JUAN S. BARRERA, (DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM AND TRADE NAME, MACHINERY AND STEEL PRODUCTS ENGINEER­ING (MASPE), PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, P…

It was the absence of any definite ruling at the time this
petition was filed on the question of whether or not a pending certification
election proceeding may be dismissed or held in abeyance, there being such a
motion on the part of the employer Juan S. Barrera, doing business under the
firm and trade name of Machinery and Steel Products Engineering (MASPE),
alleging an unfair labor practice against one of the contending parties,
private respondent MASPE Workers Union, the other being private respondent
Philippine Associated Workers Union, that led this Court to give it due course.  The unfair labor practice imputed to such
labor union consisted of failure to bargain collectively, aggravated by an
illegal strike.  Respondent Court of
Industrial Relations denied such a motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds
therein alleged “appear not to be indubitable.” A motion for
reconsideration having proved futile, this petition was filed.  Subsequently, to be precise, in 1973, in the
case of B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. v. Goodrich (Marikina
Factory) Confidential and Salaried Employees Union-NATU,^[1]
such a question was given an answer by this Court, one adverse to the claim of
petitioner.  This petition, therefore,
must be dismissed.

The case for petitioner was put most vigorously in the exhaustive
and scholarly brief of its counsel, Manuel M. Crudo.  To quote from its pertinent portion:  “On September 22, 1970 the petitioner Barrera filed a motion
to dismiss or hold case in abeyance, in CIR Case No. 2759-MC.  In said motion, we called attention to the admission of Maspe
Workers Union as intervenor in the case.  We stated that the intervenor
union, its officers and members had committed various acts of unfair labor practice and were on illegal strike punctuated by force, violence and intimidation.  We
called attention to our formal
charge of unfair labor practice
against the intervenor union.  We called attention to the fact that in the
charge of unfair labor practice among the reliefs
prayed for were to declare
respondents therein collectively and individually guilty of unfair labor practice; to declare
the strike, and other concerted actions resorted to in pursuance of said unfair
labor practice illegal; to declare the Maspe
Workers Union as consequently having
lost all rights and privileges accorded by law to a legimate
labor union; and to
declare all individual respondents therein and others as having lost their employment status  by virtue of the illegality of the strike staged by them.  We then pointed out that unless the case for
unfair labor practice against Maspe Workers Union,
its officers and members is decided the status of that union and its members
who are respondents would be uncertain (i.e., in relation to the requested
certification election and the outcome thereof). * * * Unfortunately, the
respondent Honorable Court of Industrial Relations denied our motion to dismiss
or hold case in abeyance. * * *.”^[2]
It remains only to be added that subsequently the Court of Industrial Relations
en banc denied a motion for reconsideration,
failing “to find sufficient justification to alter or to modify the
aforesaid Order.”^[3]

To repeat, the petition cannot prosper.

1.     
As set forth in the B. F. Goodrich
Philippines, Inc. decision:  “There
is novelty in the specific question raised, as to whether or not a
certification election may be stayed at the instance of the employer, pending
the determination of an unfair labor practice case filed by it against certain
employees affiliated with respondent-unions. 
That is a matter of which this Court has not had an opportunity to speak
on previously.  What is settled law, dating
from the case of Standard Cigarette Workers’ Union v. Court of Industrial Rela­tions,
decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization objecting to the
participation in a certification election of a company-dominated union, as a
result of which a complaint for an unfair labor practice case against the
employer was filed, the status of the latter union must be first cleared in
such a proceeding before such voting could take place.”^[4]

