THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFf AND APPELLEE, VS. ALOD MANOBO AND MALOMPON MANOBO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

The accused-appellants, Alod Manobo and Malompon Manobo, with two
others, were indicted for robbery with triple homicide in the Court of
First Instance of Davao, per its Criminal Case No. 3014. After trial,
they were convicted only of triple homicide and sentenced –

“each to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision mayor to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal
for the death of Uy Kee Kang alias Chiquito, with the accessory
penalties provided for by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Chiquito in the sum of P3,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; another indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal
for the death of Mandolo-on Manoba, with the accessory penalties
provided for by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Mandolo-on
in the sum of P3,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and still another indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal, for the death of Chinaman Te Chu alias Tiago, with the
accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Tiago in the sum of P3,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the proportionate costs of the
proceeding.

“Pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code, the total penalty to be served by each accused
shall not exceed forty (40) years.” ^[1]

They appealed to the Court of Appeals which, in CA-G.R. No. 15933-R,
finding that the imposable penalty for each appellant should be reclusion perpetua “for each of the three murders”, certified the case to the Supreme Court.

Review of the evidence discloses that along the beach in the barrio
of Kilain, which is three hours ride by motor launch to the town of
Malita, Davao, and against a background of thick tropical foliage and
mountainous terrain, stood the house of a Chinese hemp merchant, Uy Kee
Kang, alias Chiquito. In this house, which doubled as a store,
he lived with his wife, Mandoloon Manoba, their infant child, and
another Chinese, Te Chu, alias Tiago. From this store, a path led some
two hundred to three hundred meters away to the house of the nearest
neighbor, the accused Alod Manobo. Further up the slope is the house of
Angoy Manobo, and still further up is the house of Simeon Te and his
wife, Sadia Manoba; and, not far distant, stands the house of Mansag
Manobo, a barrio lieutenant.

After suppertime on 9 August 1954, the accused Malompon Manobo
reported to the above-named barrio lieutenant that there was trouble in
the house of Uy Kee Kang, whereupon, Mansag sounded his agong to call
for his tribesmen. Several persons responded and constituted themselves
into a posse. It proceeded to the house of Uy Kee Kang and
surrounded it. Noting that nothing was astir, the group went inside and
there saw lying on the floor side by side the blood-bathed corpses of
Tiago and Mandoloon Manoba; the latter’s baby was alive and still
suckling its dead mother’s breast. An open wooden chest was noticed,
but Uy Kee Kang was nowhere to be found. A search was started and he
was discovered lying among the bushes about a hundred meters from his
store in a semi-recumbent position, riddled with bullets and soaked
with blood. Rigor mortis had already set in.

Autopsy examinations showed: on Uy Kee Kang, total hematoma on the
face and hand and five-centimeter-diameter gunshot wounds in the
clavicle, right chest, back and inner ventral thigh, with his lungs,
liver and intestines perforated. On Mandoloon Manoba, an incised gaping
wound two inches in length in the neck, transverse position, cutting
the esophagus and principal blood vessels of the neck; another incised
wound, triangular in form, an inch in diameter in the mid-sternum;
another in the chest, somewhere deviating to the left side, and a
fourth but superficial incised wound in the abdomen, right
hyperchrondium. On Te Chu, an incised wound an inch below the left
nipple to the mid-sternum; another in the left chest penetrating the
lung substance; another in the right chest; and others, below the right
nipple, abdomen, forearm, knee and right arm, ventral side.

As a result of police and PC investigation at the scene of the
crime, a bronze dagger and an empty .22 caliber shell were recovered.
The house’s main door was found open while a rear door was found forced
open, and in one of the windows were the blood-stained prints of two
hands. A sum of P4,300.00, which had been delivered to Uy Kee Kang on 4
August 1954 in payment of abaca sold by the deceased to the Columbian
Rope Company, was not found in the house, despite search.

On 16 August 1954, in the town of Malita, the above-named
appellants, Alod and Malompon, executed separate extrajudicial
confessions, Exhibits “D” and “E”, the jurat of both affidavits
appearing under the signature and seal of the local justice of the
peace, Enrique A. de los Santos. These confessions relate that at about
four o’clock in the afternoon of 9 August 1954, Malompon, Alod, Sabonal
and Antonino met at the house of Alod and planned to rob and kill
Chiquito and his family; that they thus, respectively, armed themselves
with a “sangot”, a “nanawe” (sharp bladed instruments), a firearm and a
bolo; that they went to Chiquito’s store at about seven o’clock; that,
in accordance with their plan, Alod knocked at the door and pretended
to buy fishing rope while the others stationed themselves at the main
door; that when Tiago opened the door they simultaneously entered; that
Antonino shot Chiquito, who was writing at that time; that Chiquito ran
and passed outside thru the backdoor but Antonino chased and fired
several shots at him; that Malompon and Sabonal stabbed Tiago to death
while Alod disposed of Mandoloon. In his confession, Alod also stated
that he took the money; on the part of Malompon, he stated that it was
part of their plan for him to notify the barrio lieutenant to cast away
suspicion and that he had hidden the “sangot”, but later had taken it
from its hiding place and had handed it to the investigators.

