SILVERIO CAGAMPANG, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. FLAVIANO MORANO, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Direct appeal on points of law from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Surigao del Norte in its Civil Case No. 1445.

The case began with a forcible entry and detainer suit instituted
by Silverio Cagampang to recover from the defendant, Flaviano Morano, a parcel
of land abutting on the sea in the municipality of Bacuag, Surigao del
Norte.  Plaintiff, who claimed to have been in
possession of the land for over 80 years, charged that in 1960 defendant,
through strategy and stealth, occupied a portion of the land and refused to
vacate it, to the prejudice of plaintiff; wherefore, the latter sought to have
possession res­tored to him, to collect a rental of P3.00 a month, plus
P5,000.00 damages and costs.  The
defendant’s answer pleaded occupancy by virtue of a foreshore “grant from
proper authorities”, and counter­claimed for damages and attorneys’ fees.

At the pre-trial in the Court of First Instance, both parties
agreed, as stated in the decision under appeal (Record on Appeal, p. 10) –

“that an ocular inspection be made on
the premises subject of this present litigation for the court to view the same
with the assistance of the District Land Officer or his duly authorized
representative in the presence of both party litigants and to find out whether
or not the lot in question can be reached by the highest ordinary tide as the
said lot is situated next to the sea.  Should
the lot in question be reached by the ordinary highest tide, then the plaintiff
shall concede that the lot right­fully belongs to the defendant and will
relinquish any of his claim and interest in the same.  Should the findings of the court be the other
way, then the defendant should abandon the lot in question in favor of the
plaintiff.  This is the main issue
agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial and the resolution of the court
of the same shall be then the basis in rendering the judgment of this
case.”

At the ocular inspection in 1965, the Court found that (Record on
Appeal, p. 13) -?

“It is the finding of this Court, with the assistance of the
representative of the Bureau of Lands, that the lot in question is not reached,
much less, covered by the highest ordinary tide.  It can only be reached or covered by the
highest tide during the months of May, June and July or during the months when
the highest tide of the year will occur.”

The Court likewise declared that the lot in question was covered
by a “Revocable Permit” based upon an “Application for Foreshore
Lease” issued in 1959 in favor of defendant Moreno, and held that the lot
was public land; that plaintiff made no improvements while defendant had actual
possession, bait a house of light materials on the disputed parcel, planted a
coconut tree, and marked the lot’s boundaries. 
It, therefore, rendered judgment for the defendant, enjoined plaintiff
from molesting the former, and ordered him to pay the costs.

Plaintiff then appealed to this Court, urging reversal for the
reason that the Court had disregarded the pre-trial agree­ment and considered
the possession and foreshore lease permit of defendant-appellee, instead of
confining itself to the determina­tion of whether the land was covered and
uncovered by the tide.

We find the appeal without merit. 
At the ocular inspection, the Court found that the land was covered by
the sea water at high tide in the months of May, June and July.  This finding makes it clear that the land was
part of the shore, and was, therefore, public land belonging to State,
conformably to Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866:

“ARTICLE 1. – The following are part of the national domain
open to public use:

(3)  The Shores. 
By shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement of the tide.  Its interior or terrestial limit is the
line reached by the highest equinoctial tides.  Where the tides are not appreciable, the
shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary
storms and tempests.” (Emphasis supplied)

By Article 420 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shores are
declared property of the public domain.

As
the lot was covered by the highest tides from May to July, and there is
no showing that these tides are due to abnormal condi­tions, the land is
obviously part of the shore and public property.  Hence, legal possession thereof appertains to
the national govern­ment or its grantees. 
No error was, therefore, committed in holding that appellee Morano,
being such a grantee, has the superior right to possession as against the
plaintiff who exhibited no State grant.

The judgment under appeal is affirmed.  Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar,
Sanchez,  Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.