IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF CHING CHONG ANG TAN TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. CHING CHONG ANG TAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,…

Ching Chong Ang Tan versus Republic of the Philippines

The Case

This is a naturalization case. Ching Chong Ang Tan, a citizen of Nationalist China residing in the Philippines, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Batangas to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines under the Revised Naturalization Law. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition and, when the trial court nonetheless granted it, appealed to the Supreme Court. The case matters because it is a compact illustration of how strictly the Court scrutinizes the requirement of a lucrative occupation, and of what happens when an applicant's claimed income rests largely on contingent profits rather than on steady earnings.

Procedural History

Ching Chong Ang Tan filed his petition for naturalization on the first of September, 1959, in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. After the requisite publication, and before the scheduled hearing, one of his two character witnesses, Modesto Castillo, died. Counsel moved for leave to substitute him and to use the affidavit of Mariano Castillo in his place, and the court granted the motion. At the hearing, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Batangas filed a written opposition, arguing that the court had not acquired jurisdiction because no new publication had been made after the death of the character witness and his substitution, as Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended, requires. The trial court rendered judgment on the sixth of September, 1960, admitting the applicant to Philippine citizenship. The Republic appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court reversed.

Facts

Ching Chong Ang Tan alleged that he was born on the sixteenth of July, 1921, in Chingkang, Fookien, China, and that he arrived in the Philippines on the second of October, 1933, on board the vessel Angking. He claimed continuous residence in the Philippines for twenty three years immediately preceding the petition: about ten years in Kinuguitan, Oriental Misamis, and from 1945 until the filing of the petition in Tanauan, Batangas.

He stated that he was engaged in the lumber business as Assistant Manager of the New Philippine Lumber Company, that he was married to Dionisia M. Padilla, a Filipino citizen, with whom he had two children, Rufina, aged three, and Crisanto, aged nine months, and that he derived an average annual income of approximately five thousand pesos from his employment. He claimed all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred Seventy Three. Two character witnesses, Modesto Castillo and Pedro Gonzales, attested to his qualifications.

At the hearing, the applicant testified that he earned about six thousand pesos per annum. On scrutiny, however, that figure consisted of a fixed salary of only one hundred fifty pesos a month, or one thousand eight hundred pesos a year, and the rest was alleged profits from his partnership in the New Philippine Lumber Company where he was employed. Those profits, the Court noted, are purely of a contingent character.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petition despite the absence of a new publication after the death of a character witness and his substitution by another.
• Whether or not the applicant's annual income shows that he is engaged in a lucrative occupation within the meaning of the Naturalization Law.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred Seventy Three, the Revised Naturalization Law, lists the qualifications of an applicant, and the decision refers to it as the source of the qualifications the applicant claimed, including the requirement of a lucrative occupation:

Section 2. Qualifications for naturalization. The petitioner must be not less than twenty one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition, must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years, must be of good moral character and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living, must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation, and must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages.

The Court applies the phrase "known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation" to the applicant's earnings, and finds his contingent profits insufficient to satisfy it.

Section 4 of the same law, referred to in the petition, sets out the disqualifications of an applicant:

Section 4. Who are disqualified. The following persons cannot be naturalized as citizens of the Philippines: those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government; those defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos; citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war; and citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

The applicant claimed none of these disqualifications attached to him.

Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended, governs the publication of the petition and the hearing, and the Republic invoked it in arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction:

Section 9. Notification and appearance. Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk of court to publish the petition and the notice of hearing once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, at the expense of the petitioner. The hearing shall be held not less than six months from the date of the last publication.

The Republic argued that the substitution of a character witness required a fresh publication under this section, a question the Court did not need to reach because it disposed of the appeal on the income ground.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court did not resolve the jurisdictional objection, because the appeal was decided on the second issue.

On the second issue, the Court ruled for the Republic. The applicant's annual income did not show that he was engaged in a lucrative occupation. His fixed salary was a mere one hundred fifty pesos a month, or one thousand eight hundred pesos a year, and the remainder of his claimed six thousand pesos consisted of alleged profits as a partner in the lumber company where he was employed. Those profits are purely of a contingent character. The Court held that, upon this showing, an applicant for letters of naturalization cannot be considered as being engaged in a lucrative occupation. The Court noted that it had repeatedly so held. The requirement is not satisfied by income that may or may not materialize; it demands a known and steady trade, profession, or lawful occupation.

Doctrine

An applicant for naturalization must have a known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation under Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Income that consists of a modest fixed salary plus contingent partnership profits does not meet this requirement, because contingent profits are not the steady earnings the law contemplates. A bar answer should state the rule as the Court framed it: upon such a showing, the applicant cannot be considered as engaged in a lucrative occupation. The doctrine ties directly to the statutory phrase "known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation," and it reminds the examinee that the Court weighs the quality and certainty of income, not merely the total figure alleged in the petition.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, with costs, and the applicant was not admitted to Philippine citizenship.

Remember This

Memorize the line that contingent partnership profits added to a small fixed salary do not amount to a lucrative occupation. Examiners use this case to test the lucrative occupation requirement under Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, and to show that the Supreme Court may reverse a grant of citizenship on a single substantive qualification even without reaching the procedural objections raised by the Republic.