VALENTINA ZAMORA AND BONIFACIO DIONES, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. TOMAS MEDRAN ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Way back in November, 1945, the court of
first instance of Mindoro rendered in these two cases, a judgment the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:

“For all the foregoing considerations, the Court
declares that Tomas Medran is the real owner of the 2-1/2 hectares of
land marked Exh. 5-Medran in the plan Exh. A-Diones; he had been in
possession as owner, continuously .since 1913 until he was interrupted
by means of force by Bonifacio Diones in the month of May, 1941; that
the judgment of the Justice of the Peace of Pinamalayan (Exh. A-Medran,
page 7, Civil Case-No, 613) is hereby affirmed, ordering Bonifacio
Diones to vacate the land wrongfully occupied by him and to return the
same to Tomas Medran. Bonifacio Diones is further ordered to pay Tomas
Medran the sum of P1,000 as damafes and the costs of these two cases,
Civil Cases Hoc. 61 and 883, respectively.”

Due to dilatory steps taken by Bonifacio Diones the judgment could
not be enforced until December 1949 when upon petition of Tomas Medran,
the clerk of court issued an order of execution which included not only
the sum of P1,000 as damages and the sum of P89.52 as costs, but also
interest at six per cent from May 17, 1941.

Objecting to the payment of interest upon the ground that the
judgment does not include it, the defendant Diones deposited the total
sum of P1,089.52 with the clerk of court, and by appropriate motion
raised the question of his liability to pay interest. After hearing
both parties, the court of first instance of Mindoro upheld the
objection of the defendant Diones. Hence this appeal by Tomas Medran,
which we find to be unmeritorious, because the judgment under execution
failed to provide for interest whether rightly or wrongly we do not
need to inquire. There is no statute directing that in the execution of
judgments for money, legal interest shall necessarily be collected.

“* * * The writ (of execution) should not require
the collection of interest when the judgment on which it is issued does
not give it, and interest is not allowed by statute. This has been held
to be the rule even where interest on judgments is allowed by statute,
if the judgment does not include it.” C.J.S. Execution p. 216 citing
several decisions.

The above doctrines seem to adapt themselves to our procedural
system, inasmuch as the practice here is that the writ of execution
must conform to the judgment which is to be executed (Velez vs.
Martinez 63 Phil. 231) the dispositive part of the judgment furnishing
guidance to the sheriff, so that when such dispositive part requires
defendants to pay jointly, it will be so enforced even if the body of
the decision quoted the contract on which the judgment was predicated
and such contract specifies ttxsb defendants’ solidary obligation.
Government vs. Vasquez 1 Of. Gaz. No. 12 p. S7&, Moran,. Rules of Court, 3rd Ed. Vol. 1 p. 725. See also Contreras vs. Felix 44 Of. Gaz. 4306.

The cases cited by the appellant, to wit, Montilla vs. Augustinian Corporation 25 Phil. 447, Lichauco vs. De Guzman 38 Phil. 232 and Seton Donna y. Inouye 40 Phil. 728 are not applicable.

Rule 53 sec. 6 provides that “when the judgment rendered by the
Court of Appeals is upon an interest-bearing claim, it shall bear the
same rate of interest; when upon a non-interestbearing claim, it shall
bear the legal rate of interest.”

This is obviously a principle of adjudication to be followed by the
Court of Appeals (and by this Court) in rendering judgments on appeal.
It is not a self-executing regulation. Anyway supposing it is
self-executing, we are not now enforcing a decision of appellate
courts, and therefore the section has no application.

The appellant invokes sec. 8 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the
pertinent portion of which directs that the execution “must require the
sheriff to satisfy the judgment with interest out of the
personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient personal property
can not be found, then out of his real property.” This rule however
merely outlining the procedure to be adopted by the sheriff says in
effect that the judgment with interest —if any has been ordered—must
first be satisfied out of personal property. It is not a directive for
collection of interest on all judgments. For one thing it does not
specify for what period of time such interest shall be assessed.

The appealed order will be affirmed with costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.