PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON AND FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, RESPONDENTS.

Assailed in this special
civil action for certiorari is the order rendered by Judge Manuel Castañeda on January 28, 1976 dismissing Criminal Case No. D-868 of the
former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and the
order rendered in the same case on March 22, 1976 by his successor, the herein
public respondent, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order of dismissal.

Culled from the records,^[1] it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio
Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan, registered in their names under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 47682.

On February 5, 1964,
complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary Public
Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico
de Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. 
On February 13, 1964,
private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with the People’s Bank and
Trust Company in Dagupan
City using the said special power
of attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the
mortgagee bank.  Both the special power
of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan
on February 13, 1964.

After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage
account not having been paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and
the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica and Vileta Quinto who were issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said property.  In January, 1972, complainant allegedly discovered
that their property was already registered in the name of said Ramon Serafica when the latter filed on said date an action for
the ejectment of the former from the premises.

On March 29, 1974
Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification
of a public document was filed against private respondent in the then Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, the information reading
as follows:

“That on or about the 5th day of February, 1964, in the City
of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Court, the above-named accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a private
individual, after having in his possession Transfer Certificate of Title No.
47682, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and
forge the signature of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney, causing
and making it appear that the said MARIANO F. CARRERA, signed and affixed his
signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a public document, when as a
matter of fact and in truth, said MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not in anyway (sic) participate in any acts
thereof, nor gave his permission, and in order to make good the acts of
falsification, with intent of gain and by means of fraud and other deceits, the
said accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsified public document (Power
of Attorney) did succeed in securing the loan from the People’s Bank and Trust
Company in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P8,500.00)
Philippine currency, without the knowledge and consent of said MARIANO F.
CARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount of P4,250.00,
and other consequential damages.”^[2]

After arraignment where
private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case proceeded to trial and the prosecution presented complainant Mariano
F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig
from the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan. 
Another witness, Col. Jose G. Fernandez, a handwriting expert, gave his
partial testimony but the same was not continued as counsel for private respondent moved for and was granted
leave to file a motion to dismiss.

On December
16, 1975, the motion
to dismiss^[3] was filed, wherein it was alleged that the
crime charged would not lie due to the partial testimony of complainant
allegedly to the effect that he authorized private respondent to mortgage the
said one-half portion of the land owned by him and his brother.  Said partial testimony of complainant was
quoted, with the emphasized portions, as follows:

“Q   Mr.
Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of
your property at present?

 A    Yes, sir, I know.

 Q   Could you tell us what happened to your
title?

 A    It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.

 Q   Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the
Bank.  Do you know the reason why it was
foreclosed by the Bank?

 A    Yes, sir.

 Q   Could you tell this Honorable Court how it
was foreclosed by the Bank?

 A    Yes, sir. 
On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked me to sign a document
as a witness and I asked him he
interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan
from the Bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother
said.

 Q   So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to you in Manila and asked you to sign a power of attorney
authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the one-half portion of that land owned by you and your brother. 
Do you have any document to show that?

x x
x

Atty. Diaz:

 Q   Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if shown to you?

 A    Yes, sir.

 Q   Now I am asking … I am showing here a document which is, your Honor, for the
purpose of identification, and may we request that it be marked as
Exhibit B for the prosecution.  This
document consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the first page be marked
as Exhibit B and the second page be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two.  Will you tell this Honorable Court what is
this?

 A    This is the document brought by my
brother to Manila for
me to sign,
sir.

x x
x

(Hearing of June 18, 1974,
pp. 8-10; Underscoring supplied)”^[4]

Based on the aforequoted testimony,
private respondent contends that there is no sufficient basis for the charge
and this fact warrants the dismissal of the case.

Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed
since more than ten (10) years had elapsed from the time the crime was
committed.  Since the information charges
the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a
public document, then the penalty shall be that for the more serious crime
which shall be applied in its maximum period, as provided for by Article 48 of
the Penal Code.  The more serious crime
in the present case is the falsification of the public document which is
punishable with prision correccional
in its medium and maximum period and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.  Prision correccional being a correctional penalty, the same
prescribes in ten (10) years.

