VALDERRAMA LUMBER MANUFACTURERS COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT VS. THE ADMINISTRATOR, AND THE HEARING OFFICER, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Carlos Fernandez and others, former employees and laborers of
petitioner Valderrama Lumber Manufacturers Co., Inc., filed claims
against the latter, for overtime pay, salary differential, and
separation pay, with Regional Office No. V of the Department of Labor
at Iloilo City (docketed as Case No. 712 [606 LS]). Having failed to
settle the case amicably, respondent Hearing Officer of the Regional
Office set the claims for hearing and reception of evidence, and
actually conducted hearing on the same on August 26, 1958. Before any
further proceeding could be had, petitioner company instituted the
present action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (docketed as Special Civil
Action No. 4989) against respondents Administrator and Hearing Officer
of said Regional Office. In due time, the Court of First Instance
granted the preliminary injunction, restraining respondents from
further proceeding with the case. In said action, petitioner company
assailed the exercise by respondents of jurisdiction over said money
claims, claiming that the same “fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the ordinary courts of justice”. Respondents, in their answer dated
October 3, 1958, contended that “Regional Offices of the Department of
Labor have been vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all cases falling under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, or cases
affecting all money claims arising from Labor Standard Laws”, by virtue
of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, as implemented by Executive Order No.
218 of the President, issued on December 10, 1956 and Rules and
Regulations Nos. 1 and 2-A of the Labor Standards Commission, dated
January 16, 1957 and December 16, 1957.

Issues having been joined, the case was tried and after trial, the
Court of First Instance, on August 26, 1960, rendered a decision
dismissing the case and dissolving the preliminary injunction
previously granted. Said decision in part reads:

“As Reorganization Plan No. 20-A has been admittedly
approved by Congress (which is constitutionally empowered to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts) and
thereby became a part of Republic Act No. 997, as amended, and the
respondents have relied thereon assuming and exercising jurisdiction
over Case No. 712 (606 LS), the instant petition is rendered groundless.

* * * * * * *

“WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued dissolved, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

“So ordered.”

Dissatisfied with said decision, petitioner company appealed to us.

Petitioner-appellant claims that the trial court erred (1) in not
holding that Reorganization Plan 20-A can not have the efficacy of a
law because it was not validly passed as a statute and because it
departed from the announced objectives of the Reorganization Act; and
(2) in giving force to said Reorganization Plan 20-A, considering that
the same is a void legislation because it constitutes an invasion of
judicial power of the courts and, therefore, was an unconstitutional
exercise of legislative power.

Those two issues have already been disposed of in a number of cases we have recently decided.

In the case of Miller vs. Mardo, 112 Phil. 792 and
companion cases, promulgated on July 31, 1961, passing upon the same
question of whether with the adjournment of the sessions of Congress
without said body passing a resolution disapproving or adopting
Reorganization Plan 20-A, as provided in Section 6 (a) of Republic Act 997, such reorganization plan became a law, this Court held:

“Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative
inaction is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. By specific
provision of the Constitution—

‘No bill
shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three
calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall
have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the
last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the
question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.’ (Sec. 21 [a], Art. VI).

‘Every
bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it;
but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where
it originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal
and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration,
two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the
bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In
all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas and nays,
and the names of the Members voting for and against shall be entered on
its Journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as
herein provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall
have been presented to him, the same shall become a law in like manner
as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its
return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the
President within thirty days after, adjournment.’ (Sec. 20-[1], Art. VI
of the Constitution).

“A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a)
of the Reorganization Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will
show that the former is in distinct contrast to the latter. Under the
first, consent or approval is to be manifested by silence or
adjournment or by ‘concurrent resolution’. In either case, the
contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring
positive and separate action by each House of Congress. It is contrary
to the ‘settled and well-understood parliamentary law (which requires
that the) two houses are to hold separate sessions for their
deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is
tit be submitted to the separate determination of the other.’ (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187).

“Furthermore, Section 6 (a)
of the Act would dispense with the ‘passage’ of any measure, as that
word is commonly used and understood, and with the requirement of
presentation to the President. In a sense, the section, if given the
effect suggested in counsel’s argument, would be a reversal of the
democratic processes required by the Constitution, for under it, the
President would propose the legislative action by submitting the plan,
rather than approve or disapprove the action taken by Congress. * * * .”

With respect to the second issue raised herein, we said in the same Miller case ^[1],
that while the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was
empowered by Republic Act 997 to create or abolish departments,
offices, agencies or functions which may be necessary for the efficient
conduct of the government service, those “functions” which may thus be
created, refer merely to administrative, not judicial ones. In
declaring the invalidity of the conferment of judicial powers on the
regional offices not previously exercised by said offices, this Court
said:

” * * * . For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government
(See Section 3 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A, No. 1241), which
plainly did not include the creation of courts. And the Constitution
expressly provides that ‘the Judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law
(Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution). Thus, judicial power rests
exclusively in the judiciary.”

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set
aside, and the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued and
later dissolved by the trial court is revived, reinstated and made
permanent, without costs. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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^[1] See also Corominas vs. Labor Standards Commission, 112 Phil., 551; and companion cases, June 30, 1961; Equitable Banking Corp. vs. Regional Office 3, L-14442, June 30, 1961; Earnshaw Docks & Honolulu Iron Works vs. Mardo, 112 Phil., 787; Liwanag vs. Central Azucarera, 112 Phil., 834; Lectura vs. Regional Office 3, 112 Phil., 837 and companion cases, Pampanga Sugar Development Co. vs. Fuentes, 112 Phil.; 784.