RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES INC. (RCPI), PETITIONER VS. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS & ELECTRICITY WORKERS’ FEDERATION (FCWF), RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE P…

Radio Communications of the Philippines versus Philippine Communications Electronics and Electricity Workers' Federation

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Radio Communications of the Philippines against the Philippine Communications Electronics and Electricity Workers' Federation and the Court of Industrial Relations. The company asked the Supreme Court to set aside an alias writ of execution enforcing a return-to-work order that the labor court had issued years earlier. The company argued that complying with the order would force it to violate Presidential Decree No. 21, which requires written clearance from the Secretary of Labor before dismissing regular employees. The case matters because it settles two things every labor lawyer must know: a return-to-work order is immediately executory, and a decree meant to protect labor cannot be turned into a weapon against the very workers it was designed to protect.

Procedural History

The dispute began when the union submitted collective bargaining proposals to the company, which rejected them on the ground that a collective labor contract already existed. Conciliation by the Bureau of Labor Relations failed, and a strike was declared. The Court of Industrial Relations took over the dispute because an unfair labor practice element was present, and the Secretary of Labor endorsed it under the Minimum Wage Law. The labor court granted the union's motion for reinstatement pending resolution of the case on the merits. When the company did not comply, the clerk of court issued a writ of execution. The company resorted to various legal moves that further delayed implementation. Eventually the labor court issued a resolution directing the clerk to issue an alias or amended writ of execution naming the strikers to be readmitted. The company then went to the Supreme Court on certiorari, invoking Presidential Decree No. 21.

Facts

On September 19, 1967, the union presented a set of proposals for a collective bargaining agreement. The company responded negatively, saying an existing collective labor contract already covered the matter. An impasse resulted, and conciliation failed. On November 17, 1967, the union declared a strike.

The Court of Industrial Relations took jurisdiction because of an unfair labor practice element, and on January 3, 1968, the Secretary of Labor endorsed the dispute under Section 16(c) of the Minimum Wage Law. On February 15, 1968, the union moved for reinstatement pending resolution of the case on the merits. The labor court granted the motion on April 23, 1968. The order was not complied with, so on December 27, 1969, a writ of execution issued requiring reinstatement of the strikers without loss of seniority. The company continued to resort to legal moves that delayed implementation.

On February 15, 1973, the labor court noted that the union had failed to submit its documentary exhibits despite repeated chances, and deemed the case submitted for resolution. On October 5, 1973, the labor court issued the resolution that became the basis of the alias writ of execution, naming one hundred sixty-seven employees who struck on November 17, 1967 and directing the clerk to issue an alias or amended writ of execution incorporating their names. The company then filed this petition, claiming that reinstating the strikers would require laying off their replacements, which would violate Presidential Decree No. 21.

Issues

• Whether or not the alias writ of execution enforcing the return-to-work order may be set aside on the ground that compliance would violate Presidential Decree No. 21.
• Whether or not the return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory pending the final outcome of the case, even without a presidential certification.
• Whether or not the company may raise defenses going into the merits, such as the alleged termination of employment of some of the strikers, to resist enforcement of the return-to-work order.

Applicable Provisions

Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 21 provides:

No employer may shut down his establishment or dismiss or terminate the services of regular employees with at least one year of service without the written clearance of the Secretary of Labor.

The company invoked this provision, claiming that reinstating the strikers would force it to dismiss their replacements without the required clearance.

Article II, Section 9 of the Constitution provides:

The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration.

The Court cited this provision to show that Presidential Decree No. 21, having received the imprimatur of the Constitution, must be read in harmony with the constitutional policy of protecting labor.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there is no conflict between Presidential Decree No. 21 and the return-to-work order. The dilemma the company posed was more apparent than real. The Court noted that the tenure of the replacements could be made to depend on the outcome of the pending case and whatever valid orders the labor court may issue in the meanwhile, and that whatever rights the replacements have must be respected. The company could even continue their employment, which would in a way atone for its intransigence. The Court stressed that a presidential decree intended to ameliorate the conditions of labor would be subjected to an interpretation not for its benefit but to enable an employer to continue a conduct of disdainful indifference to a valid order. The company had nobody to blame but itself, since as far back as April 23, 1968, its obligation was clear, yet it employed dilatory tactics instead of yielding obedience. Otherwise, a party would benefit from its own defiance of a lawful order.

On the second issue, the Court held that the return-to-work order was immediately effective and executory notwithstanding a motion for reconsideration. Speaking through Chief Justice Makalintal in the Philippine Air Lines Employees' Association case, the Court had ruled that such an order is:

immediately effective and executory, notwithstanding the fact that a motion for its reconsideration has been filed.

The Court added that the absence of a presidential certification did not call for a different conclusion, because the certification may come from the Secretary of Labor under the Minimum Wage Law, as happened in this case. The labor court, in issuing the alias writ, was according respect to authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court.

On the third issue, the Court held that the company raised defenses going into the merits too late. Even assuming their plausibility, the return-to-work order was temporary in character pending the final outcome of the controversy. From the leading case of Rex Taxicab Company versus Court of Industrial Relations, the Court has consistently held that there can be no inference of separation from the service arising from the mere fact of participation in a strike. As Justice Laurel stressed:

With reference to the contention that the drivers in question, by declaring a strike, either voluntarily ceased to be employees of the petitioner or gave just cause for their separation, it need only be stated that the declaration of a strike does not amount to a renunciation of the employment relation.

Doctrine

A return-to-work order issued by the labor tribunal pending the final outcome of a case is immediately effective and executory, notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Its very nature lends itself to no other construction.

The certification that triggers the labor court's jurisdiction need not be presidential; it may proceed from the Secretary of Labor in accordance with his powers under the Minimum Wage Law.

The declaration of a strike does not amount to a renunciation of the employment relation, so no inference of separation from the service arises from the mere fact of participation in a strike.

Presidential Decree No. 21, which requires written clearance from the Secretary of Labor before dismissing regular employees, must be read in harmony with the constitutional policy of protecting labor. It cannot be used as a weapon against the very employees it was meant to protect, and an employer cannot benefit from its own defiance of a lawful order.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, declared the decision immediately executory, and directed the Court of Industrial Relations to take the necessary steps to implement the decision with all promptness and dispatch, with costs against the company.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory, and a strike is not a renunciation of the employment relation. Examiners like to use this case to test whether a labor decree meant to protect workers can be invoked by an employer to delay enforcement of a valid labor order, and to test the rule that a strike does not sever the employer-employee relationship.