MILDRED FLORES PIAD, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DICDICAN, J.:
The material and relevant facts, as culled from the record, are as follows:
On December 12 1995, Flores Enterprises, Inc. (“FEI”), represented by its President, herein petitioner Piad, entered into a Letter of Undertaking[4] with Aberdare Land, Inc. (“ALI”), represented by its President, Cordell Y. Guanco (“Guanco”).
The said agreement allowed ALI to develop FEI’s property located in Quezon Avenue, Lucena City, Quezon, which was then mortgaged with Luzon Development Bank.
According to the Letter of Undertaking, ALI would advance Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FEI in order to enable the latter to redeem the property from Luzon Development Bank. An additional Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) shall be given by ALI to FEI within thirty (30) days from the redemption of the involved property. Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) shall likewise be advanced by ALI to FEI upon drawdown from its financiers for the start of the development of the Joint Venture Project.
Following the letter of their agreement, ALI advanced the amounts as agreed upon.
However, after FEI successfully redeemed the property from the bank, the joint venture agreement did not materialize. Consequently, ALI demanded that FEI return the money that it had already advanced.
As partial payment thereof, petitioner Piad issued and delivered to ALI ten (10) postdated Far East and Trust Bank Co. checks, seven (7) of which are enumerated herein as follows:
|
Check No.
|
Amount
|
Date
|
|
000000963
|
P520,000.00
|
June 30, 1997
|
|
0000000965
|
P515,000.00
|
July 30, 1997
|
|
0000000966
|
P512,500.00
|
August 15, 1997
|
|
0000000967
|
P510,000.00
|
August 30, 1997
|
|
0000000968
|
P507,500.00
|
September 15, 1997
|
|
0000000969
|
P505,000.00
|
September 30, 1997
|
|
0000000970
|
P502,500.00
|
October 15, 1997
|
When the aforementioned checks were all deposited to ALI’s account, the same were dishonored by the bank for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (“DAIF”) and Account Closed.
By reason of the dishonor of the subject checks, ALI sent a demand letter[5] to herein petitioner dated November 24, 1997, requiring the latter to settle all her obligations which amounted to Five Million Pesos (P5 million) within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
After the lapse of the period as indicated in ALI’s demand letter, no payment was made by the petitioner. As a consequence, on June 30, 1999, ALI, through its President, Cordell Y. Guanco, caused the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, against petitioner Piad with the Metropolitan Trial Court (“MeTC”) of Quezon City. The criminal cases filed against the petitioner were then docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 0077850 to 56.
The cases were later consolidated and raffled to Branch 37 of the MeTC.
On June 1, 2000, upon being arraigned of the charges against her, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty thereto. Subsequently, a pre-trial was conducted. A trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During the trial, the prosecution adduced in evidence the testimonies of Cordell Y. Guanco, ALI’s President, and Lorenzo Elago. After the prosecution presented its evidence and rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court, asserting that she could not be convicted of the offenses as charged beyond reasonable doubt on the ground that she was never notified of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and that she did not personally receive the notice of dishonor dated November 24, 1997. Opposed by the prosecution, the Demurrer to Evidence was denied by the MeTC.
In an attempt to absolve herself from criminal liability, the petitioner denied the accusations hurled against her and presented as principal witness, Patricio Baldonasa, Operations Manager of FEI. Said witness mainly testified that FEI had already settled the amount of P5 million with ALI from the proceeds of a P14 million loan that FEI obtained from Luzon Development Bank.
After a trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a Decision[6] dated October 18, 2012, the dispositive portion is cited herein as follows:
“In view thereof, the aforementioned issues manifest, beyond reasonable doubt, that violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 have been committed.
“The accused is hereby ordered to:
1. Pay the amount of each of the checks that were issued;
2. Pay a fine of Php200,000.00 each for checks number 000000063 (sic), 000000065 (sic), and 000000066 (sic);
3. Serve an imprisonment of thirty days for each of the seven checks;
4. Pay the costs of suit.
“The accused is to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
“SO ORDERED.”
According to the MeTC, there were no pieces of evidence presented by the defense to counteract the claim of ALI that the checks issued by the petitioner have not been paid.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed an Appeal[7] from the judgment of the MeTC on July 29, 2013 to the RTC stationed in Quezon City.
