VICENTE T. TAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE JOB B. MADAYAG AND SERVILLANO E. BANAYAD, JR., RESPONDENTS.

In a sworn letter-complaint dated April 27, 1993, Vicente T. Tan charged
Judge Job B. Madayag of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145, and
Servillano E. Banayad, Jr., then acting officer-in-charge of the branch, with
neglect of duty. Specifically,
complainant alleged that respondents “deliberately and maliciously failed
to give notice to the movant-intervenors of the denial of their motion for
intervention (where complainant is co-movant) and have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence by either hiding
or concealing and refusing to give movants a copy of the said order of denial,”^[1]
thus allegedly depriving them of the opportunity to take the necessary legal
action to prevent the original parties in Civil Case No. 92-2198 from entering
into a settlement which was executed without their (movants’) knowledge.

Complainant was one of the movants for intervention in Civil Case
No. 92-2198 entitled “Aboitiz and Co., Inc., et al. vs. American Express
Bank, Ltd.,” before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145,
presided over by respondent judge. The
case involved the recovery of certain shares of stock of the defunct
Continental Bank (which later became the International Corporate Bank
[INTERBANK]) allegedly issued in the name of complainant and four other
corporations wherein the former is an officer and a stockholder. These shareholdings were allegedly part of
the shares of stock sequestered by the Government right after the EDSA
revolution of 1986 and which thereafter became part of the capital stock of
INTERBANK.

On September 8, 1992, complainant filed a motion to intervene in
the said civil case. The motion was set
for hearing on September 18, 1992. On
December 22, 1992, respondent judge issued an order denying the aforesaid
motion for intervention for lack of merit. However, it was only on April 15, 1993 when complainant’s counsel
received a notice of the aforesaid order of denial. This was preceded by a letter of complainant, dated April 5,
1993, requesting a certification that neither he nor his lawyers had been furnished
a copy of the order of December 22, 1992 denying the motion for
intervention. The trial court, through respondent Banayad, Jr., issued a certification^[2]
on the same date to the effect that
movants Vicente T. Tan, et al. were indeed not furnished a copy of the said
order.

Complainant claims that
he had previously caused several persons to go to the Office of the Clerk of
Court of Branch 145 to verify the status of the said motion which was then
pending resolution, only to be informed that the same had not yet been acted
upon. Furthermore, complainant avers
that there were at least two occasions when the expediente of the case could not be located, hence the
real status of the motion for intervention could not then be determined.

These incidents led
complainant to deduce that the failure to send the required notice of the order
denying intervention was deliberate, in order to enable the original parties in
the aforesaid civil case “to enter into all kinds of settlements causing
undue injury to complainant and to the other stockholders who have actual and
material interest in the subject matter of the litigation.”^[3] In other words, with the settlement of the
case between the original parties thereto, the legal remedies that could have
been available to complainant, had he been properly and timely informed of the
denial of his motion for intervention, had been effectively foreclosed by the
time the court furnished him with its notice of denial of the motion for
intervention.

In a resolution dated June 23, 1993, the Court, acting on the
recommendation of Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, resolved to
require respondents to file their comments.

In his comment dated July 27, 1993, respondent Banayad, Jr.
stated that he was on leave for the purpose of taking the 1992 Bar examinations
when the motion for intervention was filed on September 18, 1992. Consequently, the representatives of
complainant tasked to follow up the status of the motion from December 22, 1992
onwards could not have approached him. However, he admitted that he furnished complainant’s counsel a copy of
the order denying the motion only in April, 1993, after he had verified from
the records that indeed only the other intervenor in the case was furnished the
required notice, while none had been sent to complainant. He asserted that it was not his duty to
release or mail copies of the order to the parties concerned. That duty, he averred, devolved upon the
clerk-in-charge and not upon him as the officer-in-charge of the branch.

