PABLO CATURA AND LUZ SALVADOR, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND CELESTINO TABANIAG, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

It is a novel question that presents itself before this Court in
this petition for the review of a resolution of respondent Court of Industrial
Relations.  Specifically, it is whether
respondent Court, in the exercise of its power of investigation to assure
compliance with the internal labor organization procedures under Section 17 of
the Industrial Peace Act,^[1]
can require a labor organization’s “books of accounts, bank accounts, pass
books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to [its]
finances” be delivered and deposited with it at the hearing to conduct
such investigation in accordance with a complaint duly filed without the
officials of such labor organization, therein named as respondents and
petitioners before us, being heard prior to the issuance of such order.  The respondent Court, first acting through
Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and thereafter en banc,
upheld its power to do so.  The challenge
to such competence sought to be fortified by the allegation of the absence of
procedural due process was rejected. 
After a careful study of the matter, we cannot say that thereby
respondent Court was in error.  We have
no reason to reverse.

As set forth in the brief for the petitioners, Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the President and Treasurer,
respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees
Association, a legitimate labor organization duly registered, there was, on
December 27, 1966, a complaint against them under Section 17 filed by the
prosecution division of respondent Court, the principal complainants being now
respondent Celestino Tabaniag
as well as other employees constituting more than ten percent of the entire
membership of such labor organization. 
In the complaint, it was charged that during the tenure of office of
petitioners before us as such President and Treasurer, they were responsible
for “unauthorized disburse­ment of union funds” with complainants on
various occasions during the latter part of 1966 demanding from them “a
full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union and to make
the book of accounts and other records of the financial activities of the union
open to inspection by the members”, only to be met with a refusal on their
part to comply.  It was further asserted
that the executive board of such labor organization passed a resolution calling
for a general membership meeting so that petitioners could be confronted about
the status of union funds, but then, Pablo Catura, as
President, cancelled such meeting.  There
was thereafter a general membership resolution reiterating previous demands
“for a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the
union”, but again there was no response, thus compelling the members to
refer the matter to the Department of Labor which duly issued subpoenas for the
presentation of such book of accounts to petitioners without any success.  After setting forth that complainants had
exhausted all remedies provided in the union’s constitution and by-laws, which
were all unavailing, the complaint sought, after due hear­ing and judgment, to
declare present petitioners, as respondents, guilty of unfair labor practice
under the above provision of the Industrial Peace Act, for them to cease and
desist from further committing such unfair labor practice complained of, and to
render a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union as
well as to make the book of accounts and other records of these financial
activities open to inspection by the members.^[2]

Thereafter, on December 28, 1966, respondent Celestino
Tabaniag and the other members, as petitioners in the
above complaint before respondent Court, sought an injunction to prevent now
petitioner Pablo Catura who, it turned out, was again
elected as President in an election on November 15, 1966, from taking his oath
of office in view of his alleged persistence in the abuse of his authority in
the disbursement of union funds as well as his refusal to make a full and
detailed report of all financial transactions of the union.^[3]

Then came the order of December 29, 1966, by Associate Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador which, instead of granting the injunction sought, limited
itself to requiring and directing “personally the respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, president and treasurer,
respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees’
Association, to deliver and deposit to this Court all the said Association’s
book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers
and other documents related to the finances of the said labor union at the
hearing of this petition on January 3, 1967 at 9:00 o’clock in the
morning.  Said respondents are hereby
required to comply strictly with this Order.”^[4]
There was a motion for reconsideration on January 2, 1967 by now petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador on the ground that they were not
heard before such order was issued, which moreover in their opinion was beyond
the power of respondent Court.  With
Associate Judge Ansberto P. Paredes
dissenting, the order was sustained in a resolution by the Court en banc
on February 28, 1967.  Hence the present petition filed on April 3, 1967.

The petition was given due course by this Court in a resolution
of April 13, 1967 with a preliminary injunction issued upon petitioners’
posting a bond of P2,000.00.  Respondents
did not take the trouble of filing an answer within the period expired on June
17, 1967 and petitioners were required to submit their brief within thirty days
under this Court’s resolution of July 14, 1967. 
Such a brief was duly filed on September 19 of that year.  There was no brief for respondents.  The case was thus deemed submitted for
decision on October 4, 1968.

In the light of the interpretation to be accorded the applicable
legal provisions and after a careful consideration of the contention that such
a power to issue the challenged order cannot be deemed as possessed by
respondent Court which moreover did not accord petitioners procedural due
process, we have reached the conclusion, as set forth at the opening of this
opinion, that petitioners cannot prevail. 
The order as issued first by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador and
thereafter by respondent Court en banc must be sustained.