On September 16, 2013, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, pertinent portions of which read to wit:
“It is undisputed that accused-appellant issued postdated checks to ALI all of which were duly signed by her. The checks issued, however, were dishonored by the drawee bank. Hence, the first and third elements are present in these cases. However, to hold accused-appellant liable for violation of BP 22, it is not enough that she issued the checks that were subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds and closed accounts. It must also be shown beyond reasonable doubt that she knew of insufficient funds at the time the checks were issued. This element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish. xxx
“In order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that she or he receive a notice of dishonor and, within five (5) banking days thereafter failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment. (Betty King vs. People, 319 SCRA 654).
“xxx xxx xxx
“To prove the alleged notice, private complainant presented a copy of the demand letter (Exhibit ‘J’) as well as the registry receipt which was, however, not even authenticated. A registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. Receipts for registered letters and return receipt do not prove themselves; they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters (Ting v. CA, 344 SCRA 551). It is clear from the foregoing that private-complainant presumed that accused-appellant received the demand letter prepared and sent by their lawyer. Private complainant in its memorandum insists that after the demand letter dated 24 November 1997 was sent to accused-appellant Piad, there had been communications with her regarding the payment of its obligations and the dishonored subject checks. In fact, they went to Lucena City and brought the subject checks and asked her to replace them but she refused to pay. To the mind of the court, the testimonies of witnesses Guanco and Elago of the prosecution do not categorically prove exactly when accused-appellant received the notice of dishonor. Hence, there is no way of determining the five (5) day period prescribed in Section 2 of BP 22 would start and end. xxx
“Even assuming that accused-appellant was properly notified of the demand letter dated 24 November 1997, still the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds would not arise. A perusal of the demand letter would show that it was a demand to FEI obligation (sic) to pay in the amount of Five Million (5,000,000.00) Pesos within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, not a notice of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks. Without proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no crime whether estafa or violation of BP 22 can be deemed to exist (People v. Ojeda, 430 SCRA 436).
“Accused-appellant Piad’s assertion that the alleged Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) obligation of FEI to ALI arising out of the 12 December 1965 Letter of Undertaking (Exhibit ‘1’) for which the subject checks (Exhibits ‘A’ to ‘G-2-B’) were issued as partial payments thereof, had been already extinguished by her prior to the institution of the criminal complaint fails to convince this court.
“As correctly pointed out by private-complainant ALI in its memorandum, accused-appellant Piad had judicially admitted in her counter-affidavit she executed during the preliminary investigation of these criminal cases that the obligation of FEI and ALI was initially Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), xxx
“xxx xxx xxx
“It is rather strange why after the issuance of the BPI Check No. 0429691 dated 7 May 1997 (Exhibit ’11’) in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) in favor of private-complainant ALI, accused-appellant Piad sent a letter acknowledging a remaining balance of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) (Exhibit ‘9’), if she had already settled the entire obligation. It is likewise hard to believe that if indeed accused-appellant had already paid her obligation before the filing of the complaint, why did she not demand the return of the subject checks she issued when allegedly several meetings were had between the parties before the filing of the complaint. xxx Except for her bare allegations that she had already paid her entire obligation, which is self-serving, there is no proof that she had been released from her obligations.
“xxx xxx xxx
“In consonance with the foregoing ruling, the court finds that the accused-appellant is under obligation to pay private complainant for the amount covered by the checks in question. Otherwise, the accused-appellant would be enriching herself unjustly at the expense of the private complainant. Likewise, it has been held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability where a mere preponderance of evidence is required (Manahan v. CA, 255 SCRA 202). xxx
“WHEREFORE, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court is REVERSED on the criminal liability and MODIFIED on the civil aspect. Accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged on reasonable doubt on the 7 counts for violation of B.P. 22. She is ordered, however, to pay to the offended party the face value of the checks in the total amount of P3,572,500.00 with 12% legal interest per annum, from the filing of the information until the finality of the decision. If the total obligation is not satisfied, it shall further earn legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the finality of the decision until full payment thereof.
“SO ORDERED.”
The petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision which was however denied by the RTC in an Order[8] dated March 19, 2014.
