MENANDRO TABLANTE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. TITA MARILYN PAYOYO-VILLORDON, AS PRESIDING JUDGE RTC OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 223 AND MERIDIAN SECURITIES, INC., RESPONDENTS.
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Tablante versus Payoyo-Villordon
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Menandro Tablante against Judge Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon, as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 223, and against Meridian Securities, Inc. The action asks the Supreme Court to annul two orders of the trial court that granted the issuance of a writ of execution but denied the petitioner's prayer for an accounting of dividends. The case matters because it is a clean, teachable application of the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, and because it draws a sharp line between what a final judgment awards and what a party may no longer add to it at the execution stage.
Procedural History
The petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against Meridian Securities before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 223. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, ordering the return of the 140 Manulife shares or, in the alternative, payment of their value, plus attorney's fees and costs. Both parties sought reconsideration and modification, and the private respondent appealed.
The Court of Appeals partly granted the petitioner's appeal and denied the private respondent's appeal, modifying the decision to order the return of the 140 shares or, in the alternative, payment of 645 pesos per share, or 90,300 pesos, plus six percent legal interest from the date of first demand until fully paid. The rest of the decision stood. The private respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied, and an Entry of Judgment declared the decision final and executory.
When the petitioner moved for issuance of a writ of execution with a prayer for accounting, the trial court granted execution but denied the accounting, and denied reconsideration. The petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.
Facts
The petitioner was a policy holder of Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, and under its demutualization program he was credited with 340 Manulife shares of stock, with an option to sell. In December 1999 he told a Manulife employee, Julie Fernandez, that he wanted to sell his shares. She recommended Meridian Securities as stock broker and instructed him to prepare the transfer documents. The petitioner prepared a handwritten letter instructing the broker to sell only 200 of his 340 shares, and entrusted the documents to Fernandez. He also instructed that the shares be sold at not less than 500 pesos each.
In March 2000, Meridian Securities sold all 340 shares at 500 pesos per share and issued a check for 166,246 pesos and 91 centavos, which the petitioner refused to receive because he had authorized the sale of only 200 shares. The broker then issued another check for 97,840 pesos, representing the proceeds of 200 shares. When the petitioner asked for a certificate for his remaining 140 shares, the broker refused. He then instructed the broker to sell those shares at the prevailing market price of 645 pesos per share, but the broker again refused.
In May 2000 the broker denied having received any instruction to sell only 200 shares. The petitioner demanded the return of his 140 shares or payment of their equivalent value, and the demand was refused. Hence the complaint for specific performance with damages.
Issues
- Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioner's prayer for accounting.
- Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the doctrine in Cojuangco versus Sandiganbayan.
Applicable Provisions
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, governs the petition, providing in the pertinent part:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
This is the vehicle by which the petitioner asks the Court to annul the trial court's orders denying the accounting.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the petition is devoid of merit. A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even to correct a perceived error of fact or law, whether by the court that rendered it or by the highest court. The recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice, void judgments, and circumstances that transpire after finality rendering execution unjust and inequitable. None applies here. The Court stressed that it loses jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter a final judgment and retains only the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it; any alteration substantially affecting a final judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court found that no pronouncement was ever made on the return of accruing dividends. The right to accrual of dividends was not alleged in the complaint, so the private respondent never had the chance to present evidence against it. The parties and the trial court were confined to the averments of the complaint, the answer, and the issues joined by the pleadings. The order of execution must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed, and it is the fallo, the dispositive part, that controls the settlement of the rights of the parties.
On the second issue, the Court held that Cojuangco versus Sandiganbayan does not apply. There, the dividends on the PTIC shares in the hands of Cojuangco constituted ill-gotten wealth and had to be reconveyed to the Republic. Here, the private respondent received no dividends on the Manulife shares sold, until it repurchased them to comply with the decisions below, and nothing in the body of the trial court and Court of Appeals decisions required the return of dividends on the 140 shares.
Doctrine
A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and unalterable. It may not be modified in any respect, even to correct a perceived error of fact or law, whether by the court that rendered it or by the Supreme Court. The exceptions are limited to the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice, void judgments, and circumstances transpiring after finality that render execution unjust and inequitable. Upon finality, the court loses jurisdiction to amend or alter the judgment and retains only the jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. An execution order must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the decision, and it is the fallo that controls the rights of the parties. A claim never alleged in the complaint, such as the right to accruing dividends, cannot be supplied at the execution stage, because the parties and the court are confined to the issues joined by the pleadings.
Disposition
The petition was dismissed, and the trial court's orders granting execution but denying the prayer for accounting were upheld.
Remember This
Memorize this line: a final and executory judgment is immutable and unalterable, and the court retains only the power to execute it according to its fallo. Examiners use this case to test the immutability of judgments, the limits of execution, and the rule that relief not prayed for in the complaint cannot be granted after finality.