PEDRO CAMUS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Camus versus Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

The Case

This is a criminal case for estafa, or swindling, brought by the People of the Philippines against Pedro Camus, who at the time of the events was the chief of the Investigation Division of the Philippine Veterans Board. Camus received money from Madki Al. Alonto, ostensibly to buy jeeps from the Foreign Liquidation Commission for veterans and guerrilla members, but no jeep was ever bought or delivered. The case matters because it fixes a rule every Bar candidate must know: when the offended party in an estafa accepts the promissory note of the accused for the repayment of money already converted, the crime is not thereby obliterated. The execution of a note acknowledging the monetary liability does not novate away the criminal offense.

Procedural History

Alonto filed his complaint in the office of the City Fiscal, where Camus failed to appear on the dates he was subpoenaed for investigation. The case was tried, and the trial court rendered judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals convicted the petitioner Pedro Camus of the crime of estafa. Camus then brought the matter to the Supreme Court. This Court does not review the facts, but the petition was given due course to determine the validity of the petitioner's contention that his liability was purely civil in nature in view of the complete novation of the contract by the execution of the promissory note in favor of the complainant Alonto for the amount of the money received from the latter.

Facts

Two or three days before April 18, 1947, Madki Al. Alonto, who used to assist Moros in applying for loans under the Veterans Act, met Pedro Camus at the Philippine Veterans Board, where Camus was the chief of the Investigation Division. Talking about buying jeeps, Camus informed Alonto that he could purchase them from the Foreign Liquidation Commission for veterans or guerrilla members at the price of 380 pesos each. Alonto requested Camus to buy one for him. On April 18, Alonto handed Camus the sum of 380 pesos, the price of a jeep, which Camus promised to purchase for him and for which Camus issued a receipt.

A few days later, Alonto went to see Camus to find out if he had already bought the jeep. Camus told him that he could not buy one jeep but had to acquire a lot consisting of a six by six truck and six jeeps, and although he already had a buyer for the truck, he did not have any for the remaining five jeeps. Alonto promised to look for buyers of the five jeeps at the agreed price of 450 pesos each, in order to leave a margin for Camus. On April 21, Alonto handed the sum of 430 pesos to Camus as the price of a jeep, less 20 pesos which Alonto promised to pay upon receipt of the jeep, and Camus again issued a receipt. Alonto later found four other buyers through the help of Deputy Governor Lucman, from whom he received the sum of 1,740 pesos, which he delivered to Camus on May 19, 1947 as the price of the four jeeps, less 80 pesos, promising to pay the balance upon delivery.

Camus said the jeeps would be delivered about the end of May, but when Alonto asked for them at the end of that period, Camus again promised to deliver them on June 2, 1947. Since then Alonto had been asking Camus either for the delivery of the jeeps or the return of the money. Camus made several promises until finally, on September 25, when he was pressed by Alonto, who was in turn being pressed by those who furnished him the money, Camus executed a note promising to return the money on September 30, but he failed on that day and on subsequent days. Camus claimed that on September 25 he offered to return the sum of 2,550 pesos, and that the note arose from a transaction in which he acted only as guarantor for one Alejandro Espere, who was to invest the money in the buying and selling of morphine sulphate. The Court of Appeals did not believe this exculpation.

Issues

• Whether or not the accused, having received money to buy jeeps and having failed to purchase jeeps or return the money, is guilty of estafa.
• Whether or not the criminal liability of the accused was substituted with a civil obligation, and the offense obliterated, by the execution of a promissory note in favor of the offended party for the amount of the money received.
• Whether or not the accused had sold the jeeps to Alonto, so that the money was merely advance or partial payment.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a specific article of the Revised Penal Code in its text; it applies the settled doctrine on estafa through misappropriation of money received for a purpose. The Court anchors the rule on the following principle drawn from its own jurisprudence, which it states in the decision:

When the offended party in a estafa accepts the promissory note of the accused for the repayment of the money already converted, the offense is not thereby obliterated.

This principle bears directly on the case because the petitioner relied on the promissory note as proof that his liability had become purely civil.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that having received money to buy jeeps and having failed to purchase jeeps or return the money, the defendant Camus was guilty of estafa. There was no doubt that the money was received by Camus for the purchase of jeeps and that no jeep was delivered, nor even purchased.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the criminal liability was not substituted with a civil obligation. Assuming that the promissory note was written as an acknowledgment of the monetary liability of Camus to Alonto, and not under the circumstances related by Camus, the question was whether the acceptance of the note obliterated the offense. The Court answered in the negative, following its earlier holdings, and stated the question and answer thus:

When the offended party in a estafa accepts the promissory note of the accused for the repayment of the money already converted is the offense thereby obliterated? This Court has held the negative.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the argument that Camus had sold the jeeps to Alonto and that the money was merely advance or partial payment, because it contradicts the findings of the Court of Appeals. As the appellate court declared, and the proofs showed, Camus was the agent of Alonto to purchase the jeeps, and Camus could not have sold the jeeps to Alonto. The Court also considered the cases invoked by the petitioner and held that they did not modify the doctrine in the decisions first cited, which still represent the true principle in the matter.

Doctrine

Three rules must be retained. First, one who receives money for a specific purpose, such as buying jeeps, and fails either to carry out the purpose or to return the money, is guilty of estafa. Second, the subsequent execution of a promissory note in favor of the offended party, acknowledging the monetary liability for money already converted, does not obliterate the crime and does not convert the criminal liability into a purely civil one; the offended party's acceptance of the note does not amount to a novation that extinguishes the offense. Third, an agent entrusted to purchase goods for another cannot be said to have sold those goods to his principal, so the claim of advance or partial payment will not lie where the finding is one of agency.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals convicting Pedro Camus of estafa, with costs.

Remember This

The single line to memorize: when the offended party in an estafa accepts the promissory note of the accused for the repayment of money already converted, the offense is not thereby obliterated. Examiners use this case to test whether a Bar candidate can distinguish a civil settlement or acknowledgment of debt from a novation that extinguishes criminal liability, and to test the rule that an agent cannot "sell" to his principal the very goods he was entrusted to buy.