BERNARDO JOCSON AND MARIA D. JOCSON, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. REDENCION GLORIOSO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

For the death of a three year-old boy who was run over by a passenger
jeepney, two actions were filed by the parents, the
first, against its owner and the driver for culpa aquiliana,
and the other, against the driver for homicide thru reckless imprudence, the
criminal action having been instituted while the civil case was pending
trial.  The civil case was dismissed, the
lower court being of the opinion that “in conscience” it could not
“hold the * * * defendant driver guilty of negligence or lack of care
resulting in or contributory to, the said accident.”^[1]
There was an appeal, but it did not prosper, the Court of Appeals dismissing it
for failure of appellants to pay the docketing fees.

The criminal case against the driver had a different
outcome.  He was convicted by the trial
court of homicide thru reckless imprudence “and aside from the prison
sentence imposed upon him, was ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the sum of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.”^[2]

The accused driver appealed raising as one of the issues “the
propriety of sentencing the driver to pay indemnity to the parents of the
deceased child, considering the fact that the civil action for damages brought
by the parents of the child against the driver and the owner of the vehicle was
dismissed.”^[3]
The matter being taken to the Court of Appeals, the decision was modified as to
the duration of the prison sentence, but insofar as the civil indemnity was
concerned, was affirmed.  After the
judgment became final, a writ for the execution of the civil liability was
returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused.

The parents, now plaintiffs-appellees,
in an action with the Court of First Instance of Manila against defendant, now
appellant, sought to enforce such civil liability against her as owner of the jeepney, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code.  At the trial, the principal
defense pressed was bar by a prior judgment, the attention of the Court having
been called to the civil case for damages based on culpa aquiliana, filed against defendant and her driver, a
case, which as noted, was dismissed.  The
defense was not considered meritorious, and judgment was rendered by the Hon. Carmelino Alvendia, finding
defendant liable for subsidiary liability in accordance with Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code in the sum of P6,030.00, with costs.

Hence this appeal.  Since
the principal legal question was that pressed before the trial judge and his
determination of such question was in accordance with the settled law, the
decision must be affirmed.

Article 103^[4]
is quite explicit.  For a felony
committed by servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties, the employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
are made subsidiarily liable.  As authoritatively interpreted by this Court
in Martinez v. Barredo,^[5]
“judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the
defendant and the offended party, should bind the person subsidiarily
liable.” Such a decision is of a “conclusive nature * * *;”^[6]
it is “binding and conclusive upon defendant not only with regard to its
civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an
employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee.”^[7]
The latest manifestation of approval of the Martinez
doctrine appears in Bantoto v. Bobis,^[8]
recently promulgated.

Thus the novel question presented is whether the previous
dismissal of an action based on culpa aquiliana
precludes the application of the plain and explicit command of Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code.  We do not think
so.  Diana v. Batangas
Transportation Co.,^[9]
while not decisive, furnishes some light.

The opinion by Justice Bautista Angelo noted that such appeal
arose “from a case originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna wherein plaintiffs seek to recover from defendant as a party subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by an employee
in the discharge of his duty the sum of P2,500 as damages, plus legal interest,
and the costs of action.”^[10]
The pertinent facts follow: 
“Plaintiffs are the heirs of one Florenio
Diana, a former employee of the defendant. 
On June 21, 1945,
while Florenio Diana was riding in Truck No. 14,
belonging to the defendant, driven by Vivencio
Bristol, the truck ran into a ditch at Bay, Laguna, resulting in the death of Florenio Diana and other passengers.  Subsequently, Vivencio
Bristol was charged and convicted of multiple homicide through reckless
imprudence wherein, among other things, he was ordered to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of P2,000. 
When the decision became final, a writ of execution was issued in order
that the indemnity may be satisfied, but the sheriff filed a return stating
that the accused had no visible leviable
property.  The present case was started
when defendant failed to pay the indemnity under its subsidiary liability under
article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. 
The complaint was filed on October
19, 1948 (civil case No. 9221).”^[11]

On December 13 of the same year, defendant Batangas
Transportation Co. filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the pendency of the other action between the same parties for
the same cause, the plaintiffs seeking to recover from the aforesaid defendant
the amount of P4,500 as damages resulting from the death of Florenio
Diana while on board a truck of defendant allegedly due to the negligent act of
its driver Bristol.  Clearly then, the
basis of the action was culpa aquiliana.  On December
16, 1948, there was a written opposition to such motion to
dismiss.  Then on February 3, 1949, came an order of dismissal from
the lower court which found the motion well-founded.  The reconsideration sought having been
denied, the appeal, as set forth in the opening paragraph of the opinion, was
taken.

