PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALBERTO PETALINO ALIAS “LANIT”, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
HERNANDO, J:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, ALBERTO PETALINO Alias “Lanit” GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided for by law. As civil liability, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Johnny Nalangay, P75,000.00 as indemnity ex-delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The accused is entitled to full credit in the service of his sentence the preventive imprisonment he has undergone pursuant (to) Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Accused Alberto Petalino alias “Lanit” was charged with Murder in an Information[4] dated February 19, 1998, the accusatory portion of which states:
That on or about the 30th day of November, 1997 in the City of Iloilo, Philipines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, herein accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation, with a decided purposes to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally stab, hit and wound Johnny Nalangay with the said knife, which the said accused was provided at the time, thereby causing upon the latter injuries on vital parts of his body which caused his death few hours thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court issued an Order[5] archiving the record of the case in view of the fact that the accused had remained at large for more than six (6) months. Accused was only arrested on December 10, 2010 and when he was arraigned on February 4, 2011 in the Ilongo dialect which he knew and fully understood, he pleaded not guilty to the crime charged with assistance of his counsel.[6]
After the pre-trial stage was terminated[7], trial on the merits ensued.
To establish the guilt of accused Amantillo, the prosecution presented two witnesses, namely, Franklin Bariquit and Jaime Nalangay.
Version of the Prosecution
Eyewitness Franklin Bariquit recalled that on November 30, 1997 he attended a party with his friend, a certain Carlo, in Barangay Danao, Iznart Street, Iloilo City. There, he met and befriended Johnny Nalangay, the victim in this case.
At around 1:30 in the morning, he and the victim decided to leave. They then headed towards the YMCA where they intended to get their respective rides for home. Bariquit walked behind the victim when the two passed through a narrow alley towards Iznart St. While they were walking, Bariquit saw a person, whom he later identified as accused Alberto Petalino alias Lanit, walking towards them from the opposite direction. When accused had passed the victim, he suddenly turned towards him, grabbed his hair and without warning stabbed the victim in the back. The victim tried to run away, but he fell down after running a distance.
Thereafter, the accused and Bariquit confronted each other. The latter kicked the accused causing him to fall down and to drop his knife. Bariquit then ran away and proceeded to PO’s Marketing which was located near the Bank of the Philippine Islands. After sensing that the accused was no longer chasing him, Bariquit went back to the alley where he last saw the victim. There, Bariquit found the victim lying on the ground, face down and bloodied all over. The victim managed to utter some words but became unconscious when he was taken to St. Paul’s Hospital where he eventually died.
Jaime Nalangay, the father of the victim, testified that his son was only twenty (20) years old at the time of his untimely death. According to him, a police officer and his friend came over to their house and informed him that his son was stabbed. Thus, he went to the hospital but when he arrived there, he found his son dead. Nalangay alleged that he spent Php15,000.00 for the embalming of his son’s remains and another Php10,000.00 for his burial although he could not present the receipts as he lost them. He also asserted that his son’s death caused him so much pain which could never be quantified into monetary amount.
Version of the defense
The defense interposed the defense of denial.
Accused Petalino testified in court to refute the accusations against him.
Accused narrated that on November 30, 1997 at around eleven o’clock in the evening, he was at his sister’s store located in Valeria-Solis Street, Iloilo City helping his sister serve the customers. He left the store shortly later and headed home towards Valeria-Iznart Streets, Iloilo City. He entered a narrow alley along the way and met two persons. One of them, a certain Bariquit, called him “Lanit”. At first, he did not reply as he did not know the two. When he was called the second time, he turned his back and accidentally bumped into another person that he later identified as the victim.
Accused apologized but the victim got angry and boxed him on his chest. Accused lost control and punched the victim back. Thereafter, the victim fell down, drew his knife and chased him. The victim then attempted to stab him but they wrestled and accused was able to get hold of the knife. Meanwhile, the victim’s two other companions attempted to help. This prompted accused to run away as both were drunk. He was chased and so, he ran towards the interior portion of Valeria Street and proceeded inside his nipa hut.