2.      This is the more relevant excerpt: 
“The unique situation before us, however, is exactly the
reverse.  It is management that would
have an unfair labor practice case filed by it for illegal strike engaged in by
some of its employees concluded, before it would agree to the holding of a
certification election.  That is the
stand of petitioner.  It does not carry
conviction.  The reason that justifies
the postponement of a certification election pending an inquiry, as to the bona fides of a labor union, precisely calls for a different
conclusion.  If under the circumstances
disclosed, management is allowed to have its way, the result might be to dilute
or fritter away the strength of an organization bent on a more zealous defense
of labor’s prerogatives.  The difficul­ties
and obstacles that must be then hurdled would not be lost on the rest of the
personnel, who had not as yet made up their minds one way or the other.  This is not to say that management is to be
precluded from filing an unfair labor practice case.  It is merely to stress that such a suit should not be allowed to lend itself as a
means, whether intended or not, to prevent a truly free expression of the will
of the labor group as to the
organization that will represent it.  It
is not only the loss of time involved, in itself not likely to enhance the
prospect of respondent-unions, but also the
fear engendered in the mind of an ordinary employee that management has many weapons in its
arsenal to bring the full force
of its undeniable power against those of its employees dissatisfied with things
as they are.  There is no valid reason then for the postponement sought.  This is one instance that calls for the
application of the maxim, lex dilationes semper exhorret. 
Moreover, is there not in the posture taken by petitioner a
contravention of what is expressly set forth in the Industrial Peace Act, which
speaks of the labor organizations ‘designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit [be the exclusive] representative of all the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.’ The law
clearly contemplates all the employees, not only some of them.  As much as possible then, there is to be no
unwarranted reduction in the number of those taking part in a certification
election, even under the guise that in the meanwhile, which may take some time,
some of those who are employees could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a
pending unfair labor practice case.”^[5]

3.     
Even on the assumption that the
vigorous condemnation of the strike and the picketing were attended by
violence, it does not automatically follow that thereby the strikers in
question are no longer entitled to participate in the certification election
for having automatically lost their jobs. 
So it was made clear in another B.F. Goodrich decision:^[6]
“What was set forth in the facts as found by respondent Judge Salvador
would indicate that it was during the picketing, certainly not peaceful, that
the imputed acts of violence did occur.  It cannot be ignored, however, that there were injuries on both sides because
management did not, understandably, play a passive role confronted as it was
with the unruly disruptive tactics of labor. 
This is not, by any means, to condone activities of such character,
irrespective of the parties responsible. 
It is merely to explain what cannot be justified.  Nonetheless, did the acts in question call
for an automatic finding of illegality? 
Again, the order issued on February
4, 1972 appeared to be oblivious of a 1971 decision of this Court,
Shell Oil Workers’ Union v. Shell Company of the
Philippines, Ltd.  There it was clearly
held:  ‘A strike otherwise valid, if
violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale.  Care is to be taken, however, especially
where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with
illegality just because it is tainted by such acts.  To avoid rendering illusory the recognition
of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and
not collective.  A different conclusion
would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike
lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as
a matter of policy.  It could be
reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal
because of the means employed.’ It must be pointed out likewise that the facts
as there found would seem to indicate a greater degree of violence.  Thus: 
‘Respondent Court
must have been unduly impressed by the evidence submitted by the Shell Company
to the effect that the strike was marred by acts of force, intimidation and
violence on the evening of June 14 and twice in the mornings of June 15 and 16,
1967 in Manila.  Attention was likewise called to the fact
that even on the following day, with police officials stationed at the
strike-bound area, molotov bombs did explode and the
streets were obstructed with wooden planks containing protruding nails.  Moreover, in the branches of the Shell
Company in Iloilo City
as well as in Bacolod,
on dates unspecified, physical injuries appeared to have been inflicted on
management personnel.  Respondent Court
in the appealed decision did penalize with loss of employment the ten
individuals responsible for such acts. 
Nor is it to be lost sight of that before the certification on June 27,
1967, one month had elapsed during which the Union was on strike.  Except on those few days specified then, the
Shell Company could not allege that the strike was conducted in a manner other than peaceful.  Under the circumstances, it would be going
too far to consider that it thereby became illegal.’ Then, mention was made of
a decision ‘in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. 
Employees’ Association v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. [where] there
is the recognition by this Court, speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing
as such being “inherently explosive.” It is thus clear that not every
form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to
cause the loss of employment by the guilty party.’ “^[7]

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed and the appealed
order affirmed.  No costs.

Aquino, Guerrero, Abad
Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., on official leave.

Concepcion, Jr., J., sick leave.

^[1]
L-34069-70, February 28, 1973,
49 SCRA 532.

^[2]
Brief for the Petitioner, 9-10.

^[3]
Petition, Annex P.

^[4]
49 SCRA 532, 538.  Standard Cigarette
Workers’ Union v. Court of Industrial Relations
is reported in 101 Phil. 126.

^[5]
Ibid, 540-541.

^[6]  Almira v. B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc.,
L-34974, July 25, 1974, 58
SCRA 120.

^[7]
Ibid, 127-128. 
Shell Oil Workers Union, L-28607, May 31, 1971, is reported in 39 SCRA 276; Insular Life
Assurance Co., L-25291, January 30,
1971, in 37 SCRA 244.