DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES, OLONGAPO CITY, ANTHONY M. RO…

Sanders versus Veridiano

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and preliminary injunction filed by Dale Sanders and A.S. Moreau, Jr. against Judge Regino T. Veridiano II of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, and the private respondents Anthony Rossi and the estate of Wyer. The private respondents sued the petitioners for damages arising from two letters they claimed were libelous. The petitioners, officers of the United States naval establishment in the Philippines, invoked the doctrine of state immunity, arguing that the acts complained of were performed in the discharge of their official duties. The case matters because it clarifies when a public officer, including an officer of a foreign state, may be sued in his personal capacity, and when the suit is in truth one against the government, which cannot proceed without its consent.

Procedural History

The private respondents filed a complaint for damages in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss under a special appearance, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. The trial court denied the motion in an order dated March 8, 1977, on the ground that the petitioners had not presented evidence that their acts were official rather than personal torts, and that the complaint alleged malice and bad faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of Moreau upon a bond. Later, the trial court declared Moreau in default in an order dated August 9, 1977. The motions to lift the default and for reconsideration were denied on September 7, 1977. The petitioners then filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, contending that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order on September 26, 1977, suspending the proceedings below.

Facts

Sanders was the special services director of the United States Naval Station in Olongapo City. Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes that station. The private respondents Rossi and Wyer were American citizens with permanent residence in the Philippines, employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department. On October 3, 1975, they were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975.

The private respondents protested and instituted grievance proceedings under the rules of the United States Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended their reinstatement to permanent full-time status with backwages, and observed that special services management practiced an autocratic form of supervision. On May 17, 1976, Sanders wrote Moreau disagreeing with the report and asking for rejection of the recommendation. The letter contained statements that Rossi tended to alienate co-workers and supervisors, that both respondents were difficult to supervise, and that they had discussed the case publicly despite being under oath not to do so. Earlier, on November 7, 1975, a letter purportedly from Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change in employment status and requesting concurrence. It was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. by direction, not by Moreau.

On November 8, 1976, the private respondents filed a complaint for damages, claiming the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings invaded their rights. They stated that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity. The petitioners moved to dismiss, arguing the acts were official and covered by state immunity.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they were sued for damages.
• Whether or not the suit is in truth one against the United States government, which has not given its consent to be sued, thus depriving the trial court of jurisdiction.
• Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss and in proceeding with the case.

Applicable Provisions

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

This provision anchors the doctrine of state immunity, which the Court applies to foreign states by reason of the sovereign equality of states.

Article 354, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

The Court notes that the letters come under the concept of privileged communications and are not punishable, and that the resented remarks are not defamatory by our standards.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the acts complained of were performed in the discharge of official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department, had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, and dismissal. His letter was a reply to a request from his superior, Moreau, for more information, and even without such request he was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticism, which was in effect a direct attack against him. As for Moreau, his letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel requesting concurrence with the conversion was clearly official in nature, performed as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel. The letter dealt with financial and budgetary problems and contained recommendations, including the re-designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Any award of damages would have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal, which would require an affirmative act of appropriating the necessary amount. This makes the action a suit against that government without its consent. The Court stressed that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and the doctrine of state immunity, and that the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability for a personal tort committed without or in excess of authority. The Court distinguished this case from Festejo versus Fernando, where a bureau director was sued for a personal tort committed without or in excess of authority. Here, the government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued, and the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

On the third issue, the Court held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion. Where the character of the act complained of can be determined from the pleadings, it is not necessary to require a trial. The Court also found that the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which was not overturned, and that mistakes of public officers are not actionable absent malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

Doctrine

A public officer may be sued in his personal capacity only where the act complained of is a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. The mere allegation that he is sued personally does not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and the doctrine of state immunity. Conversely, the mere invocation of official character will not insulate him from liability for a personal tort. Where the acts complained of are performed in the discharge of official duties, the suit is in truth one against the government, and it cannot prosper without the government's consent to be sued. This rule applies not only to officers of the local state but also to officers of a foreign state, by reason of the sovereign equality of states and Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice, and there are recognized exceptions, such as suits to compel a public officer to perform an act required by law, or to restrain a Cabinet member from enforcing an unconstitutional law, or to secure a judgment that the officer may satisfy by himself without the government having to perform a positive act.

Disposition

The petition was granted. The challenged orders of March 8, 1977, August 9, 1977, and September 7, 1977 were set aside, the respondent court was directed to dismiss the civil case, and the temporary restraining order was made permanent.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the mere allegation that a government functionary is sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and the doctrine of state immunity. Examiners like to use this case to test whether a student can distinguish a personal tort committed without or in excess of authority from an official act that makes the suit one against the government, and to test the application of state immunity to officers of a foreign state.