During his cross-examination, accused averred that he was able to evade the stabbing blows because the victim was drunk and he was not. He did not know if the victim was wounded when he left the place. After the incident, he stayed in his nipa hut and went home to Barangay Sinikway, Lapuz. He was later imprisoned for another criminal case, that of alarm and scandal. Later still, he learned that he was likewise charged with the crime of Murder for allegedly killing the victim Johnny Nalangay.
On January 24, 2013, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision finding accused Alberto Petalino alias “Lanit” guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder. It appreciated the circumstance of treachery which qualified the killing to murder.
Hence, this appeal by accused-appellant anchored on the following assignment of errors, to wit:
The Assigned Errors:[8]
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE (DOUBT);
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WHEN IT WAS NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He points out to the supposed several inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony of prosecution witness, Franklin Baraquit, which purportedly made his testimony inherently incredible and unreliable.
This Court holds otherwise.
First and foremost, it should be emphasized that the prosecution witness, Franklin Baraquit, personally witnessed the commission of the crime. In court, he positively and categorically identified appellant as the one who stabbed and killed the victim. In clear, straightforward and vivid details, Baraquit recalled as to how the stabbing incident transpired, thus:
The foregoing evidently shows the culpability of appellant.
On the other hand, the purported inconsistent statements of Bariquit raised by appellant are not as serious and damaging as appellant insists they are. On the contrary, they refer only to minor or trivial matters which do not necessarily impair or taint the credibility of the witness and his testimony.
We stress that whether or not the witness and the victim actually came from a birthday party or any other party prior to the stabbing incident and/or whether or not said party was held in YMCA or at the back of the BPI, are too inconsequential to discredit the overall testimony of the prosecution eyewitness. Even then, Bariquit’s confusion as to the exact place where the party was supposedly held can be excused in view of his explanation on his unfamiliarity with the place.[9] At any rate, what is of utmost importance is his certainty[10] with respect to the place where he personally witnessed appellant stab the victim and which later resulted to the latter’s untimely death.
In like manner, We reiterate that it is highly indisputable that Bariquit personally witnessed the commission of the crime. He saw the actual stabbing of the victim by appellant as he was then behind the former at the time of stabbing. Necessarily, Bariquit actually witnessed what had happened to the victim. Hence, the assertion of appellant that Bariquit could not have witnessed what had happened merits no consideration.
Appellant also questions how could it be possible for Bariquit and the victim to talk with each other when the two of them were more than ten (10) arms length away from each other before the stabbing incident. Interestingly, contrary to what appellant would want to impress upon this Court, there seems to be no inconsistency at all on the matter. From the statement[11] of Bariquit, it appears that he and the victim were talking while they were still in the party and before they walked towards Iznart Street to get their respective rides home. Hence, they were no longer talking with each other immediately prior to the stabbing incident as Bariquit was in fact more than ten (10) arms length behind the victim.
Appellant’s assertion that the witness’ recollection on the manner in which the victim was stabbed was incredible is equally unpersuasive. His argument that when a person uses the left hand to stab the victim when right-handed people tend to perform certain tasks better using the right hand, is highly specious.
In the first place, it bears emphasis that appellant did not even mention that he was right-handed. In any event, there was likewise no need for the prosecution to prove that appellant was left-handed as the same is of no importance considering that even right-handed people could still properly use their left hand in performing a task. This is not concededly contrary to human experience at all.
Verily, it must be emphasized too that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.[12] Without any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, as in this case, the rule should not be disturbed.[13]
The trial court expressed in no uncertain terms that the eyewitness’ testimony had been consistent and clear as opposed to the appellant’s denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime. Its apt finding is worth reiterating, thus:
Franklin’s positive identification of the accused as the victim’s assailant deserves full faith and credit. His statements were consistent and clear. Although the alley was not lighted, the place was illuminated by the reflection of the light coming from the streetlights on both sides of Iznart St. He witnessed the incident at a distance of about twelve (12) to thirteen (13) meters away and the accused even ran after him. Furthermore, he was already familiar of the face of the accused having seen him for four (4) (times) prior to the incident. His proximity to and familiarity of the accused destroy any doubt that he erred in identifying the latter as the perpetrator. Withal, his positive identification prevails over the accused’s uncorroborated denial. Oft-repeated that greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness than the accused’s denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime. This is so inasmuch as mere denials are self-serving evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. In the same vein, accused’s attempt to interpose self-defense, which also lacked substantial corroboration, does not deserve consideration.
