THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BENJIE LAGAO Y GARCIA @ BINGO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Lagao

The Case

This is People versus Lagao, a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecute Benjie Lagao y Garcia, known as Bingo, for the killing of Anthony Sumad-ong Nerida. The accused was charged with homicide, convicted by the trial court, and now asks the Supreme Court to overturn that conviction. The case matters to a reviewee because it is a compact laboratory on the hearsay rule and its most famous exception, the res gestae rule — the principle that statements made under the stress of a startling occurrence may be received in evidence — and on how our courts treat a dying man's identification of his attacker when relayed by those who heard it.

Procedural History

Alfredo Nerida, Senior, the father of the late Anthony Nerida, filed a complaint for homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Agoo, La Union. Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed an information for homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33. When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment on April 24, 2012, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordering him to pay the heirs actual damages of 18,600 pesos, moral damages of 50,000 pesos, death indemnity of 50,000 pesos, and the costs. The accused, through the Public Attorney's Office, moved for reconsideration; the motion was denied for lack of merit in an order dated May 24, 2012, which also granted the prosecutor's prayer for an increased bail bond. The accused then filed a notice of appeal, and the case rose to the Supreme Court by ordinary appeal under Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Facts

On or about the twentieth day of February 2008, in the Municipality of Bauang, Province of La Union, Anthony Sumad-ong Nerida was attacked and struck on the head with a hard object, suffering fatal injuries that caused his untimely death. The information alleged that the accused acted with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously.

After the injury, the deceased told two prosecution witnesses, Ricardo De Guzman and Ryan Cruz, who had struck him. At trial, these witnesses testified that the deceased himself made the statement identifying the accused. Doctor Bernardo Parado, the municipal health officer of Bauang, La Union, conducted an autopsy and declared the cause of death to be cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to intracranial hemorrhage secondary to blunt force injury at the middle occipital area. His findings corroborated the witnesses' account that the deceased was struck with a blunt object on the head.

The accused offered only denial. The trial court weighed the evidence, convicted him of homicide, and denied reconsideration. Hence the appeal, in which the accused argued that the two witnesses were not eyewitnesses, that their testimonies rested on what the deceased told them, and that those testimonies were therefore hearsay and inadmissible.

Issues

• Whether or not the testimonies of Ricardo De Guzman and Ryan Cruz, recounting the deceased's statement identifying the accused, are hearsay and therefore inadmissible.
• Whether or not the deceased's statement is admissible as part of the res gestae.
• Whether or not the trial court committed serious errors in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.

Applicable Provisions

Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence:

Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

This is the rule the accused invokes, and the Court must decide whether the witnesses' testimony falls within it or within an exception.

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, which the Court cites in concluding that the elements of homicide were proven, defines and penalizes the crime:

Article 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

This provision supplies the elements the Court checks against the evidence: that a person was killed, that the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance, that the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed, and that the killing was not attended by any qualifying circumstance of murder, parricide, or infanticide.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the testimonies are not hearsay. Under the rule, evidence is hearsay if its probative value rests not on the witness's personal knowledge but on that of someone not on the stand. Here, however, what the witnesses testified to was a fact within their own perception — that the deceased actually made the statement. What was offered was the fact that the utterance was made, not necessarily the truth of its contents. Evidence of the making of such a statement is primary, not secondary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant to its existence.

On the second issue, the Court held that the deceased's statement and the witnesses' testimonies on it form part of the res gestae. The rule applies where the declarant did not testify, provided three requisites concur: that the principal act be a startling occurrence; that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and that the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. The Court found the lapse of time between the infliction of the injury and the making of the statements brought the case within the rule.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court committed no serious error. Doctor Parado's autopsy findings corroborated the witnesses, and against their affirmative testimony the accused offered only denial, which, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not demand absolute certainty; only moral certainty — that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind — is required, and it was met. The Court also deferred to the trial court's assessment of credibility, given its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand, and affirmed the findings.

Doctrine

First, a witness may testify only to facts of his personal knowledge, derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided by the rules. Second, when a witness testifies that another person made a statement, and the point is the fact that the utterance was made rather than the truth of its contents, the testimony is not hearsay but primary evidence. Third, a statement of a declarant who does not testify is admissible as part of the res gestae — the res gestae being the startling occurrence itself — when the principal act was a startling occurrence, the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a falsehood, and the statement concerns the occurrence and its immediate attending circumstances. Fourth, denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and cannot outweigh credible affirmative testimony. Fifth, proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only moral certainty, and the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is accorded great weight.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for utter lack of merit and affirmed the decision and order of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, convicting Benjie Lagao y Garcia of homicide.

Remember This

Memorize the three requisites of res gestae: a startling occurrence, a statement made before there was time to contrive a falsehood, and a statement concerning the occurrence and its immediate attending circumstances. Examiners use this case to test the hearsay rule, the distinction between offering a statement to prove it was made and offering it to prove its truth, and the weight of denial against affirmative testimony.