MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA SA ESSO (PFPW) AND PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF PETROLEUM WORKERS, PETITIONERS, VS. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., AND HON. CARMELINO G. ALVENDIA, JUDGE OF THE COU…

Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso versus Esso Standard Eastern

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by the Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso, a labor union affiliated with the Philippine Federation of Petroleum Workers, against Esso Standard Eastern, a foreign corporation engaged in the marketing and distribution of petroleum products, and against the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila who issued the disputed injunction. The union asks the Supreme Court to annul a preliminary injunction that restrained its members from striking and picketing at the company's Pandacan Terminal while a certification election was pending. The case matters because it draws the boundary between the regular courts and the Court of Industrial Relations in labor disputes, and because it teaches that the right to strike and picket, though protected by law, may be enjoined only by the tribunal that the Industrial Peace Act designates, and only after the safeguards of that Act are observed.

Procedural History

The Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations, asking to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees at the Pandacan Terminal. Hearings were held in February 1965 and were scheduled to continue. Before the hearings could resume, the union declared a strike. Esso then went to the Court of First Instance of Manila and filed a petition for injunction against the union and its federation. The trial court, through the respondent judge, issued a preliminary injunction ex parte on the same day, upon a bond of one thousand pesos. The union did not wait for the trial court to resolve its motion for reconsideration; it came directly to the Supreme Court in this original action for certiorari, and the Supreme Court issued its own preliminary injunction to restrain enforcement of the trial court's order. The Supreme Court then decided the case on the merits.

Facts

Esso is a foreign corporation registered in the Philippines and engaged in the marketing and distribution of petroleum, oil, gas and allied products. Its employees are affiliated with either of two labor organizations: the Citizens Labor Union and the Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso. Esso had a collective bargaining agreement only with the Citizens Labor Union, entered into in April 1963 and expiring in July 1966.

In January 1965 the Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations, claiming to represent a majority of the employees at the Pandacan Terminal and praying to be certified as their exclusive bargaining agent. Hearings were conducted on several dates in February. Esso moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that its bargaining agreement with the Citizens Labor Union was still effective. Before the hearings could continue, on February 19 the Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso declared a strike at the Pandacan Terminal.

Three days later Esso filed a petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the union and its federation. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction ex parte on the same day, commanding the respondents to refrain from continuing to strike, picket and engage in other concerted activities causing stoppage or slow-down of work at the Pandacan Terminal and related stations, for as long as the certification election was pending. The union then came to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the Court of Industrial Relations denied Esso's motion to dismiss and requested the Department of Labor to conduct the certification election, and it noted that the strike had been declared despite an agreement to maintain the status quo.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to issue the injunction, or whether that authority belonged exclusively to the Court of Industrial Relations.
• Whether or not the injunction was directed against illegal acts rather than against the protected right to strike and picket.
• Whether or not the injunction complied with the procedural requirements of the Industrial Peace Act.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2, paragraph j, of the Industrial Peace Act defines a labor dispute:

Any controversy concerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

This definition brings the contest between the two rival unions, and Esso which joined it, within the concept of a labor dispute governed by the Industrial Peace Act.

Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act protects concerted activities:

To engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.

This is the statutory source of the right to strike and picket that the trial court's injunction restrained.

Section 9, paragraph d, of the Industrial Peace Act sets the procedural requisites for a labor injunction:

The substantial and irreparable injury will be caused to the property of the complainant unless the injunction is issued; that the injury thus averted is greater than that caused by the injunction to the defendant; that the complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and that the public officers charged with the duty to protect the complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

These safeguards, including a previous hearing, were not observed when the trial court issued its injunction ex parte.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the third ground raised by the union was decisive: the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction. At the time Esso applied for injunction, the certification election case was already pending before the Court of Industrial Relations. Although the controversy over bargaining representation was primarily between the two unions, Esso became a party when it moved to dismiss the certification petition. The strike was merely an incident in that case, interwoven with the contest for bargaining supremacy. From the standpoint of both law and expediency, the remedy lay with the Industrial Court, not with the trial court. The Court rejected Esso's reliance on a New York decision, because no coercion to recognize a rival union in advance of certification was alleged, and it noted that the allegation that the union struck to compel discrimination against the rival union was itself an allegation of unfair labor practice, which would place the matter within the Industrial Court's jurisdiction.

On the second issue, the Court stressed the harshness of the remedy. The right to strike and picket is recognized and protected by law. Yet Esso obtained an injunction not against specific unlawful acts but against the strike and picketing in their entirety, by the expedient of going to a regular court, alleging that no labor dispute existed, and invoking the Rules of Court instead of the Industrial Peace Act.

On the third issue, the Court held that the procedural requisites of the Industrial Peace Act were not met. No hearing was held; the injunction was issued ex parte, in accordance with the prayer of the petition, restraining activities fundamentally recognized and protected by law. The Court distinguished the earlier Associated Labor Union case, where the injunction was directed at specific illegal acts and a claim for damages was asserted. Here there was no claim for damages and no specific illegal acts; the injunction was a blanket one against striking and picketing by employees of Esso, in a labor dispute already before the Industrial Court. The Court also excused the union's failure to await resolution of its motion for reconsideration, given the mass arrests of strikers under the broad terms of the injunction.

Doctrine

A controversy between rival unions over who should be the exclusive bargaining agent is a labor dispute under the Industrial Peace Act, and the employer who intervenes in the certification case becomes virtually a party to it. Where a labor dispute is already before the Court of Industrial Relations, the authority to issue an injunction in connection with a strike arising from that dispute belongs exclusively to the Industrial Court, not to the regular courts under the Rules of Court. The right to strike and picket is protected as part of the right to engage in concerted activities, and any injunction in a labor dispute must comply with the procedural requisites of the Industrial Peace Act, including a previous hearing on substantial and irreparable injury, the balance of injuries, the absence of an adequate remedy at law, and the inability or unwillingness of public officers to protect property. An ex parte blanket injunction against striking and picketing, obtained by alleging that no labor dispute exists, is void for lack of jurisdiction.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the writ, set aside the order of the trial court, and made permanent its own injunction, with costs against Esso.

Remember This

Memorize this line: where a labor dispute is already pending before the Court of Industrial Relations, only that court may enjoin a strike arising from it, and never by a blanket ex parte order. Examiners use this case to test jurisdiction over labor injunctions and the procedural safeguards of the Industrial Peace Act.