1.  The controlling
provisions of law to the specific situation before this Court concerning the
power of investi­gation of respondent Court to assure compliance with internal
labor organization procedures with the corresponding authority to investigate
to substantiate alleged violations may be found in paragraphs (b), (h), and (1)
of the aforecited Section 17 of the Industrial Peace
Act.  Thus: “The members shall be
entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and representatives
of all financial transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws of
the organization.”^[5] *
* * “The funds of the organization shall not be applied for any purpose or
object other than those expressly stated in its constitution or by-laws or
those expressly authorized by a resolution of the majority of the member.”^[6] *
* * “The books of accounts and other records of the financial activities
of a legitimate labor organization shall be open to inspection by any officer
or member thereof.”^[7]

To repeat, the complaint before respondent Court against petitioners
as President and Treasurer of the union, specifically recited an unauthorized
disbursement of union funds as well as the failure to make a full and detailed
report of financial trans­actions of the union and to make the book of accounts
and other records of its financial activities open to inspection by the
members.  Clearly, the matter was deemed
serious enough by the prosecutor of respondent Court to call for the exercise
of the statutory power of investigation to substantiate the alleged violation
so as to assure that the rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization as specifically set forth in Section 17 be respected.  All that the challenged order did was to
require petitioners, as President and Treasurer of the labor organization, to
“deliver and deposit” with respondent Court all of its book of
accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other
documents related to its finances at the hearing of the petition before it on
January 3, 1967.

On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond
the statutory power conferred.  If it
were otherwise, the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may not be
effectively complied with.  The authority
to investigate might be rendered futile if respondent Court could be held as
having acted contrary to law.  To
paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and
rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions.  The documents required to be produced consti­tutes
evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not there was a failure
to comply with the mandates of the law. 
It is not for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on
administrative agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in
this case intended to protect the rights of union members against its
officers.  The matter was properly within
its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and effectiveness
should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so
arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to
priority.  No such showing has been made;
no such showing can be made.  To repeat,
there should be no question about the correctness of the order herein
challenged.

2.  Nor is the validity of
the order in question to be impugned by the allegation that there was a denial
of procedural due process.  If the books
and records sought to be delivered and deposited in court for examination were
the private property of petitioners, perhaps the allegation of the absence of
due process would not be entirely lacking in plausibility.  Such is not the case however. The pertinent
section of the Industrial Peace Act makes clear that such books of accounts and
other records of the financial activities are open to inspection by any member
of a labor organization.  For the court
to require their submission at the hearing of the petition is, as above noted,
beyond question, and no useful purpose would be served by first hearing
petitioners before an order to that effect can be issued.  Moreover, since as was shown in the very
brief of petitioners, there was a motion for reconsideration, the absence of
any hearing, even if on the assumption purely for argument’s sake that there
was such a requirement, has been cured. 
So it was held by this Court in
a recent decision.  Thus: “As far
back as 1935, it has already been a settled doctrine that a plea of denial of
procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting of an absence of
notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having
had the opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. ‘What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute
absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.’ There is then no occasion
to impute deprivation of property without due process where the adverse party
was heard on a motion for reconsideration constituting as it does ‘sufficient
opportunity’ for him to inform the Tribunal concerned of his side of the
controversy.  As was stated in a recent
decision, what ‘due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what
it requires is fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being
paramount,’ the conclusion being that the hearing on a motion for
reconsideration meets the strict requirement of due process.”^[8]

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
denied.  The writ of preliminary
injunction issued under the resolution of April 13, 1967 is dissolved and declared to be without any
further force or effect.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

^[1]
The first paragraph of Section 17, Republic Act No. 875, the Industrial Peace
Act, reads as follows: “It is hereby declared to be the public policy of
the Philippines
to encourage the following internal labor organization procedures.  A minimum of ten per cent of the members of a
labor organization may report an alleged violation of these procedures in their
labor organization to the Court.  If the
Court finds, upon investigation, evidence to substantiate the alleged violation
and that efforts to correct the alleged violation through the procedure
provided by the labor organization’s constitution or by-laws have been
exhausted, the Court shall dispose of the complaint as in ‘un­fair labor
practice’ cases.” The exclusive competence of respondent Court of
Industrial Relations under this provision of law was sustained in the following
cases:  Tolentino
v. Angeles, 99 Phil. 309 (1956); Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa
v. Bugay, 101 Phil. 18 (1957); Philippine
Land-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) v. Ortiz, 103 Phil. 409 (1958); Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Padilla, 106 Phil. 591
(1959).

^[2] Complaint,
Annex A, Brief for the Petitioners, pp. 11-15.

^[3]
Petition, Annex B, Ibid, pp. 16-21.

^[4] Order, Annex C, Ibid, p. 23.

^[5]
Paragraph (b).

^[6]
Paragraph (h).

^[7]
Paragraph (l).

^[8] Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co. v. Cadiao, L-28725, March
12, 1968, 22 SCRA 987,
994.  Citing De Borja
v. Flores, 62 Phil. 106 (1935); De Borja v.
Tan, 93 Phil. 167 (1953); Embate v. Penolio, 93 Phil. 702 (1953); Caltex
(Phil.), Inc. v. Castillo, L-24657, Nov. 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 1071.