According to the version of the prosecution, during the
investigation that followed the gory occurrence, Dominga, the wife of
Malompon, had hinted to PC Captain (then a Lieutenant) Miguel Lagura
that her husband knew something about the killings. Lagura lost no time
in contacting Malompon, who had gone to Malita to attend the burial of
the deceased Chinese. When Lagura met Malompon, the latter blamed the
Masaglang brothers. Lagura, forthwith, went to Cubog to interrogate
these brothers. The brothers Masaglang denied to Lagura any knowledge
or participation in the crime, and so, Lagura brought them to Kilain
and confronted Malompon. Malompon broke down and admitted having killed
the deceased; he then accompanied Lagura to the house of Alod where he
showed and identified the “sangot”. Lagura found in a box the “nanawe”,
still bearing stains of blood, and the shirt of Alod, also with spots
of blood, hanging in an extension by the kitchen. Thereafter, Alod and
Malompon were taken to Malita, their confessions reduced in writing
which they thumbmarked after the same were translated to them in the
Manobo dialect.

Appellants, on the other hand, claim that they did not kill the
victims and that they signed their confessions only because they could
no longer stand the maltreatment they received at the hands of the PC,
the police, and the father of Chiquito, who had held them incommunicado
for four days; that Malompon, furthermore, was duped by Lagura’s
promise that he would be utilized as a state witness; that at the time
of the killings they were in the house of Alod eating their supper;
that when they heard the shots and shouts for held of Mandoloon,
Malompon went to report the matter to barrio lieutenant Mansag.

The appellants Alod and Malompon having confessed to conspiring and carrying out the killing of Kee Kang alias Chiquito, his wife, Mandoloon, and that of Chinaman Te Chu alias
Tiago, with intent to commit robbery, the main issue naturally revolves
around the credibility to be accorded to the confessions, Exhibits “D”
and “E”. These were executed in the office of the Chief of Police of
Malita, Davao, and sworn to by both appellants before Justice of the
Peace De los Santos, after the contents had been read and translated to
both appellants, as already noted. The latter stoutly assert that they
signed their confessions because they were unbearably maltreated by the
investigating PC officers, Lieutenant (later Captain) Lagura and Sgt.
Robrico (whom accused called Federico), assisted by Kee Kang’s father,
Vicente Uy.

Close examination of the testimony of appellants Alod, Malompon and
their witnesses leave this Court unconvinced that their confessions
were obtained by maltreatment, as they maintain.

Appellant Alod described in detail how he was repeatedly hit with a
broom handle; how the investigators inserted bullets (cartridges)
between his fingers and pressed them together, causing intense pain and
producing a lump at the base of his fourth finger; and how, while
handcuffed, Vicente Uy had shoved the handcuffs against Alod’s mouth
with such violence that one of his upper front teeth (which he brought
and exhibited at the trial) was dislodged and three other teeth were
loosened. Yet no complaint was formulated by Alod to the Justice of the
Peace when the confession was sworn; and when defense counsel brought
Alod to a physician for examination the latter certified (Exhibit “17”)
that Alod showed no external signs of injury, though he complained of
pain over the right chondral arch, a complaint that of course was
unverifiable by the doctor. No mention appears to have been made to the
physician, nor to the Justice of the Peace, of the missing tooth nor of
the finger lump, altho Alod sought to explain that he forgot to do so;
this, despite the fact that the examination was made for the express
purpose of establishing his injuries. Nor does the record contain any
plausible reason why only the fourth finger showed signs of damage,
when bullets, according to this appellant, had been inserted between
all his fingers, that were then forced together. His attempted
explanation that after inserting three bullets (cartridges) between
Alod’s fingers two were removed is too artificial to merit
consideration.

Similarly, the alleged violence to Alod’s teeth by his investigators
was emphatically disproved when, in demonstrating before the trial
Judge, with similar handcuffs on his wrists, it was found that the
handcuffs would not reach Alod’s teeth. Moreover, as noted in the
appealed decision, in the process of knocking out his teeth, Alod’s
lips must have been lacerated; yet he showed no trace of any such
injury. Counsel’s theorizing that a different kind of handcuffs was
used in the court demonstration is not supported by the record.