It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed
in the case merely alleged the date of the commission of the crime which was
February 5, 1964 and the information was filed only on March 29, 1974.  This being the case, private respondent
claims that more than ten (10) years had passed from the commission of the
crime to the filing of the information. 
No other allegation having been made as to the discovery of the alleged
crime, private respondent claimed that the period of prescription commenced on
the day on which the crime was committed. 
He asserts that, from the date appearing in the transfer certificate of
title covering the land mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage documents were
duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan
City on February 13, 1964,
hence the alleged crime became public knowledge on the same date.  To support his theory, private respondent
made the following citation:

“The period of prescription commences to run from the date of
the commission of the crime if it is known at the time of its commission.

“Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be
discovered, because the entire series of transactions was by public
instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa
committed in connection with said transaction was known to the offended party
when it was committed and the period of prescription commenced to run from the
date of its commission.  People v. Dinsay, C.A.
40 O.G. 12th Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967, Vol. I, pp. 711-712).”^[5]

The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows that what was intended was an authority to
mortgage only the one-half portion pertaining to his brother and he was only
quoting what his brother told him when he said that “x x
x this is an authority to Federico de Guzman to get a
loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me,
my brother said.”^[6]

It further submitted that the information was not filed out of
time since the date to be considered should not be the date of registration of
the alleged power of attorney on February 13, 1964.  It
argued that the crime was actually discovered only in January, 1972 when Ramon
S. Serafica filed an action to eject complainant from
the premises, which fact was not alleged in the information because it was
considered by the prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter which would not be
in accord with the legal truism that an “information must allege only
ultimate facts and not evidentiary matters.”^[7]

With regard to the case
of People vs. Dinsay cited by private
respondent, petitioner submits that “(t)he same has only a persuasive
effect and not to be considered as an interpretation of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code as the same is the sole prerogative of the Supreme
Court.”^[8]

As earlier noted, then
Presiding Judge Manuel Castañeda of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed
the case on January 28, 1976 on the ground that the crime had
prescribed.  The People’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the succeeding Presiding Judge Felicidad Carandang Villalon.

On March
25, 1976, the
prosecution filed a notice of appeal from both orders of the trial court.  In a resolution dated May 13,
1976, this Court
required the prosecution to file a petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Republic Act No. 5440.^[9] Thereafter, said petition for review and the
corresponding comment and reply of the parties having been filed, on February
21, 1977 the Court
resolved to treat said petition as a special civil action and required
petitioner and private respondent to submit their respective memoranda.^[10]

From the memoranda
submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution of the following issues:

1.   Whether the People could appeal from the order
of dismissal because the private respondent would thereby be placed in double
jeopardy;

2.   Whether the charge of estafa
thru falsification of a public document filed against the private respondent
has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact; and,

3.   Whether the offense charged in the
aforementioned criminal case is already extinguished by prescription.^[11]

The bar of double
jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse.  As enunciated in People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:

“As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case
after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Section 9,
Rule 113).  However, an appeal by the
prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial
court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon
motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal
or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and
(3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so
that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt
or innocence of the defendant.”^[12]

On the issue of whether
the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public
document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the
affirmative.  The falsification of a
public document may be a means of committing estafa
because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage
not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial documents.  The damage to
another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by
the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the public,
official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.^[13]

Petitioner posits that
the offense charged is supported by the fact that what was intended to be
mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining to Severo
Carrera, not the portion pertaining to complainant,
otherwise complainant would not have quoted his brother’s words.  The theory of petitioner and the findings of
public respondent are substantially the same. 
We agree that the offense charged does exist in fact and in law, as
explained in the findings of the court below:

“In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial
testimony of complainant Mariano Carrera and of the
record, as regards the first ground,
the court finds that the contention is  the defense
that the authorization given to him to mortgage the whole property is not
sustained by the evidence because a cursory study of the answer made by the witness complainant clearly
shows that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion
pertaining only to Severo Carrera,
excluding that portion pertaining to said complainant.  (tsn, pp. 8-10,
hearing on June 18, 1974).  In
other words, the alleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get a
loan from the Bank on the half portion
of the land referred to the share of Severo Carrera only.  This
finding is based on the following quoted answer:

‘A   x x x                                      x x x                              x x x   

and when I asked him
he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a
loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me,
my brother said.’

Mariano Carrera
on June 18, 1974, gave the
above-quoted testimony.  He merely quoted
his brother Severo Carrera
to whom the half portion of the land belongs. 
Severo Carrera, as
quoted by Mariano Carrera, did not use the phrase
‘which belongs to you.’“^[14]

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of
the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public
document, the resolution of the issue on prescription is, however, determinative
of the validity of the impugned orders of public respondent.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty
for a complex crime is that for the most serious component offense, the same to
be applied in its maximum period.  In the
crime of estafa thru falsification of a public
document, the more serious crime is the falsification which carries with it the
correctional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not more than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172
of the Code.  Crimes punishable by
correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 of
the Code, and Article 91 thereof states that the prescriptive period commences
to run “from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents x x x.”

The document which was
allegedly falsified was a notarized special power of attorney registered
in the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1964 authorizing private respondent to mortgage a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682 in order to
secure a loan of P8,500.00 from the People’s Bank and Trust Company.  The information for estafa
thru falsification of a public document was filed only on March
29, 1974.  We reject petitioner’s claim that the
ten-year period commenced when complainant supposedly discovered the crime in
January, 1972 by reason of the ejectment suit against
him.

People vs.
Reyes^[15] cites authorities on the well established
rule that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole
world.  The record is constructive notice
of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included
therein.  All persons are charged with
knowledge of what it contains.  On these
considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et al., ^[16] to the effect that in the crime of
falsification of a public document the prescriptive period commences from the
time the offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after
the document was registered with the Register of Deeds is not without
legal basis.

It was also noted that in
Armentia vs. Patriarca,
et al.,^[17] in interpreting the phrase “from the
discovery” found in Article 1391 of the Civil Code which authorizes
annulment, in case of mistake or fraud, within four years from the time of the
discovery of the same, the Court
also held that the discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time
the document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is
that registration is a notice to the whole world and this should apply to both
criminal and civil cases.

We are further in accord
with the conclusion in Reyes that the application of said rule on constructive notice in the
interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be
favorable to private respondent herein, since the prescriptive period of the
crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, that is, from the time the
questioned documents were recorded in the Registry of Deeds.

In the instant case, the
special power of attorney involved was registered on February
13, 1964.  The criminal of information against
private respondent having been filed only on March 29, 1974, or more than ten
(10) years thereafter, the crime with which private respondent was charged has
indubitably prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit and the challenged orders of public respondent are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Complainant’s Affidavit, Original Record, 4-5, 193-194; TSN, June 18, 1974,
2-7; Nov. 28, 1975, 2-6.

^[2]
Original Record, 1.

^[3] Rollo, 54-69.

^[4] Ibid.,
55-56.

^[5] Ibid., 59.

^[6] Ibid., 62.

^[7] Ibid.,
64.

^[8] Ibid.,
65.

^[9] Ibid.,
42.

^[10] Ibid., 136.

^[11] Ibid.,
153, 165.

^[12]
154 SCRA 175 (1987), reiterating People vs. Desalisa,
et al., 125 Phil. 27 (1966).

^[13]
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Twelfth Edition, 1981, Book II, 235.

^[14] Original
Record, 204-205.

^[15]
175 SCRA 597 (1989).

^[16]
70 SCRA 606 (1976).

^[17]
18 SCRA 1253 (1966).