Unstirred by the foregoing disposition of the RTC, the petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court raising as errors the following acts that were purportedly committed by the RTC, to wit:
I.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION ON ITS REASONING THAT THE ARGUMENTS THEREIN HAD ALREADY BEEN CONSIDERED AND PASSED UPON BY IT IN ITS SEPTEMBER 16, 2013 DECISION.II.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TOTAL OBLIGATION OF FEI TO ALI WAS TEN MILLION PESOS THERE BEING UNREFUTED EVIDENCE THAT THE TOTAL OBLIGATION OF FEI IS FIVE MILLION PESOS ONLY.III.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS AMONG THE BASES FOR ITS DECISION THE PETITIONER’S PURPORTED JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS IN HER COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT WHICH THE LATTER FILED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION STAGE WHEN SAID DOCUMENT WAS NOT AT ANY TIME REPRODUCED TO FORM PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7(B), RULE 112 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OR OFFERED IN EVIDENCE BY ANY PARTY.IV.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY FOR AN ALLEGED CORPORATE OBLIGATION, PURSUANT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATE CORPORATE PERSONALITY AND TO THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN BAUTISTA V. AUTO PLUS TRADERS, INC., ET AL., G.R. NO. 166405 DATED AUGUST 6, 2008.
The primordial issue brought before this Court for resolution is whether the RTC erred in finding that the petitioner was civilly liable to pay the face value of the worthless checks that she issued to ALI.
After a careful and judicious scrutiny of the whole matter, together with the applicable laws and jurisprudence in the premises, we find the instant petition to be bereft of merit.
The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable[9]. If the accused, however, is not found to be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action[10]. This rule more specifically applies when (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted[11]. The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him/her[12].
It can, therefore, be concluded that, if the judgment is conviction of the accused, then the necessary penalties and civil liabilities arising from the offense or crime shall be imposed. On the contrary, if the judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition of the civil liability will depend on whether or not the act or omission from which it might arise exists[13].
The petitioner was charged with violation of BP Blg. 22 for issuing seven worthless checks to ALI. However, she was acquitted because the element of notice of dishonor was not sufficiently established. Nevertheless, the act or omission from which her civil liability arose, which was the making or the issuing of the subject worthless check, clearly existed. Her acquittal from the criminal charge of BP 22 was based on reasonable doubt and it did not relieve her of the corresponding civil liability.
Through the petition for review in the case at bench, the petitioner asserted that she cannot be held liable for the payment of the face value value of the checks considering that the obligation of FEI to ALI had already been fully settled even before the filing of the criminal cases for BP 22. According to the petitioner, the Five Million Pesos that was advanced by ALI to FEI had already been extinguished when BPI Check No. 0429691 dated May 7, 1997 in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) in favor of ALI was claimed by ALI and thereafter deposited by Mrs. Alice Coseteng of ALI.
We are not persuaded by the arguments as raised by the petitioner. A careful perusal of the record of the case would readily show that the Letter of Undertaking[14] executed between FEI and ALI on December 12, 1995 specified that Five Million Pesos shall be given by ALI to FEI for it to be able to redeem the mortgaged property from Luzon Development Bank. Thirty (30) days from the redemption of the property, ALI shall advance another Five Million Pesos to FEI. Applicable provisions of the Letter of Undertaking are reproduced hereunder for reference:
“1. ALI redeems for P5M FEI’s Quezon Avenue property located in Lucena City, Quezon province presently mortgaged with the Luzon Development Bank.
“xxx xxx xxx
“5. ALI shall advance an additional P5M to FEI within thirty (30) days from release of FEI’s property mortgage with the Luzon Development Bank. ALI shall likewise advance another P15M to FEI upon drawdown from its financiers for the start of the joint Venture’s development project. xxx”
A reading of the factual background of the case would reveal that FEI had redeemed the Quezon Avenue property from the bank. Clearly, P5 million had been given by ALI to enable FEI to redeem said property from the bank.
The controversy lies as to whether ALI had complied with the second part of its undertaking with FEI that it shall advance another P5 million to FEI within 30 days from the release of the latter’s property from its mortgage with the bank.
We upheld the findings of the RTC that, if it be true, as claimed by the petitioner, that she had already settled FEI’s obligation with ALI as evidenced by BPI check no. 0429691 dated May 7, 1997 in the amount of P5 million pesos, her acknowledgment of a remaining balance of P5 million pesos in her letter[15] addressed to Guanco as the President of ALI dated June 2, 1997 and her issuance of several checks which were dated beyond the aforementioned date would prove otherwise.