In reversing the action of the lower court, this Court stated
that there could be no doubt “with regard to the identity of
parties.”^[12]
It is not so concerning “the identity of reliefs
prayed for, * * *.”^[13]
As was stated in the opinion:  “It
should be noted that the present case (civil case No. 9221) stems from a
criminal case in which the driver of the defendant was found guilty of multiple
homicide through reckless imprudence and was ordered to pay an indemnity of
P2,000 for which the defendant is made subsidiarily
liable under article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, while the other case (civil
case No. 8023) is an action for damages based on culpa aquiliana which underlies the civil liability
predicated on articles 1902 to 1910 of the old Civil Code.  These two cases involve two different
remedies.”^[14]

It was the conclusion of this Court then:  “Consider­ing the distinguishing
characteristics of the two cases, which involve two different remedies, it can
hardly be said that there is identity of reliefs in
both actions as to make the present case fall under the operation of Rule 8,
section 1(d) of the Rules of Court.  In
other words, it is a mistake to say that the present action should be dismissed
because of the pendency of another action between the
same parties involving the same cause. 
Evidently, both cases involve different causes of action.  In fact, when the Court of Ap­peals dismissed
the action based on culpa aquiliana
(civil case No. 8023), this distinction was stressed.  It was there said that the negligent act
committed by defendant’s employee is not a quasi crime, for such
negligence is punished by law.  What
plaintiffs should have done was to institute an action under article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code (CA-G.R. No. 3632-R). 
And this is what plaintiffs have done. 
To deprive them now of this remedy, after the conviction of defendant’s
employee, would be to deprive them altogether of the indemnity to which they
are entitled by law and by a court decision, which injustice it is our duty to
prevent.”^[15]
On the same principle then, the previous dismissal of the action based on culpa
aquiliana could not be a bar to the
enforcement of the subsidiary liability required by Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.

What clearly emerges then is the controlling force of the
principle that once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the
employer, according to the plain and explicit command of Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, is subsidiarily liable, if it
be shown that the commission thereof was in the discharge of the duties of such
employee.

Another consideration is equally decisive in the affirmance of the appealed judgment.  A decision of conviction of the driver was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which rejected the defense of a bar by a
prior judgment arising from the dismissal of the action based on culpa          aquiliana.  “To take up this issue anew, [according
to the lower] Court, would be equivalent for this Court to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals.  That would be
preposterous and against the law.  While
it is true that the defendant in this case was not a party to the Criminal
Case, since the liability sought to be enforced against her in this case is
merely subsidiary and is a necessary consequence of the judgment of conviction
rendered in the criminal case, the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the
defense of prior judgment set up by Mendoza is equally applicable against
defendant in this case.”^[16]

No error could be imputed the lower court for viewing the matter
thus.  From Shioji
v. Harvey,^[17]
the principle is undisputed that a lower court judge “cannot enforce
different decrees than those rendered by the superior court.  If each and every Court of First Instance
could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of [a higher court], there
would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result.” As noted
by this Court, the emphatic language employed was “intentionally framed *
* * to keep lower courts from assuming supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or
to reverse the judgment of the higher court.”^[18]
To the same effect is the view that there is compelling reason for denying a
lower court the power to refuse “to issue such writ [of execution] or
quash it or order its stay, when the judgment had been reviewed and affirmed by
an appellate court, for it cannot review or interfere with any matter decided
on appeal, or give other or further relief, or assume supervisory jurisdiction
to interpret or reverse the judgment of the higher court.”^[19]
The latest opinion of this Court on the matter, speaking through Justice Dizon follows: 
“It is elementary – so elementary, indeed, that even freshmen law
students know it – that an inferior court has no legal authority to set aside a
final and executory decision * * *.”^[20]

The lower court, therefore, acted strictly in compliance with a
principle, authoritative and binding in character, in holding
defendant-appellant subsidiarily liable.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed.  With costs against defendant-appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

Sanchez and Angeles,
JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 17.

^[2]
Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 71.

^[3] Id.,
p. 71.

^[4]
ART. 103.  “Subsidiary civil
liability of other persons. – The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
duties.” Article 102 speaks of subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and proprietors of establishments.

^[5]
81 Phil. 1, 3 (1948).

^[6] Nagrampa v. Mulvaney
McMillan & Co., Inc. 97 Phil. 724 (1955).

^[7]
Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.
99 Phil. 670, 673 (1956).  See also Manalo and Salvador
v. Robles Trans. Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729 (1956).

^[8] L-18966,
Nov. 22, 1966.

^[9]
93 Phil. 391 (1953).

^[10]
Diana v. Batangas Trans. Co., 93 Phil. 391,
392 (1953).

^[11] Id.,
at p. 392.

^[12] Id.,
at p. 393.

^[13] Id.,
at p. 393.

^[14] Id.,
at pp. 393-394.

^[15] Id.,
at pp. 394-395.

^[16]
Decision of the lower court, Record on Appeal, pp. 73-74.

^[17]
43 Phil. 333, 337 (1922).  According to Cabigao and Izquierdo v.
Del Rosario and Lim, 44 Phil. 182, 185 (1922) citing Shioji
v. Harvey, “Inferior courts cannot vary the mandate of the superior
court, or examine it, for any other purpose than execution; nor give any other
or further relief; nor review it, upon any matter decided on appeal for error
apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to settle so much as has been
remanded.”

^[18]
Chua A.H. Lee v. Mapa, 51 Phil. 624, 628
(1928).  See also Philippine Trust Co. v.
Santamaria, 53 Phil. 463 (1929).

^[19] Amor v. Jugo, 77 Phil.
703, 707 (1946).

^[20] Usaffe Veterans Asso., Inc. v.
Treasurer of the Phil., L-18393, December
17, 1966.