JOCELYN N. BAUTISTA, PETITIONER, VS. MANOTOK REALTY, INC., RESPONDENT.BR>
BRUSELAS, JR. J.:
(a) Decision,[2] the dispositive of which, reads –
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant appeal for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, dated April 24, 2013 is affirmed in toto. Without Costs.
SO ORDERED.”
and –
(b) Order[3] which denied her motion for reconsideration of the assailed Decision.
The petition for review arose from a complaint[4] for unlawful detainer filed by respondent Manotok Realty, Inc. (MRI) against Lourdes Bautista and all persons claiming rights under her before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
MRI alleged that it is the administrator of a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 3 situated at 716 Avellana St. (formerly Juan Luna) Tondo, Manila, portion of Lot 2-C and duly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 172592,[5] particularly described as follows:
“A parcel of land, known as Lot 1, Block 3 situated at 716 Avellana St. (formerly Juan Luna) Tondo Manila, bounded on the:
N- Avellana Street
S- Lot 2
E- Lot 3
W- Maliklik Street
containing an area of One hundred five square meters more or less.“
The said parcel of land was leased by MRI to Lourdes Bautista under the terms and conditions set forth in a Contract of Lease,[6] which was for a period of one year commencing on 1 January 2009 and expiring on 31 December 2009 and with a monthly rental fee of Four thousand four hundred forty-four and 75/100 (P4,444.75). The contract expired on 31 December 2009 and was not renewed thereafter and after its expiration, Lourdes Bautista and all those persons claiming rights under her continued occupying the said parcel of land and incurred the following:
Compensation for use and occupancy:
1. P4,667.00 monthly from 1 January 2010 to
31 December 20102. P4,900.35 monthly from 1 January 2011 to
31 August 2011Plus Interest Total amount due as of 31 August 2011
MRI sent a demand letter[7] dated 1 September 2011 to Lourdes Bautista to pay the above-mentioned amount and to vacate the subject parcel of land within fifteen days from receipt thereof. Notwithstanding the receipt of the same on 4 October 2011, Lourdes Bautista still deliberately failed and refused to pay and vacate. By reason of the unjustified refusal of Lourdes Bautista to pay and vacate, MRI was constrained to file an action for unlawful detainer and engage the services of counsel with an agreed acceptance fee of P10,000.00.
On 20 July 2012, Jocelyn Bautista (Bautista) filed an Answer,[8] stating among others, that she was the occupant of the subject property and one of the children of Lourdes Bautista who passed away on 22 April 2010. The MeTC admitted the Answer and allowed the substitution of Jocelyn Bautista for the deceased Lourdes Bautista. Bautista argued that MRI was not the owner of the subject property nor did it have any authority to lease the same, considering that the alleged lease contract was executed on 23 February 2009, while the Management Contract,[9] purportedly giving the latter the authority to lease, was executed only on 21 April 2009.
Bautista also argued that MRI’s Management Contract was dubious in nature as it lacked the signatures of several members of the Manotok family and was not clear as to whether the subject property was included among the properties to be administered by MRI.
Bautista averred that her family had occupied the subject property for more than 60 years, improved the same and paid real estate taxes thereon, thereby giving rise to a presumption of ownership. In line with this argument, Bautista claimed that there was an ongoing case for fraudulent representation, intimidation, annulment of lease contract and quieting of title before the RTC of Manila where MRI was one of the defendants and that the said case would determine the real owner of the subject property.
Finally, Bautista contended that the identity of the subject property had not been established.
On 10 September 2012, the MeTC rendered its Decision[10] that ordered Bautista to vacate the subject property and to pay MRI One hundred thirteen thousand seventy-two and 20/100 Pesos (P113,072.20) as back rentals from 1 January 2012 to 31 August 2011, and thereafter the sum of Four thousand nine hundred and 35/100 Pesos (P4,900.35) as reasonable compensation for her continued use and occupation of the subject property from 1 September 2011 until she finally vacated the same, and Ten thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney’s fees. According to the MeTC, as between TCT No. 172592 presented by MRI and the various statements of account and official receipts evidencing real estate tax payments presented by Bautista, the former should prevail. Tax declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail over a certificate of title which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. With more reason, in the present case, when the tax receipts presented by Bautista pertained only to the real estate taxes paid on the improvements on the subject property and not on the land itself. Having duly established that the Manotok family, as represented by MRI, was the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 172592, the MeTC ruled that it was the Manotok family, through their administrator, MRI, that had the right to possess the same.
The MeTC further ruled that while indeed the Management Contract between MRI and the Manotok family was executed on 21 April 2009 and the Lease Contract between MRI and Bautista was executed earlier on 23 February 2009, it was, however, apparent from Section 1 of the Management Contract that the parties intended the same to have a retroactive effect when they specified an earlier commencement date of 16 November 2008, which thereby ratified the acts done by MRI in representation of the Manotok family prior to its execution.