In the said letter, herein petitioner had indicated and acknowledged that she will settle her remaining balance with ALI and had even submitted a collateral to show her goodwill in complying with her obligation.
To reiterate, assuming arguendo that the only amount advanced by ALI to FEI was P5 million pesos, BPI check no. 0429691 dated May 7, 1997 for the sum of P5 million pesos was supposedly sufficient as settlement for the obligation of FEI with ALI. Interestingly, in this scenario, the existence of the letter dated June 2, 1997 acknowledging her remaining obligation with ALI amounting to P5 million pesos would no longer be necessary. The fact that the petitioner drew several checks in favor of ALI as payment for the amounts advanced by the latter despite the existence of BPI check no. 0429691 dated May 7, 1997 and such checks were even dated beyond the date of the BPI check would only prove that said BPI check was only a partial payment and that the amount that FEI owed to ALI was more than P5 million.
As correctly ruled by the RTC, it was hard to believe that, if indeed the petitioner had already paid her obligation before the filing of the complaint, why did she not demand the return of the subject checks that she issued when allegedly several meetings were had between the parties before the filing of the complaint.
Veritably, even absent the petitioner’s counter-affidavit wherein she allegedly admitted that the obligation that FEI owed to ALI amounted to Ten Million Pesos, the preponderance of evidence to show that the obligation of FEI to ALI was more than Five Million Pesos had been discharged nonetheless.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it is worthy to note that the trial court did not convict the petitioner of the offenses charged since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt which is the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of evidence to prove the elements of violations of BP 22 does not mean that the petitioner had no existing debt with ALI, a civil aspect which is proven by another quantum of evidence which is a mere preponderance of evidence. Moreover, from the above pronouncement of the RTC as to the prosecution’s failure to prove that the petitioner issued the check knowing at the time of its issuance that she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for the full payment of the check upon its presentment, it can be deduced that the prosecution was able to establish the presence of the other elements of the offense as charged, i.e., (1) a person draws and issues a check, (2) the check is applied on account or for value, and (4) the check is dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds or credit. Hence, the fact that the petitioner was proven to have drawn and issued a check and that the same was subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds leads to the logical conclusion that the fact from which her civil liability might arise, indeed, existed. On the basis of the foregoing, the RTC correctly held the petitioner civilly liable for the face value of the worthless checks.
Finally, the petitioner insinuated that she could not be held personally and civilly liable to ALI for the value of the seven checks which were issued as payment of a corporate obligation.
Surprisingly, since this is the first time that this issue had been raised by herein petitioner, it is, thus, too late in the day for her to raise that she could not be held liable in her personal capacity for the obligations incurred by the corporation, as this matter had not been pleaded before the MeTC nor RTC. Simply put, issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are barred for being violative of basic due process.
Generally, laws, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[16] and, as such, are deemed to have been waived. Basic consideration of due process impels this rule[17].
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the instant petition. The Decision dated September 16, 2013 as well as the Order dated March 19, 2014 of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City in Criminal Cases Nos. R-QZN-13-00600-CR to R-QZN-13-00606-CR are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[*]Paredes, and [**]Corales, JJ., concur.
[*] Acting Senior Member per Office Order No. 461-14-ABR dated November 3, 2014.
[**] Acting Junior Member vice J. Elbinias per Office Order No. 461-14-ABR dated November 3, 2014.
[1] Rollo, Petition for Review, pp. 9-42.
[2] Ibid, Decision, pp. 43-51.
[3] Ibid, Order, pp. 52-53.
[4] Ibid, p. 67.
[5] Ibid, pp. 69-70.
[6] Ibid, Decision, pp. 92-95.
[7] Ibid, pp. 96-117.
[8] Ibid, Order, pp. 52-53.
[9] Art. 100, Revised Penal Code.
[10] Sec. 2, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court.
[11] Alferez v. People, G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA 116, 125.
[12] Sanchez v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, 511 Phil. 540, 558 (2005), citing Manantan v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 308 (2001).
[13] Nissan v. Felipe, G.R. No. 199067, November 11, 2013.
[14] Supra, Note No. 1, p. 67.
[15] Supra, Note No. 1, p. 76.
[16] Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation v. Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, 459 Phil. 395, 415 (2003).
[17] Phil. Nails and Wires Corporation v. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., 445 Phil. 465, 478 (2003).