EDUARDO G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. SUSANO R. NEGADO, AS GENERAL MANAGER OF THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, AND THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERA…

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

The petitioner-appellant is an employee of the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority, hereinafter referred to as the NWSA. On November
11, 1957, one Turiano A. Alonzo filed with the General Manager of that
office a sworn statement alleging that on September 6, 1957 he gave an
amount of P100.00 to petitioner-appellant on the understanding that the
latter would have the former’s house connected to the water main of the
NWSA but that up to the date of said statement the water service
connection had not yet been installed.

The
respondent-appellee General Manager of the NWSA notified the
petitioner-appellant of the sworn statement, giving him seventy-two
(72) hours from receipt of the notice to submit a detailed answer
thereto, together with whatever evidence he may desire to present in
support of his side of the case.

In his answer, the petitioner-appellant alleged that he is a mere
timekeeper-capataz in the Construction Division, Engineering Department
of the NWSA, and that what transpired between him and Alonzo was a
purely unofficial transaction, private in nature and had no relation to
or connection with the performance of his official duties. Contending
that the acts imputed to him could not be the subject of an
administrative investigation, the petitioner-appellant moved to dismiss
the case, but the motion was denied.

The case having been
later set for a formal investigation, the petitioner-appellant
instituted with the Court of First Instance of Manila this proceedings
for prohibition to prevent the respondents-appellees from conducting
the said investigation. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction was, after hearing, denied at an earlier stage
of the case.

Respondents-appellees then filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the ground that it states no cause of action.
In an order dated July 12, 1958, the lower court granted the motion,
with the opinion that “the respondents as employers of the petitioner
have the right to investigate the acts of the petitioner which have
anything to do with the business of the respondent, irrespective of
whether they have a direct bearing or not with his official duties as
such employee.” Motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal
having been denied, the case was appealed directly to us, the issues
raised being limited to questions of law.

The pivotal
question is whether or not the respondents-appellees have the power and
jurisdiction to administratively investigate the petitioner-appellant.

It is urged that the acts imputed to the petitioner-appellant had no
connection with his duties as timekeeper-capataz in the Construction
Division of the Engineering Department of the NWSA and, therefore,
could not be a cause of investigation by the said office. This
proposition is untenable. As certified to by the Chief of the Service
Department of the NWSA the petitioner-appellant has no authority to
accept cash deposits to cover installations of water service
connections which are all done by the Service Department. Hence,
petitioner-appellant’s unauthorized act of receiving cash money with
the promise to install a water service with it, and his failure to use
the said amount for such purpose, clearly constitute deceit or
dishonesty.

Under section 6 of Republic Act 1383 (Charter of
the NWSA), employees of the NWSA are subject to Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations, except those whose positions may, upon
recommendation of the Board of Directors, be declared by the President
of the Philippines as policy-determining, primarily confidential, or
highly technical in nature. The position of timekeeper-capataz not
falling under any of these exceptions, the petitioner-appellant is,
undoubtedly, subject to civil service rules.

Among the
different acts of misconduct for which a civil service employee may be
investigated and/or punished by the chief of a bureau or office under
section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code is dishonesty. In the very recent case of Nera vs. Garcia, 106 Phil., 1031, it has been held that dishonesty on
the part of an employee to warrant his punishment or dismissal need not
be committed in the course of the performance of his duties. Said this
court in that case:

“As to the holding of
the trial court about dishonesty or misconduct in office having
connection with one’s duties and functions in order to warrant
punishment, this involves an interpretation of Section 694 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which for purposes of reference we
reproduce below:

‘Sec. 694. Removal or suspension.—No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.

“The
President of the Philippines may suspend any chief or assistant chief
of a bureau or office and in the absence of special provision, any
other officer appointed by him, pending an investigation of the charges
against such officer or pending an investigation of his bureau or
office. With the approval of the proper head of department, the chief
of a bureau or office may likewise suspend any subordinate or employee
in his bureau or under his authority pending an investigation, if
the charge against such subordinate or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty.’ (Italics supplied.)

It will be observed from the last four lines of the second paragraph
that there is a comma after the words dishonesty and oppression,
thereby warranting the conclusion that only the phrase ‘grave
misconduct or neglect, is qualified by the words ‘in the performance of
duty.’ In other words, dishonesty and oppression to warrant punishment
or dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of
duty by the person charged.

“Section 34 of Republic Act No.
2260, known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, which refers to the same
subject matter of preventive suspension, throws some light on this
seeming ambiguity. We reproduce said section 34:

‘SEC. 34. Preventive Suspension.—The
President of the Philippines may suspend any chief or assistant chief
of a bureau or office and in the absence of special provision, any
other officer appointed by him, pending an investigation of the charges
against such officer or pending an investigation of his bureau or
office. With the approval of the proper Head of Department, the chief
of a bureau or office may likewise preventively suspend any subordinate
officer or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an
investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty,
or if there are strong reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty
of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.’ (Italics
supplied.)

It will be noticed that it
introduces a small change into Section 604 of the Revised
Administrative Code by placing a comma after the words ‘grave
misconduct’ so that the phrase ‘in the performance of duty’ instead of
qualifying ‘grave misconduct or neglect, as it did under Section 694 of
the Revised Administrative Code, now qualifies only the last word
‘neglect’, thereby making clear the legislative intent that to justify
suspension, when the person charged is guilty merely of neglect, the
same must be in the performance of his duty; but that when he is
charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, these need
have no relation to the performance of duty. This is really
understandable. If a Government officer or employee is dishonest or is
guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of
character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to
continue in office. The Government cannot well tolerate in its service
a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and
well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more
and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his
fellowmen, even against offices and entities of the Government other
than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he
enjoys and possess a certain influence and power which renders the
victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less
disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and
actuations. As the Solicitor General well pointed out in his brief,
“the private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public
life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or
employee to continue in office and the discipline and moral of the
service.”

It is significant that
petitioner-appellant’s misdeed is not entirely disconnected with the
business of the NWSA because the said office is in charge of the
construction, maintenance and operation of water and sewerage systems.
The petitioner-appellant, in receiving a considerable amount of money
under, promise to install a water connection, seems to have capitalized
on his being an employee of the NWSA.

Section 695 of the
Revised Administrative Code says that “for neglect of duty or violation
of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the public service,”
a civil service subordinate officer or employee may be removed,
suspended or otherwise punished by a reduction of salary. The act
imputed to the petitioner-appellant being one which affects the
business of the NWSA, “public interest warrants his investigation. The
principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the
object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation of the people’s
faith and confidence in their Government.

The
petitioner-appellant contends that the basis of the investigation is a
mere sworn statement or affidavit and is not a complaint in itself.
This issue as to whether or not there was filed a valid administrative
complaint is of no moment for a complaint is not a prerequisite to an
administrative investigation. “Administrative proceedings may be
commenced against a government officer or employee by the head of
office of the bureau or office concerned motu proprio or upon
complaint of any person which shall be subscribed under oath by the
complainant * * * (Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941.)

Premises considered, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Barrera, JJ., concur.

Endencia, J., did not take part.