The MeTC likewise found no irregularity in the Management Contract which lacked the signature of several members of the Manotok family, it appearing that a majority of 16 out of 24 signatories affixed their signatures.
As for Bautista’s challenge to the identity of the subject property, the MeTC held that the Management Contract was clear in that the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 172592 was included among the properties to be administered by MRI. MRI’s description of the 105 square-meter subject property forming part of TCT No. 172592 was likewise clear in its allegations in paragraph 3 of its Complaint, in its Contract of Lease with Bautista, as well as in its demand letter dated 1 September 2011.
As to Bautista’s claim that there was an ongoing case for fraudulent representation, intimidation, annulment of lease contract and quieting of title before the RTC of Manila where MRI was one of the defendants, the MeTC noted that the rule was well-settled that actions for annulment of deeds and quieting of title would not abate ejectment proceedings.
Having disposed of the foregoing preliminary issues, the MeTC then proceeded to tackle the merits of MRI’s complaint for unlawful detainer. According to the MeTC, evidence on record showed that Bautista’s predecessor-in interest Lourdes Bautista, entered into a Contract of Lease for a period of one year, commencing on 1 January 2009. The lease expired on 31 December 2009 and was not renewed. Lourdes Bautista’s successors-in-interest, however, continued enjoying the subject property without objection from MRI. MRI’s inaction, thus, gave rise to an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion under Article 1670[11] of the Civil Code. Since the rent under the original Contract of Lease was payable on monthly basis, the period of the implied new lease was considered to be from month-to-month in accordance with Article 1687[12] of the New Civil Code. Since a demand to pay and vacate was served on Bautista on 6 October 2011, at the end of that month, MRI and Bautista’s lease was deemed to have expired; and when Bautista opted to stay after the expiration of the lease, she became an unlawful occupant of the subject property.
Bautista appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC. Bautista argued that MRI has no authority to lease any land to Lourdes Bautista; and that the identity of the property in the lease contract, as well as in the TCT, did not prove that it was the same as the residential address of Lourdes Bautista.
On 8 January 2014, the RTC promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. According to the RTC, MRI and Lourdes Bautista had entered into a contract of lease on the subject property and such fact was admitted by Bautista in paragraph 10 of her Answer, albeit she interposed that Lourdes Bautista was weak at the time due to her breast cancer. Also, during the pre-trial, Bautista acknowledged that indeed the property that she was leasing from MRI was part of the latter’s title. The RTC held that such admissions were binding on her, the same being judicial in nature, which required no further proof. The RTC likewise noted that Bautista failed to submit any evidence to support her assertion that no such admission was ever made or that the same was made through palpable mistake. The RTC held that as a lessee, Bautista was not allowed to deny the title of Manotok. The RTC further ruled that, assuming that no such admission was made, Bautista’s defense that she was very weak at the time the contract of lease was executed cannot be appreciated not only because it is not one of the grounds to nullify a contract but more importantly, no evidence was presented to buttress the same.
Anent the defense raised by Bautista that MRI had not properly identified and established in its complaint the lot being leased to Bautista, the RTC found the same untenable because the subject property was clearly identified in the contract of lease.
Bautista moved to reconsider the RTC decision but her motion was denied in an Order[13] dated 3 April 2014.
In coming to the Court via the instant petition for review, Bautista raised the following issues-
“1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER-DEFENDANT ADMITTED THE ALLEGED LEASE CONTRACT IN HER ANSWER AND STIPULATIONS.
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF HAS THE AUTHORITY TO LEASE ANY LAND TO THE PETITIONER-DEFENDANT.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPERTY OCCUPIED BY PETITIONER-DEFENDANT AND THE PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY LEASED BY RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF AS WELL AS THE ONE COVERED BY TITLE PRESENTED BY THE LATTER ARE ONE AND THE SAME.”
Bautista argues that contrary to the RTC Decision, she did not admit the alleged lease contract in her Answer as she had no knowledge of the the same. In fact, she, in effect, denied its existence when she qualified that her mother could not have executed the contract of lease because the latter was then very weak due to her breast cancer. She also points out that no rental receipt was ever issued or produced by MRI to show that there was a lease contract. She also argues that, at the time the alleged lease contract was executed, MRI has no authority to lease as its authority was only granted after the lease; that the provision for retroactivity was binding only to the contracting parties and not to a third party as the same was not notarized; and that had the parties to the Management Contract intended that the same shall have a retroactive effect they should have expressly provided for the same. She likewise maintains that the principle, that a tenant cannot deny the title of the landlord, would not apply in the present case because MRI neither acquired title over the leased premises nor the right to offer the same for lease. Finally, she contends that the finding of the RTC that the 105 square-meter property occupied by Bautista was actually within the area covered by the title and the Management Contract, which has an area of several thousands of square meters, was dubious and unsupported by any shred of evidence.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Contrary to the claim of Bautista, a perusal of her Answer shows that there was an admission of the lease contract, particularly in paragraph 10 thereof, which reads: “Defendant (Lourdes Bautista) at the time of the the execution of the contract was suffering breast cancer and she is very weak.” Such statement is clear that indeed Lourdes Bautista executed the contract of lease. The alleged weak condition of Lourdes Bautista at the time of the execution of the lease contract did not in any way affect the validity of the same. The fact of existence of the lease contract was further bolstered by the allegation in the Answer that Lourdes Bautista paid the monthly rental of P4,430.00 to the representative of Manotok Services Inc. Under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof; that admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that such admission was never made. There being no evidence submitted to show that such an allegation was not made or that the same was made through palpable mistake, these allegations in the Answer are deemed judicial admissions of Bautista and are binding upon her.
