TRINIDAD SUNGLAO VDA. DE CORONEL, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. CONRADO T. DANAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH II, GUAGUA, PAMPANGA, AND DEPUTY SHERIFF CARLOS PU…

In her Complaint-Affidavit filed on 16 April 1991, complainant
charges the respondent Judge with grave abuse of discretion for knowingly
rendering an unjust order. The order
alleged to be unjust is a writ of demolition the latter issued on 16 June 1989
for the demolition of the complainant’s house purportedly in enforcement of his
decision in an ejectment case, Civil Case No. 2551, entitled “Salud Romero
versus Trinidad Coronel.” The writ was issued not upon motion of the
plaintiff, Salud Romero who had died on 28 December 1986, but on motion of
Tarcila Romero, the plaintiff’s alleged successor-in-interest who did not
obtain a formal substitution of parties. Complainant likewise charges the respondent sheriff for implementing the
said order on 6 September 1989.

Complainant further alleges that Atty. Arturo Rivera — Tarcila’s
counsel who prepared the motion for demolition — and Engineer Rogelio Herrera
— the person Tarcila hired to undertake a resurvey of the questioned premises,
the result of which was made the basis for the issuance of the demolition order
— are “compadres” of
Tarcila Romero.

In a verified Joint Comment received by the Office of the Court
Administrator on 6 July 1992, respondent Judge admits having issued the writ of
demolition on 29 May 1989 “after due notice and hearing, and after having
not taken cognizance of a raised new matter pertaining to the existence or
non-existence of a right of way on the affected realty,” but denies having
stood as godfather to one Jack Magtoto, claiming that he (respondent Judge) is
“unaware why his name appears on the ‘Certificate of Confirmation.’”
He likewise denies “having been partial in favor of one party and against
the other in the disposition of the subject case.” Respondent sheriff, on
the other hand, admits “having implemented the ‘Writ Of Demolition’ x x x
after the same was assigned to him by the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC),
Regional Trial Court stationed at Guagua, Pampanga,” but asseverates that
he did so “solely in accordance of (sic) its expressed order”; he
additionally maintains that he “has not committed acts of partiality in
favor of one party and against the other in the process of its
implementation.”

On 15 October 1992, we required the parties to inform the Court,
within ten days from their receipt of a copy thereof, whether or not they would
be submitting this case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.

In their Compliance with Statement received by this Court on 23
December 1992, respondents agreed to have the case resolved on the basis of the
pleadings. Complainant, on the other
hand, failed to comply with our 15 October 1992 Resolution despite her receipt
of a copy thereof on 2 December 1992.

From the parties’ pleadings, the following facts are duly
established:

Salud Romero instituted in 1983 an ejectment case, Civil Case No.
2551, against complainant Trinidad Sunglao vda. de Coronel with Branch II of
the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga; the former amended the complaint
in the said case on 3 June 1983. On 13
June 1983, the parties entered into an amicable settlement wherein they (a) acknowledged that portions of
their respective houses encroached upon the other’s property, (b) mutually
agreed and undertook to remove and demolish such portions of their houses which
encroached on the other’s property, and vacate the latter within nine (9)
months from 3 June 1983 — or on or before 31 March 1984, (c) mutually agreed
that the failure on the part of either to comply with their undertaking would
entitle the aggrieved party to the ex-parte issuance of a writ of
execution for the enforcement of the decision to be rendered in accordance with
the Compromise Agreement and (d) waived forever all their other claims against
each other.

On 19 July 1983, the court, per the respondent Judge, handed down
a decision approving the compromise agreement. Complainant thereupon performed her obligation as provided therein by
removing the portion of her house which encroached on the property of Salud
Romero. Only the comfort room of the
former’s house remained as a result thereof. Later, from the pooled resources of her children, the complainant was
able to construct a new 2-bedroom bungalow at a cost of P150,000.00.

As stated in the second and third paragraphs of the Writ of
Demolition, a writ of execution for the enforcement of the decision was issued
by the respondent Judge on 9 May 1986 and was implemented by deputy sheriff
Florencio Razon on 23 May 1986 by serving a copy thereof to the complainant and
giving her two weeks to remove the structure which encroached on the
plaintiff’s property.

On 23 June 1986, Salud Romero filed a motion for demolition on
the ground that the complainant’s house allegedly encroached on her
property. It appears that “another
survey” of Salud Romero’s property conducted by Engr. Rogelio Herrera was
used as the basis for the said motion. Herrera was the same engineer who conducted the survey which served as
the basis of the parties’ extrajudicial partition executed on 11 November
1981. In her opposition thereto, the
complainant alleged that she had already demolished the subject portion of her
house in accordance with the compromise agreement. Hearings were had on both the motion and opposition. For reasons not disclosed in the pleadings,
the court failed to resolve the said motion for demolition. On 28 December 1986, Salud Romero died.

On 7 June 1987, respondent Judge stood as sponsor during the
confirmation of Jack Magtoto, son of the spouses Tarcila Romero and Jesus Magtoto,
Sr. A little over a year earlier, during confirmation rites held on 14 May
1986, Atty. Arturo Rivera, counsel of Tarcila Romero, stood as Jesus Magtoto,
Jr’s sponsor while Engr. Rogelio Herrera stood as Regina Magtoto’s sponsor. Both Jesus Jr. and Regina are the children
of Jesus Magtoto, Sr. and Tarcila Romero.

Tarcila Romero, representing herself to be the
successor-in-interest of Salud Romero, pursued the motion for demolition.

