PRIMITIVO NEPOMUCENO, PETITIONER, VS. BENJAMIN SALAZAR, RESPONDENT.

There are before us two (2) Petitions for Review of the same
Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated 17 May 1973, which Resolution dismissed
petitioners’ appeals from an Order of the Court of Agrarian Relations
(“CAR”) dated 15 January 1972, issued in CAR Cases Nos. 2557 and
2558.

On 14 July 1970,
Emerenciana Nepomuceno and Primitivo Nepomuceno filed with
the CAR of Malolos, Bulacan,
CAR Cases Nos. 2557 and 2558, respectively, seeking the ejectment
of respondent Benjamin Salazar from lands owned by petitioners and situated in
Barrio Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan.  Petitioners’ lands had theretofore been
devoted to the growing of rice, except that during the dry season, portions
thereof were planted to water-melons. 
Respondent Salazar was the agricultural lessee or tenant of the lands in
question.  The record is silent on the
precise area of the lands involved but the modest extent of such lands is
clearly indicated by the agreed rental amounting to sixteen-and-a-half (16-1/2)
cavans of palay per
calendar year paid by Salazar to each of the petitioners.  In their complaints, petitioners stated that
they wanted to convert their agricultural lands to commercial or
non-agricultural uses; that they wanted to establish poultry and hog farming
projects in said land; and that the rest of their land would be cultivated by
petitioners personally.

On 11 October 1971, after pre-trial and after commencement of
trial on the merits, respondent Salazar (defendant therein) filed a Motion to
Dismiss both complaints upon the ground that Section 36 of Republic Act No.
3844 had been amended by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389, by deleting
personal cultivation by the landowner as a ground for permissible ejectment of a tenant. 
Respondent argued that Republic Act No. 6389, which took effect on 10 September 1971, should be given
retroactive effect as a piece of remedial legislation beneficial to
agricultural tenants like himself.  The
CAR issued an Order dated 16 November
1971 holding in abeyance the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss until after the parties shall have completed their
respective presentation of evidence on the merits.

Subsequently, however, on 15 January 1972, and before completion
of presentation by the parties of their respective cases, the CAR issued a
lengthy Order, which after extensive discussion including reproduction of
excerpts from the debates in the Senate preceding the enactment of Republic Act
No. 6389, granted the Motion to Dismiss partially, that is, with
respect to personal cultivation by the landowner as a ground for ejectment of a tenant. 
At the same time, that Order partially denied the Motion to Dismiss with
respect to the other ground adduced by petitioners, that is, conversion of the
lots into land devoted to commercial and non-agricultural purposes, such as
poultry and hog farming, holding that ejectment of a
tenant remained legally permissible on such other ground.  The dispositive
portion of this Order read as follows:

“WHEREFORE, defendant’s urgent motion to dismiss dated October 11, 1971 is partly granted
with respect to the cause of action alleged in the complaints in these cases for the ejectment of the
defendant from the landholdings in question on the ground of personal
cultivation, and as prayed for, the complaints with respect to said
cause of action are hereby dismissed. 
The same motion to dismiss hereby [is] partly denied with respect to the
cause of action for the ejectment of the defendant
from the lands in question on the ground of conversion thereof into commercial
and other useful non-agricultural purposes.

Let the records of these cases be returned to Commissioner Onesimo L. Espejo for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.”^[1]

Petitioners both appealed to the Court of Appeals.  On 17
May 1973, the Court of Appeals rendered a Resolution dismissing
petitioners’ appeals upon the ground that the 15 January 1972 order of the Agrarian
Court was an interlocutory order and as such could
not be the subject of an appeal.  The
Resolution of the Court of Appeals stated in part:

“It should be observed that the order subject of the present
appeal partly grants the motion to dismiss the complaints on the cause of
action for ejectment based on personal cultivation and partly denied the same motion to
dismiss with respect to the cause of action based on conversion of the land
into commercial or other useful non-agricultural purposes.  Evidently, therefore the said order does
not finally dispose of the pending cases so that nothing more can be done with
them in the agrarian court.  Indeed,
said order expressly orders the return of the records of the case to the
hearing commissioner for further proceedings, so that trial may continue on
the other cause of action.

‘1.  The
forefront question is whether the disputed orders are final and appealable.  Private
respondents Santos Dy-Kia seeks to strike down the
appeal because the orders are interlocutory. 
And citing Section 1 of Rule 43
of the Rules of Court, he puts forth the claim that only final orders of
the Agrarian court are appealable.  He is correct.

2. 
The orders of the lower court are aimed at continuing the proceedings
before it.  Hearing of the case on the
merits is not yet finished.  Final
judgment is yet to be rendered.  A rule
long standing and frequently cited is that orders which do not finally dispose
of the pending case so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court
are interlocutory.  An issue relating thereto must wait until the
trial court writes its final determination. 
It is only then that appeal is proper.’ (Anduina
vs. Dy Kia,
29 SCRA 198, 204)

In view of the foregoing consideration,
therefore, the appeal in these two cases should be dismissed.”^[2]
(Underscoring supplied)

In a Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners urged that the Order
of the CAR was not interlocutory considering that one of the substantive
grounds or causes of action pleaded by petitioners for the ejectment
of respondent Salazar would definitely no longer be considered by the CAR in
rendering its decision on the merits. 
The Motion for Reconsideration was unsuccessful.

In the instant Petition for Review, petitioners assail the
correctness of the Court of Appeals holding that the CAR Order of 15 January 1972 was merely an
interlocutory order which could not, therefore, be the subject of an appeal.