Also, aside from the admissions in the Answer, both parties entered into a stipulation during the preliminary conference. A portion of the stipulation made by both parties during the pre-trial, as stated in the Order issued by the MTC , is hereunder quoted, thus:
“4. That the Lease Contract between plaintiff MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and defendant LOURDES BAUTISTA was executed on February 23, 2009 (Exh. “B”/Exh. “2”).”
Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission of the execution of the lease contract. In Constantino et. al vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino Jr.[14] the Supreme Court held that pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsel, as in the present case, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated.
The contention of Bautista that the management contract would not in any way affect a third person as the same was not notarized lacks basis. A perusal of the Management Contract shows that the same was notarized on 21 April 2009. We are likewise unpersuaded by the contention of Bautista that the parties to the Management Contract did not intend that the same shall have retroactive effect as they did not expressly provide it in the contract. A scrutiny of the Management Contract shows that at the very start of the agreement, it was expressly stated that the Management Contract shall be for a period of one (1) year commencing from 16 November 2008 up to 15 November 2009. Considering that the contract was entered into on 21 April 2009, it is therefore quite clear that the parties intended the contract to apply retroactively. The said contract, in effect, ratified the contract of lease executed by MRI in favor of Bautista.
Because MRI had been authorized to administer the property, Bautista’s argument that the principle, that a tenant cannot deny the title of the landlord because he neither acquired title over the subject property nor the right to offer the same for lease, is therefore bereft of merit. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the relation of lessor and lessee does not depend on the former’s title but on the agreement between the parties, followed by the possession of the premises by the lessee under such agreement. As long as the latter remains in undisturbed possession, it is immaterial whether the lessor has a valid title — or any title at all — at the time the relationship was entered into.[15]
Finally, the Court disagrees with Bautista’s contention that the ruling of the RTC, that the 105 square-meter property occupied by her was within the area covered by the title and the management contract, was not supported by evidence. As correctly held by the RTC, the contract of lease identified the premises being leased to Bautista. It was very clear in the contract of lease that the 105 square-meter subject property forms part of TCT No. 172592, to wit:
“That the LESSOR hereby leases unto the LESSEE, and the latter accepts in lease from the former, the following premises, situated at Lot 1, Block 3 716 Avellana St. (formerly Juan Luna) and more particularly described as follows:
“A parcel of land, known as Lot 1, Block 3 situated at 716 Avellana St (formerly Juan Luna) Tondo Manila, portion of Lot 2-C and duly covered by TCT No. 172592. Bounded on the:
N-Avellana Street
S- Lot 2
E- Lot 3
W- Maliklik Street
containing an area of ONE HUNDRED FIVE SQUARE METERS (105.00 sq.m) more or less.“
Furthermore, the Management Contract clearly stated that the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 172592 was among the properties to be administered by MRI. But more importantly, Bautista herself admitted during pre-trial that the subject property had no separate title and was merely a portion of TCT No. 172592.
All of the foregoing considered, Bautista failed to show any reversible error committed by the RTC when it sustained the MeTC’s order that directed Bautista and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the premises and to pay rental fees and attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed RTC Decision dated 8 January 2014 is, accordingly, AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Bueser, and *Reyes Carpio, JJ., concur.
*Acting Junior Member per Office Order No. 81-15-ABR dated 16, March 2015.
[1] Rollo, pp. 7-20.
[2] Written by Judge Bibiano G. Colasito, in Civil Case No. 13-130938, entitled “ Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Lourdes Bautista, et al.;” Rollo, pp. 21-28.
[3] Rollo, pp. 35-42.
[4] Rollo, pp. 46-50
[5] Rollo, pp. 165-168.
[6] Rollo, pp.154-157.
[7] Rollo, p. 158.
[8] Rollo, pp.51-54.
[9] Rollo, pp. 159-164.
[10] Rollo, pp. 72-78.
[11] Artice 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract shall be revived.
[12] Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.xxx.
[13] Rollo, p. 35-42.
[14] G.R. No. 181508, 2 October 2013, 706 SCRA 580.
[15] Josie Go Tamio vs. Encarnacion Ticson, G.R. No. 154895, 18 November 2004, 443 SCRA 44.