PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARMANDO DE GUZMAN Y JACOBE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
GONZALES-SISON, M., J.:
The accused-appellant was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide in an Information filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal (Branch 76), the accusatory portion of which reads:
“That on or about the 27th day of May 2005 in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the driver of a KAWASAKI Motorized Tricycle bearing Plate No. PY-8476 and owned by Remegio Jacobe, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid injuries to person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the said motor vehicle in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence, the said vehicle hit and bump a pedestrian one MARINA ROXAS y MERCADO, thereby causing the latter to sustain mortal injuries which directly caused her death, the offense being attended with the qualifying circumstances of having failed to lend on the spot to the injured party such help as may be in his hands to give.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
The accused-appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, was duly arraigned, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Cristina Rendoña, Jose Arnel Marquez, PO2 Joselito Infante, and Bonifacio Roxas.
Cristina Rendoña (Cristina) testified that on May 27, 2005 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening, she and her sister Marina Roxas (victim) alighted from a passenger jeepney and was about to cross M. H. del Pilar Street, Brgy. Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal when they saw a tricycle fast approaching. Upon seeing the tricycle, the two were prompted to stop. However, when the tricycle was already near, Cristina and the victim were surprised to see another tricycle behind the first tricycle speeding and overtaking the first tricycle. Consequently, the victim pushed Cristina forward to prevent her from being hit by the tricycle but Cristina sustained some injuries just the same while the victim was hit and dragged by the sidecar of the second tricycle causing her instantaneous death. The driver of the second tricycle was later identified as Armando De Guzman who fled on board his tricycle right after the incident.
Initially, Cristina and the victim were rushed by other tricycle drivers to H-Vill Hospital but the doctor at H-Vill told them that the condition of the victim is “50/50”. So that, Cristina and the victim were brought to the East Avenue Medical Hospital where Cristina and the victim were X-rayed and medicaly treated. However, despite medical attendance, the victim died. Cristina presented photographs of her injuries in the arm, right cheek and left hip and was issued a medical certificate.
Cristina further testified that the accused-appellant was arrested only on a Monday night because he hid. The folowing day, a Tuesday, Cristina filed a complaint. She identified accused-appellant Armando de Guzman in court.
When crossed-examined, Cristina testified that the name of the accused-appellant was only relayed to her by the tricycle drivers who assisted and brought them to the hospital. Cristina recognized the face of the accused-appellant because he was the one whom she saw overtaking the other tricycle prior to their being hit by his sidecar. The tricycle that bumped them had no passenger but she did not notice if there was any back rider. Cristina recalled that accused-appellant was running very fast and, in fact, she saw smoke coming out from the back of the tricycle. She describes the same as “mabilis po kasi umuusok ang likuran niya at nakita ko po kung paano niya pigain ang manibela niya”.[2]
As testified to by P/Chief Inspector Jose Arnel Marquez, he is a Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory who signed and issued Medico-Legal Report M-292-05.[3] He narrated that he conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim by virtue of a letter-request for autopsy[4] by the Chief of Police of Rodriguez Municipal Police Station. Upon receipt of the letter-request for autopsy, he proceeded to the Boy Santiago Funeral Parlor where the cadaver of the victim was brought. There, a representative of the parlor handed to him a Certification of Identification and Consent for Autopsy[5] signed by the daughter of the victim and the victim’s Certificate of Death.[6] After receipt of these documents, witness proceeded with the examination of the external injuries sustained by the victim consisting of ten (10) contusions and abrasions. After the external examination on the cadaver, he proceeded with the overall opening of the cadaver and found out that the victim sustained fracture from the skull particularly the frontal bone, the parietal bone, temporal bone, the occipital bone and there was a subdural and sub-arachnoidal hemorrhage on the brain which could have been inflicted by coming in contact with a hard and blunt object, like the front or side part of the tricycle. In sum, the witness certified that the cause of death of the victim is traumatic injuries to the head.[7]
As regards witness PO2 Joselito Infante, for purposes of expediency, the prosecution and the defense entered into a stipulation of facts to the effect that this witness was requested to investigate the incident that transpired on May 27, 2005 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening; that he had gone to the place of the incident and gathered evidence for the vehicular incident report, subject to the counter-proposal by the defense that this witness had no personal knowledge of the incident which was admitted by the prosecution; that after the investigation, he prepared a Recommendation which he submitted to the Chief of Police dated May 29, 2005. He was presented to identify Exhibits “D” and “D-1” which is a Memorandum indorsing a case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.