Respondent judge, for his part, adopted the comment he had filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman in Case No. OMB-0-93-0974, as the instant
complaint is allegedly identical to that case. In his said comment, respondent judge alleged that after signing the questioned
order of December 22, 1992, he sent the records of the case and the pertinent
order to respondent Banayad, Jr. for
the corresponding notifications to be sent to all parties in the case. He averred that, as a matter of procedure,
it is respondent Banayad, Jr., as officer-in-charge, who instructs the mailing
clerk to send out copies of orders to the parties by mail and that it is not a
duty of the presiding judge to personally send out copies of his orders to the
parties.

In his consolidated reply dated October 13, 1993, complainant
reiterates that the delay in the resolution of his motion for intervention had
in fact resulted in a denial of justice and that, by reason of respondent
judge’s neglect of duty, he was deprived of his property without due process of
law. Furthermore, according to
complainant, respondents cannot invoke the neglect of their staff as a
legitimate excuse for the delay in sending him copy of the order denying the
motion for intervention, and both respondents must be held liable for failing
to exercise close supervision over their personnel.

By resolution of the Court dated November 3, 1993, the matter was
referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. On January 10, 1994,
the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its report with the following
findings:

“We find the complaint meritorious. It is evident from the records and
from the admission of the respondents themselves that indeed the counsel for
the complainant (movant in the case) was furnished a copy of the Order dated
December 22, 1992 only sometime in April, 1993 or more than three (3) months
after its issuance. It is also settled
that the duty of sending out copies of the Orders issued by the Court
devolve(s) upon the Clerk-in-Charge. Be
that as it may, respondents may not be absolved from any liability for the said
inadvertence which allegedly prejudiced the complainant. Their respective defenses that it is not
their duty to send out notices to the parties concerned is not tenable. Respondent Banayad, as Officer-in-Charge of
that Court during the period in question, may not invoke (the fact) that he was
on leave in September, 1992 as the questioned Order was issued when he had already
reported back for work. He should have
instructed the personnel in charge to mail copies of the Order to the parties
concerned with utmost dispatch. Respondent Judge, for his part, also failed to exercise close
supervision over his personnel in violation of Rule 3.09, Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which states:

‘A judge should organize and supervise the Court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times
the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.’

“However, we are not convinced that the delay was tainted with
malice or was done deliberately to prejudice complainant. Upon knowing that complainant was not sent a
copy of the Order, respondent Banayad immediately instructed the
clerk-in-charge to send a copy thereof to complainant’s counsel.”^[4]

The Court agrees with the above findings and opinion of the Court
Administrator. Respondents’ neglect of
duty is a matter of record. A judge
cannot simply take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court
personnel. Proper and efficient court
management is definitely his responsibility. He is directly responsible for the proper discharge of their official
functions. “Court personnel are
not the guardians of a Judge’s responsibilities.”^[5] The
efficient administration of justice cannot accept as an excuse the shifting of
blame from one court personnel to another. In this case, the delay complained of could have been avoided had the
respondents adopted the system of maintaining even a simple checklist of all matters
submitted for resolution, and that definitely includes the prompt sending out
of notices of court orders to all the parties in the case to satisfy the
requirements of due process.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Job B. Madayag is hereby
SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for the delay in the service to the counsel for
complainant of a copy of the order dated December 22, 1992 issued in Civil Case
No. 92-2198, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
or acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Respondent Servillano B. Banayad, Jr. is hereby ORDERED to pay a
fine of P1,000.00, likewise with the same warning of more severe sanctions in
the event of a repetition of the same or similar act or acts.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), no
part.

Padilla, Nocon, and
Puno, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 5.

^[2]
Rollo, 15.

^[3]
Ibid., 5.

^[4]
Rollo, 55-56.

^[5]
Nidua vs. Lazaro, A.M. No. R-465 MTJ, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 581,
citing Secretary of Justice vs. Legaspi, A.C. No. 269-J, September 10,
1981, 107 SCRA 233.