THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JESUS BANGALAO, FILEMON JUBAHIB, FRANCISCO LOVENO AND TITO ESTACA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

The above-entitled case was begun in the Justice of the Peace Court
of Tagbilaran, Bohol, upon complaint of Abundia Palban, mother of the
offended party, Rosita Palban, a minor. The complaint alleges that the
accused “by means of force and intimidation succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with one Rosita Palban, a minor.” When the case reached the
Court of First Instance, the provincial fiscal filed an information for
rape,’alleging that Rosita Palban is “a minor and demented girl,” and
that the defendants-appellees “successively had sexual intercourse with
her by means of force and against the will of Rosita Palban,” and as a
result of which she suffered less serious physical injuries in her
genitalia.

In the Court of First Instance, with Hon. Hipolito Alo as presiding
judge, the proceedings and trial were interrupted by failure of some of
the witnesses to appear, and in the course of the hearing of a motion
for the arrest of the absent witnesses, the father and the mother of
the offended party, a motion was presented by counsel for the defense
to quash the information on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction to try the case. As ground for this motion, it was argued
that while the complaint filed by the mother of the offended party
alleges that the crime was committed through the use of force and
intimidation, no such allegation exists in the informations filed by
the provincial fiscal, and in lieu thereof allegation is made that the
offended party is a minor and demented girl. A motion to the same
effect had been previously denied in the earlier part of the
proceedings by Judge Segundo Apostol, who had previously presided over
the court that was trying the case. Judge Alo granted the motion to
quash, stating that there was a difference between the complaint and
the information insofar as the manner in which the crime of rape was
committed, and that although the information alleges also the use of
force, the Fiscal admitted during the trial that he had no evidence to
prove it. His Honor reasoning that the main basis of the charge
contained in the information is the offended party’s insanity, while
the complaint, that of intimidation and force, so that the complaint
alleges one way of committing the crime while the information charges
another, held that as the allegation of force set forth in the
information was not alleged in the complaint, the proceedings were not
initiated by the person called upon by article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code to file the complaint, and in violation of the rule enunciated in
the case of People vs. Oso, 62, Phil., 271.

The Fiscal has appealed against the order of dismissal, claiming
that the court had jurisdiction to try the case and that the lower
court erred in applying the doctrine laid down in the case of People
vs. Oso. The accused-appellees try to justify the order of dismissal,
arguing that even if the lower court had erred in dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction, they have the right to invoke the defense of
double jeopardy, and this would be a bar to the prosecution of the
appeal.

We find that His Honor did not correctly apply our ruling in the
case of People vs. Oso. In that case the complaint filed was for
forcible abduction, while the information filed by the Fiscal was for
rape. Inasmuch as the crime of rape is different from the crime of
forcible abduction alleged in the complaint, said complaint could not
serve as a basis for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the crime
actually committed, rape. In the case at bar, however, the complaint
was for rape, and this gave the court jurisdiction to try the case. The
power of jurisdiction of the court is not over the crime of rape when
committed on a minor and demented girl, but over rape, irrespective of
the manner in which the same may have been committed.

It must be borne in mind that complaints are prepared in
municipalities, in most cases without the advice or help of competent
counsel. When the case reaches the court of first instance, the Fiscal
usually conducts another investigation, and thereafter files the
information which the results thereof justify. The right and power of
the court to try the accused for the crime of rape attaches upon the
filing of the complaint, and a change in the allegations thereof as the
manner of committing the crime should not operate to divest the court
of the jurisdiction it has already acquired. The right or power to try
the case should be distinguished from the right of the accused to
demand an acquittal unless it is shown that he has committed the
offense charged in the information even if he be found guilty of
another offense; in the latter case, however, even if the court has no
right to find the accused guilty because the crime alleged is different
from that proved, it cannot be stated that the court has no
jurisdiction over the case.

We are, therefore, constrained to hold that His honor committed an
error in holding that the court had no jurisdiction to try the crime
charged in the information, simply because it charges the accused with
having committed the crime on a demented girl, instead of through the
use of force and intimidation. However, we find the claim of the
defendants-appellees that the appeal can not prosper because it puts
them in double jeopardy, must be sustained. Under section 2, Rule 118
of the Rules of Court, the People of the Philippines can not appeal if
the accused or defendant is placed thereby in double jeopardy.

As the court below had jurisdiction to try the case upon the filing
of the complaint by the mother of the offended party, the
defendants-appellees would be placed in double jeopardy if the appeal
is allowed.

Wherefore, the appeal is hereby dismissed, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.