to heirs, that the widow was not a candidate and so could not be a real party in interest, and that the public interest in a protest dies with the protestant.

Issues

• Whether or not the widow of a deceased protestant may intervene and substitute for him in a presidential election protest.
• Whether or not the death of the protestant abates the election protest and ousts the Tribunal of jurisdiction.
• Whether or not the protest should be dismissed for lack of a real party in interest.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal Rules provides:

Rule 14. Election Protest. Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

This fixes who may commence a presidential election protest, and by its express enumeration identifies the real parties in interest.

Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, the rule on substitution, provides:

Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

This is the rule the widow invoked, and the Tribunal applied it suppletorily, but only to allow substitution by a real party in interest.

Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the rule on intervention, provides:

Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

This requires a direct and immediate interest, which the widow does not possess.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Tribunal denied the motion. Under Rule 14, only the second and third placers may contest a presidential election, and the widow was not even a candidate. Applying Rule 3, Section 16 suppletorily, the Tribunal held that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to heirs upon death. It had consistently rejected substitution by the widow or heirs in election contests where the protestant dies.

On the second issue, the Tribunal held that the death of the protestant does not necessarily abate the action. An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or protestee, such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the proceedings. Substitution and intervention are allowed, but only by a real party in interest, meaning the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment and entitled to the avails of the suit. In earlier cases, the vice-mayor was allowed to substitute because he would succeed to the office; here, the widow herself denied any claim to the presidency, so she is not a real party in interest.

On the third issue, the Tribunal held that while an election protest is imbued with public interest, nobility of intention is not the point of reference. Under Rule 19, Section 1, the interest must be direct and immediate. The widow will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome. No real party, such as the vice-presidential aspirants, came forward to intervene or substitute. Allowing non-real parties to intervene would make proceedings unnecessarily complicated, expensive, and interminable, which is not the policy of the law.

Doctrine

A public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. The right to file an election protest is personal and non-transmissible, so the widow or heirs of a deceased protestant cannot substitute for him unless they are real parties in interest. The death of the protestant does not abate the protest, because an election protest is imbued with public interest; but substitution or intervention is allowed only by a real party in interest, that is, the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment and entitled to the avails of the suit. Under Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal Rules, only the registered candidates who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest a presidential election, and by that express enumeration the rules identify the real parties in interest. Under Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an intervenor must have a direct and immediate interest such that he will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment.

Disposition

The motion of Jesusa Sonora Poe to intervene and substitute for the deceased protestant was denied for lack of merit, and the election protest was dismissed on the ground that no real party in interest came forward within the period allowed by law to intervene or be substituted for the deceased protestant, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

The line worth memorizing is that a public office is personal and not transmissible to heirs, so an election protest survives the protestant's death but only a real party in interest may substitute or intervene. Examiners like to use this case on the survival of election protests, the concept of a real party in interest, and the limits of intervention under Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.