In People vs. Hewald, et al,^[3]
the Court characterized an interlocutory order in the following terms:

“An order is interlocutory when it does not terminate or
finally dispose of the case, because it leaves something to be done by the
court before the case is finally
decided on the merits.  But, an order is
final when it disposes of the case, decides the same on the merits and leaves
nothing to be done therefore, except the execution of the terms of the order of
judgment (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1957 ed., pp. 638-39).”

Again, in Bairan
vs. Tan Siu Lay,^[4]
the Court held, through Mr. Justice Dizon:

“It is settled that a court order is final in character if
it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, leaving thereafter no
substantial proceeding to be had in connection therewith except its execution; and, contrary wise, that a
given court order is merely of an interlocutory character if it is provisional
and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject in
the court by whom it was issued.

It will be noted that in connection with the order of January 4, 1961, the court decided,
over petitioner’s objection, that the latter must file a surety bond as
prayed by his adversary.  Thus, upon
the question of whether or not petitioner should file a bond, there was nothing
left to be done except to have the order aforesaid carried out.  It is
clear, therefore, that said order in final in character and, as such, is
appealable within the period of appeal provided by
law.”^[5]

Tested by the above standard, the CAR’s
Order of 15 January 1972 may be seen to be a strange creation indeed, neither
fish nor fowl, as it were, but bearing the characteristics of both an
interlocutory and a final order.  That
order may be regarded as an interlocutory order, just as the Court of Appeals
did so regard it, on the basis that further proceedings in the main case were
clearly contemplated.  At the same time,
however, those further proceedings would clearly relate only to one of the two
(2) substantive grounds or causes of action raised by the petitioners in their
complaints before the Agrarian Court.  The CAR purported to have disposed finally of
the question of availability under the law of the ground of personal
cultivation by a landowner of his own land. 
Thus, the CAR in effect held that it would no longer receive nor
consider any evidence and argument concerning the ground of personal
cultivation; insofar as that particular substantive ground was concerned, there
was nothing more that petitioners could have done.

Clearly, the Agrarian Court
here committed the serious error of rendering a piecemeal judgment.  Instead of partially granting and partially
denying the respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, the Agrarian
Court should have held in abeyance the resolution
of that Motion to Dismiss, treated the same as a supplemental answer, continued
with trial until completion thereof on an unrestricted basis, and dealt with
both substantive grounds alleged by petitioners in its decision on the merits.  The respondent Court of Appeals too erred in
failing to modify and set aside that part of the Order of the Agrarian
Court which purported to dismiss the complaint to
the extent it was based upon the claim of personal cultivation by the
landowner.

It remains to point out that the Agrarian
Court was also substantively in reversible error
when it held that personal cultivation by the landowner was no longer available
as a ground for ejectment of an agricultural lessee
or tenant in the circumstances of this case.

Petitioners’ complaints were filed, as already noted, on 14 July 1970; Republic Act No. 6389
was approved by the Congress on 10
September 1971.  The effectivity clause, however, of Republic Act No. 6389 did
not invest Section 7 thereof with retroactive effect.  It follows that the general rule established
in Article 4 of the Civil Code that “laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided,” must be held applicable.

The precise issue here at stake has already been resolved by the
Court in Calderon, et al. vs. Dela Cruz,^[6]
in the following terms:

“We are not unaware that on 10 September 1971 R.A. 6389 took effect
and abrogated the right of the landowners to dispossess the tenants or
agricultural lessees on the ground of personal cultivation.  We have categorically ruled in Nilo v. Court
of Appeals and Castro v. Castro
[128 SCRA 519 (1984)] and reiterated in Diga v.
Adriano [133 SCRA 421 (1984)] that said law can not be given retroactive
effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a legal
implication of law to that effect. 
To hold that landowners can no longer effect
their claims because of R.A. No. 6389 would deprive them of their right to
enjoy their property which they had already asserted before the statute was passed.  Precisely, the lawmaking body in providing
personal cultivation as a ground to eject tenants intended to encourage and
attract the small landowners to
go to their respective province and till their lands.  Furthermore, this rule would be till thwarting
the policy of encouraging self-reliant and independent small farmers if lessor-lessee relations on tiny parcels of land, as in this
case, are perpetuated even when the owners can and desire to cultivate the land
themselves.”^[7]

It is thus clear that both grounds for ejectment of respondent tenant or lessee raised by
petitioners, i.e., personal cultivation by the landowner and conversion of the
land to commercial and non-agricultural uses, remained available to petitioners
at the time of the filing of their complaints. 
Petitioners were entitled to prove that respondent lessee or tenant
could be ejected from petitioners’ land on either or both grounds under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6389.  We
should, however, add the caveat that our disposition of this case is
without prejudice to the possible application of subsequently enacted laws and
regulations, if any, bearing upon this matter.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 17
May 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE; the Order dated 15 January 1972 of the then Court
of Agrarian Relations is hereby SET ASIDE to the extent that such Order
purported to grant partially respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; and these cases
are hereby REMANDED to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez,
Jr., Bidin, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 15-16, G.R. No. L-37165;
underscoring supplied.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 20-21, G.R. No. 37165.

^[3]
105 Phil. 1297 (1959).

^[4]
18 SCRA 1235 (1966).

^[5]
18 SCRA at 1239, underscoring supplied. 
See also Dais vs. Garduño, et al., 49
Phil. 165 (1926).

^[6]
138 SCRA 173 (1985).

^[7]
138 SCRA at 178; underscoring supplied.