🎧 Case Brief Lecture

ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILS., INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GEORGE D. JONES, RESPONDENTS.

December 6, 1995

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Abbott Laboratories versus National Labor Relations Commission

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Abbott Laboratories, Philippines, against the National Labor Relations Commission and George D. Jones. Abbott asks the Supreme Court to annul two joint resolutions of the Commission which, in executing a long final judgment, ordered Jones reinstated and awarded him accrued reinstatement wages. The case matters because it shows how a final and executory judgment is enforced years later, and it fixes the narrow gate through which a petition for certiorari must pass: only errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, never a re-weighing of evidence.

Procedural History

The story begins with a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Jones against Abbott. The labor arbiter sustained the dismissal. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the arbiter, then reversed itself on reconsideration and found Jones guilty of abandonment. Jones elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which in a decision dated December 6, 1995 reversed the Commission, declared Jones illegally dismissed, and ordered his immediate reinstatement with backwages and without loss of seniority rights. That decision became final and executory in March 1996.

Execution then crawled through the labor tribunals. A partial writ satisfied the backwages up to the date of entry of judgment. Later, a labor arbiter ruled that the amount received was full satisfaction of backwages and that reinstatement was no longer feasible, awarding separation pay instead. Jones returned to the Supreme Court, which in a resolution dated October 24, 2012 directed strict execution of the 1995 decision, ordered the case re-raffled to another labor arbiter, and required a report of compliance. The new labor arbiter ordered reinstatement and later assessed accrued salaries. Abbott challenged both orders before the Commission, which issued the two joint resolutions now assailed, the second denying reconsideration. Abbott then filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Facts

George D. Jones began working with Abbott in February 1971 as a medical representative and rose to District Sales Manager for Western Visayas. At the time of his dismissal in October 1989 he was receiving a monthly salary of 10,000 pesos plus mid-year and Christmas bonuses. In 1989 he applied for and was granted vacation leave, then sought sick leave on the strength of a medical certificate. Abbott disapproved the sick leave and directed him to report. Jones, then in Canada, wrote that he would report in the first week of December upon his physician's advice. Abbott terminated his services on the very day he was required to report, and he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal upon returning.

The Supreme Court in 1995 found the dismissal illegal and ordered reinstatement with backwages and without loss of seniority rights. Execution followed. Jones received 1,022,458.90 pesos as backwages up to the date of entry of judgment, while insisting that this did not satisfy his backwages from March 1996 onward because he had not yet been reinstated. A labor arbiter later declared that amount full satisfaction and, finding reinstatement no longer feasible, awarded separation pay. The Supreme Court struck that down in October 2012, holding that the fallo gave Abbott no alternative to pay separation pay, and directed strict execution of the reinstatement order.

After the case was re-raffled, the labor arbiter ordered reinstatement and issued a writ of execution. Abbott manifested that it had reinstated Jones effective January 2013, but the sheriff's report showed no proof of actual reinstatement. The labor arbiter then assessed Jones's accrued salaries and benefits at 69,956,187.95 pesos and ordered payroll reinstatement. The Commission set aside those orders, ordered Abbott to reinstate Jones immediately and to pay 2,704,890 pesos as accrued reinstatement wages from March 1996 to April 2013, with reinstatement wages to continue accruing until actual reinstatement. Both parties sought reconsideration, which was denied.

Issues

  • Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in finding that Abbott failed to reinstate Jones and in effectively ordering his payroll reinstatement.
  • Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in awarding backwages or reinstatement wages to Jones notwithstanding his alleged refusal to report for work.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on the extraordinary writ of certiorari, provides:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

This is the sole vehicle Abbott used, so the entire case turns on whether the Commission crossed the boundaries of jurisdiction or abused its discretion gravely, not on whether its findings were correct.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition raises a question of fact: whether Jones was actually reinstated effective January 2013. The determination of that fact is the statutory function of the National Labor Relations Commission. Certiorari does not entertain questions of fact or of law, but only lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It does not encompass an error of law, nor a mistake in the appreciation of evidence or the evaluation of its relative weight. A party assailing factual findings must show that the tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the controversy. The Court found no such showing, and no demonstration that the Commission's conclusions were manifestly mistaken.

On the second issue, the Court likewise found no grave abuse of discretion. The Commission's award of accrued reinstatement wages flowed from the final 1995 judgment, which ordered reinstatement with backwages and gave Abbott no alternative of separation pay. The Court examined the factual submissions only to the extent of considering whether the Commission went beyond its jurisdiction, and it found that it did not.

Doctrine

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is confined to the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is not a vehicle for reviewing questions of fact or errors of law, nor for re-weighing the evidence. Factual findings of the National Labor Relations Commission, as the agency with the statutory function of determining facts, are entitled to deference and will be disturbed only upon a clear showing of capricious and whimsical action or total disregard of material evidence. And a final and executory judgment must be executed strictly according to its fallo; where the judgment orders reinstatement without offering separation pay as an alternative, the employer cannot substitute separation pay for reinstatement.

Disposition

The petition was denied for lack of merit, and the challenged joint resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission were sustained.

Remember This

Certiorari corrects jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, never facts or errors of law, so factual findings of the labor tribunals stand absent capricious disregard of evidence. Examiners use this case to test the limits of Rule 65 against labor tribunal findings and the strict, unalterable execution of a final judgment ordering reinstatement.