In addition, it is well to note that appellant admitted that he was at the crime scene albeit denied having stabbed the victim. Necessarily, his mere denial cannot overcome the positive identification of the eyewitness. It has been held in a long line of cases that denial is a weak defense and it cannot prevail against a positive identification.[14] Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[15] They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[16]
We also affirm the trial court’s finding that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as to effectively upgrade the crime to Murder.
Article 248[17] of the Revised Penal Code defines Murder as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery, among other circumstances, attended the killing. The presence of one of the circumstances enumerated in Art. 248 of the Code would suffice to qualify a killing as murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense, which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated, two conditions must concur:
(1) The employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender’s safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and
(2) The offender’s deliberate or conscious choice of means, method or manner of execution.
Here, contrary to the assertion of appellant, the attack made by him against the victim was sudden and unforeseen. To recall, prosecution witness Bariquit re-enacted in court how the stabbing incident transpired. We reiterate and highlight the following, thus:
INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated how Alberto Petalino stabbed the victim by representing himself as the accused and Mr. Cabayao as the victim. Along the way they met each other and when he passed over the victim, he turned his body towards the victim and grabbed his hair using his right hand and stabbed him at his back using his left hand and the direction of the knife is towards the left portion of his body. (Emphasis supplied)
It is on the basis of the foregoing that the trial court concluded that the attack was effected treacherously. We find no compelling reason to rule otherwise. It is evident that appellant’s attack on the victim was sudden, deliberate and unexpected. Its suddeness afforded no opportunity for the victim to retaliate and defend himself. The victim was caught off-guard when appellant suddenly grabbed and stabbed him right after the latter passed over the victim. As correctly ruled by the trial court:
x x x The victim had no inkling at all that he will be stabbed. He was unarmed and did not give the slightest provocation for the attack. It cannot be gainsaid that in that situation, the victim was helpless and had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. The accused did not stop there. He vented his anger at Franklin and chased him with a knife. These circumstances without doubt show that the attack perpetrated by the accused on the victim was treacherous.
The Autopsy Report dated December 1, 1997 issued by Dr. Tito D. Doromal showed, among others, that the victim sustained “stab wound 1.5×0.4 cm. sharp on its medial and level of the 4th intercostal space, 9.0 cm. from the posterior median line, 119 cm. from the left heel, penetrating the thoracic cavity incising the left infra-clavicular artery, mid-clavicular line ending underneath the skin.” This supports Franklin’s testimony that the accused stabbed the victim from behind without risk of retaliation from the victim. Treachery is therefore, present and this qualifies the killing of the victim to murder.
In light of the foregoing, this Court has no other recourse but to sustain the conviction of appellant for the crime of Murder as his guilt was proven beyond any shadow of doubt by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 24, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35 of Iloilo City in Criminal Case No. 48928 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quijano-Padilla, and Azcarraga-Jacob, JJ., concur.
[1] Per Notice of Appeal; Record, p. 99.
[2] Penned by Presiding Judge Fe Gallon-Gayanilo; Record, pp. 90-96.
[3] Ibid, p. 96.
[4] Record, p. 1.
[5] Record, p. 6.
[6] Record, Certificate of Arraignment, p. 14.
[7] Record, Pre-Trial Order dated May 17, 2011, pp. 28-31.
[8] Rollo, Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 13.
[9] Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), July 19, 2011, pp. 13-14:
x x x x x x x x x
[10] TSN, July 19, 2011, pp. 14-15:
[11] TSN, July 19, 2011, pp. 13-14:
[12] People v. Lanuza, G.R. No. 188562, August 17, 2011.
[13] People v. Basao, et. al., G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012.
[14] People v. Caisip, G.R. No. 119757, May 21, 1998.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Art. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery xxx;
x x x x x x x x x