With regard to appellant Malompon, he affirmed in court to having
been maltreated for four days, and was promised besides that he would
be made a state witness. Like Alod, he showed no visible signs of
injury, but merely complained of pain to the physician (Exhibit “18”).
This appellant, moreover, appears to have made three differing
statements: one pointing out to the Masaglang brothers as presumable
authors of the crime; a second one confessing to having planned, with
Alod, and Sabonal and Antonino (sons of Alod), to rob and kill the
victims; and to have entered the house of the victims through a ruse
(Exhibit “D”); and a third one the following day, Exhibit “8”, that he,
Alod, Sabonal and Antonino had been induced by manobos Semion, Angos
and Monsad to go with them to the house of the victims, and that it was
the three last named who carried out the massacre. It is incredible
that all these statements were dictated by the Constabulary
investigators: what interest could the latter have in extorting
contradictory statements? If Malompon’s implication of the Masaglangs
had been merely dictated by the PC investigators, the latter would not
have taken the trouble of bringing the Masaglangs all the way from
Cubog to Malita for confrontation with appellants, as no man in his
right senses would go chasing after his own fabrications. Lagura’s
testimony that when confronted with the Masaglangs these appellants
confessed their guilt is neither improbable in itself nor inconsistent
with general experience.

Nor can we see why, after securing the confessions of Alod and
Malompon (Exhibits “D” and “E”) on the 16th of August, the
investigators should extort from them on the very next day, August
17th, another statement (Exhibit “8”) pointing out to an entirely
different set of killers. The argument that the PC investigators wished
to implicate also other persons to explain the shooting of Kee Kang is
pure conjecture.

In another portion of the record, Malompon testified that when he
was brought to the house of Alod and the then PC Lt. Lagura fround the
weapons (a “nanawe” and a “sangot”), he was asked by Lagura whether
they were the ones used in the killing, and Malompon nodded, which
indirectly corroborates Lagura’s testimony that, when shown the
“nanawe” and asked if it was the one used by Alod, Malompon answered
that it was. It is, therefore, plain that Malompon’s claim to innocence
about the crime was feigned, and his claim that maltreatment impelled
him to nod his head in token of assent to the identity of the fatal
weapons is not credible.

Both Alod and Malompon testified that they were maltreated in the
presence of many persons besides the investigators, a pretense that
renders the alleged maltreatment all the more improbable, considering
that violence upon prisoners to force a confession is a criminal act
that is usually done in secret. True, defense witness Mansag deposed
that accused Sabonal and Antonino were taken from jail and maltreated
in the public plaza; this story is not only unbelievable, but it is
peculiar that the latter ware precisely the ones who did not confess
and, in fact, were acquitted below.

Witness for the defense William Joyce, who had been Malompon’s
employer, and had engaged the attorney for the defense in the trial
court, testified that Justice of the Peace de los Santos expressed to
him, in the course of a conversation, that the Judge believed the
accused not guilty, but signed the confessions due to maltreatment. De
los Santos denied having made the statement, and reiterated his
testimony for the prosecution that the confessants never claimed in his
presence that they were coerced into making their statements, Exhibits
“D” and “E”. Both Captain Lagura and Sgt. Robrico, likewise, denied
torturing the appellants, and the trial court did not give credence to
Mr. Joyce. We find no reason to alter this view, considering that Vice
Mayor Santisteban, who, according to Joyce, was also present, did not
corroborate him; Santisteban declared that when Joyce asked Judge de
los Santos if the accused were guilty the latter merely responded
“Maybe”. It is more credible that Joyce did misunderstand Judge de los
Santos, for the latter knew that the murders were not triable by him,
and, therefore, had no cause to pronounce whether the accused were
guilty or not.

It is pointed out that some expressions in the confessions are not
consistent with the ignorance and lack of culture of the appellants.
This is true, but it must be remembered that Exhibits “D” and “E” are
English translations of their original answers in the dialect, and some
deformation through interpretation can hardly be avoided. Thus, that
the confessions used the expression “stabbed to death” when the wounds
were actually incised is not strange in persons not trained in medical
precision, and no more outrageous than the defense claim that when
Mansag testified that the rear door was “shut” he really meant it was
“locked”. At any rate, the essential admissions of guilt are present,
and the appellants themselves avow that their statements were
translated to them by Peralta and Santisteban before the thumbmarking
thereof.

The rule is well established that a voluntary extra-judicial confession, when supported by evidence of corpus delicti, sustains a finding of guilt. The corpus delicti
as to the slayings is unquestionable, and the appellants not having
proved that their confessions were involuntary, the appealed verdict of
guilty can not be overturned, particularly since the confession is
supported by the finding of the murder weapons in Alod’s house and by
the incomplete entry in Kee Kang’s account book, which testifies to the
sudden irruption of the appellants into the Chinaman’s house, as
narrated in their confessions.