As also disclosed in the writ of demolition, the respondent Judge
handed down on 29 May 1989 a resolution directing the issuance of a writ of
demolition “to be enforced and implemented conformably with the mandate of
the aforesaid Decision of July 19, 1983.”

Pursuant thereto, the respondent Judge issued on 16 June 1989 a
writ of demolition which was then referred to the respondent sheriff for
enforcement. The latter implemented the
same and demolished the questioned structure; he made his return on 25
September 1989.

In its evaluation, report and recommendation, the Office of the
Court Administrator “sees no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge in the issuance of the questioned writ of demolition” for
he conducted a hearing thereon on 16 May 1988, acceded to the parties’ request
for him to conduct an ocular inspection of the premises and even summoned the
geodetic engineer who prepared the subdivision plans. Thus, respondent Judge “had exercised due care in the
issuance of the writ.” The Office faults him, however, for issuing the
writ of demolition without the proper substitution of parties. According to the report, the respondent
Judge “should have denied the motion in view of [the] lack of legal
personality of the movant.” The Office nevertheless opines that this alone
does not indicate the respondent Judge’s bias in favor of Tarcila Romero,
especially since the complainant “was also obligated to inform the trial
court of the impropriety of the motion due to lack of proper substitution of
parties.” As to the respondent Judge’s acting as Jack Magtoto’s godfather
during the boy’s confirmation, the Office concludes that this “newly found
relationship with the movant” was a compelling reason for him to have
voluntarily inhibited himself from resolving the motion.

As regards the respondent deputy sheriff, the Office of the Court
Administrator “finds no basis of (sic) the charges against” him. It then recommends:

“x x x that respondent Judge be severely reprimanded for his
act of indiscretion which wittingly or unwittingly may have favored a party to
a case with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar omission will be
dealt with more severely.”

We agree with the finding
of the Office of the Court Administrator that there is no basis for the
charge against deputy sheriff Carlos Puno as he merely enforced and implemented
the writ of demolition which, to him, had been validly issued.

We are, however, unable to concur with the finding that the
respondent Judge exercised due care in the issuance of the writ of demolition
because the movant therefor was not a party to the case and was not substituted
for the deceased plaintiff. This
irregularity cannot be extenuated by the complainant’s failure to inform the
court of the said infirmity. Nor can we
subscribe to the conclusion that the respondent Judge’s relationship to Tarcila
Romero — as a “compadre” — was sufficient justification for
him “to have voluntarily inhibited himself from resolving the
motion,” and that for failing to do so, he be disciplinarily punished with
a severe reprimand.

While it is beyond dispute that the above suggested ground is not
one for the mandatory disqualification of the respondent Judge under the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, he could, of
course, have voluntarily inhibited himself pursuant to the second paragraph
thereof which provides as follows:

“A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.”

The
respondent Judge opted not to disqualify himself. Considering, however, that the relationship per se was not
raised in issue before he acted on the motion, this Court cannot hold him
liable for indiscretion in not inhibiting himself from the case, particularly with respect to his resolution of the motion. We may, however, consider the influence of
such a relationship in connection with his actuations relative to the issuance
of the writ of demolition.

The trial court’s 19 July 1983 Decision in Civil Case No. 2551
was based on a Compromise Agreement. This being the case, it became immediately executory (Samonte vs.
Samonte, 64 SCRA 524 [1975]; Arkoncel vs. Lagamon, 204 SCRA 560
[1991]) and could have been executed on motion within five (5) years from 19
July 1983 — particularly, on or before 19 July 1988. Thereafter, but not later than ten (10) years from 19 July 1983,
the same can be enforced only by a separate action. (Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to
Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code). While it is true that in the instant case a writ of execution was issued
on 9 May 1986, or within the prescribed 5-year period, the same was not
effectively implemented because deputy sheriff Razon merely served it on the
complainant who was then given two weeks to remove the structure. It was only on 16 June 1989, or more than
five (5) years after the finality of the judgment, that a writ of demolition
was issued to enforce the 19 July 1983 decision. Clearly, therefore, the trial court had lost its authority to
enforce its judgment on the basis of a mere motion.

Furthermore, respondent Judge does not deny the fact that
plaintiff Salud Romero died on 28 December 1986 and was not substituted by her
legal representative as decreed by Section 17, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Such a representative could have
validly applied for the issuance of an alias writ of execution or a writ of
demolition pursuant to Section 7, Rule 39 of the same Revised Rules of Court.

Then too, the structure to be demolished was not the same structure
which was earmarked for removal under the compromise agreement in Civil Case
No. 2551.

If the respondent Judge, upon the solicitation of a party
(Tarcila Romero) who had not yet acquired legal standing in the case, issued
the writ of demolition despite the fact that his court had ceased to have
authority to enforce the decision by motion, then the least possible
explanation therefor could be that he was unaware of the aforesaid rules. If he was cognizant of the said rules, then
he deliberately ignored them to extend benefit to a party who happened to be
his “comadre.” In
such a case, he had allowed a relationship to influence his action to the
prejudice of the complainant.

Thus, we do not hesitate to rule that the respondent Judge
committed grave abuse of authority in the performance of his functions. He violated Canons 3 and 18 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which respectively mandate that a “judge’s official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his every day life, should be beyond reproach,” and that he
“should administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the
system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction of law.”

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby imposes upon the respondent
Judge a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warns him that a repetition
of the same act or a commission of similar acts would be dealt with more
severely.

The case against deputy sheriff Carlos Puno is dismissed for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, and Vitug, JJ., concur.