To be sure, the investigators appear to have been remiss in failing
to ascertain the origin of the bloody handprints found outside the
window of Chiquito’s house, what rifle fired the bullet that killed him
and ejected the empty shell that was found near the kitchen, and
whether the stains in Alod’s shirt and the weapons were caused by human
blood or not. We believe that the true cause is not a desire to hide
the truth, as the defense avers, but the lamentably deficient
preparation of the investigators and a general tendency to rely
excessively on confessions on the part of law officers. Be that as it
may, the failure to follow these leads does not justify the assumption
that, if made, the result would necessarily favor the herein
appellants, or raise reasonable doubt over the guilt admitted by them.
A confessant carries the burden of convincing the judge that his
admissions are involuntary or untrue, as well as to establish
exculpatory facts.

Much stress is laid on the fact that the rear door of the victim’s
house was found by then Lt. Lagura to have been forced open and the
testimony of the defense witnesses that when they first arrived ahead
of the police investigators that door was shut. It is argued that such
circumstance does not dovetail with appellants’ confessions that they
secured entrance through the ruse of pretending to buy rope. But the
uncontradicted testimony is that blood drops or dots were found
“leading outside passing through the rear door” leading to the place
where Kee Kang’s corpse was found. The probabilities are that if the
door was forced open it was by Kee Kang himself, in his haste to escape
the assailants.

The allegations of the defense are not supported by unbiased
evidence, since their main witnesses are members of the appellants’ own
family. We, therefore, find no adequate justification in deviating from
the appreciation of the trial court, who saw the witnesses testify. The
virulent and personal attacks of defense counsel, some of them based on
facts admittedly not on record, must be deplored and condemned. This
Court feels constrained to reiterate that passionate insults do not
constitute argument, and that it is debasing to the administration of
justice that a member of the bar, who feels called upon to protect
their client’s constitutional rights, should be the one to deny due
process to the trial judge by attacking him behind his back in the
appeal brief. We reiterate here what was said in Perkins vs. Perkins,
57 Phil. 223, 236:

“The court notices with considerable regret the
heated and acrimonious tone of the remarks of the counsel for
appellant. In his brief, in speaking of the action of the trial judge.
We desire to express our opinion that excessive language weakens rather
than strengthens the persuasive force of legal reasoning. We have
noticed a growing tendency to use language that experience has shown
not to be conducive to the orderly and proper administration of
justice. We therefore bespeak the attorneys of this court to desist
from such practices, and to treat their opposing attorneys, and the
judges who have decided their cases in the lower court, adversely to
their contentions with that courtesy all have a right to expect.”

On the nature of the crime committed, we agree with the trial court
that these appellants may not be convicted of robbery with homicide,
there being no adequate independent proof of the robbery. There is no
sufficient evidence, outside of the confessions, that anything was
stolen from the house of the victims. While there is testimony that
four or five days prior to the crime Kee Kang received a large amount
of money, there is nothing to prove that the money remained with him
until the time the killings were committed, several days later. The hiatus
between the reception of the money and the delict itself was long
enough for the deceased to send the money elsewhere. Nor is there
evidence that anything was taken from the house or the trunks therein.
That the appellant intended, as they admitted, to rob Kee Kang does not
constitute actual robbery. Without separate proof of corpus delicti, the extrajudicial confessions will not support conviction for robbery (Rule 133, section 3).

No robbery being proved, conviction for robbery with homicide
becomes impossible (People vs. Bamego, 61 Phil. 318, Peo. vs.
Panaligan, 43 Phil. 131; Peo. vs. Labita, 99 Phil. 1068).

The slaying of Kee Kang, his wife Mandoloon, and his clerk Te Chu
must thus be considered as triple murder (People vs. Barruga, 61 Phil.
318, 331, and cases cited), qualified by treachery (which absorbs
nocturnity), and aggravated by the circumstance of having been
perpetrated in the dwelling of the victims. The apposite penalty would
be death, but, for lack of a sufficient number of votes, the sentence
is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The sentence appealed from is modified, by increasing the penalty, from that imposed by the court below, to reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the same is affirmed. Each appellant to pay one-half of the costs.

The attention of the authorities concerned is called to the
testimony of the accused and their witnesses to the effect that they
were detained for several days for purposes of investigation, which is
in violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. A thorough
investigation of the matter is in order, so that if the charge is
substantiated the persons responsible may undergo condign punishment.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., no part.

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^[1] The case against
appellants’ 2 other co-accused, Sabonal Manobo and Antonino Manobo, was
dismissed by the trial court on defense motion for insufficiency of
evidence after prosecution rested its case.