Likewise, for purposes of expediency, the prosecution proposed for a stipulation of facts to the defense that witness Bonifacio Roxas is the husband of the victim and that he will be presenting the funeral and burial expenses incurred by him for the death of his wife, to which proposal the defense agreed.
The appellant, for his part, testified that he was a construction worker. On May 27, 2005, after their work at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening, he was requested by his co-workers to bring them home using the tricycle which is owned by his uncle. It was then drizzling and they took the highway Balite which is the usual route for jeepneys and trucks. He claims that the victim suddenly crossed the street. As he was trying to avoid being hit by an incoming truck, he accidentally hit the victim. Upon hitting the victim, he panicked and was confused. Feeling at a lost on what to do, he fled.
When cross-examined, appellant admitted that he was only using a student driver’s license on the date of the accident. The operator of the tricycle allowed him to drive the tricycle with full knowledge that he had no valid driver’s license. Appellant also admitted that at the time of the incident, he was not being supervised by any licensed driver which is a requirement for those possessing only student driver’s license. He further admitted that he did not immediately surrender to the police because he was afraid of the relatives of the victim. He only came to know about the victim from his brother and that his companions at the time of the incident assisted the victim.
Appellant likewise stated that on the night when he fled from the scene of the incident, he went to H-Vill Hospital to report the incident. He admits that he is responsible for the death of the victim but raises the defense of “accident” because according to him he merely tried to avoid an incoming truck. He explains that he was then overtaking another tricycle and a truck was coming at the opposite direction.
On redirect examination, appellant admits that he did not pick up the victim to bring her to the hospital because he was confused. Instead, he fled and just reported the incident to a hospital. However, he claims that he told his companion to help the victim. This companion approached the victim and hailed a tricycle. He did not attempt to help the victim for fear of being mauled by bystanders.[8]
No other witness was presented to corroborate the appellant’s testimony.
Brushing aside the appellant’s defense of “accident”, the RTC convicted him of the crime charged in the Information in its Decision of January 9, 2013 as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Armando de Guzman y Jacobe alias “Arman” GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE (Violation of Article 365, 6th paragraph no. 2 in relation to the last paragraph of the Revised Penal Code) and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum, to 7 years, 4 months and 1 day as maximum, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Accused Armando de Guzman y Jacobe alias “Arman” is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the following amounts:
a. Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. Php 67,000.00 as actual damages representing the burial and funeral expenses;
c. Php 100,000.00 as moral damages; and
d. Php 50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Accused Armando de Guzman y Jacobe alias “Arman” is hereby ordered committed to the National Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa City for service of sentence.
SO ORDERED.”
Hence, the present appeal raising the lone assignment of error, viz:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was negligent and that he failed to exercise the necessary precaution in order to prevent injury to others. He added that the victim and her companion were negligent when they crossed the street and even stayed at the middle for minutes.
The appeal lacks merit.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, defining and penalizing quasi-offenses provides:
“Imprudence and negligence. – Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. (emphasis supplied)
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hand to give.”[9] (emphasis supplied)
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the trial court found the appellant to be recklessly imprudent when, by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution in driving a tricycle, he did or failed to do such act which was the proximate cause of the accident that resulted in the death of the victim. We agree with the succinct disquisitions of the trial court, thus:
“… It is not far fetched to think that it was upon overtaking a tricycle when accused de Guzman was surprised to see a truck running towards his direction. The circumstances of the case clearly support a findings that due to wanton disregard for traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid injuries to person, accused de Guzman drove his motorcycle in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said motor vehicle to hit and bump a pedestrian victim MARINA ROXAS y MERCADO that resulted to her death. The accused could have been more prudent if only he drove in a moderate speed taking into account the presence of pedestrians. Due to over speeding, accused de Guzman was placed in a compromising situation because it came to the point when he had to choose between hitting a truck or two (2) human beings, and for lack of proper discernment, he chose to hit the latter.
Verily, the use of the word ‘accident’ by the accused operates to show that he admits having committed the crime and that proper sanction shall therefore be imposed on his unlawful acts/omissions.”
Notably, appellant does not dispute the findings of negligence and imprudence on his part made by the trial court, hinging his present appeal instead on the alleged negligence of the victim when she and her sister Cristina crossed the street and even stayed at the middle for minutes. Appellant thus proffers “accident” as an exempting circumstance. Accordingly, appellant insists that the victim’s own fault and negligence serves to absolve him of any criminal liability. We cannot sustain appellant’s contention.
Here, it is safe to conclude that appellant was committing multiple violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code[10] at the time the accident occurred. The prosecution has adequately proven that appellant was speeding as he overtakes another tricycle without having a clear view of the incoming truck from the opposite direction, and such negligent and imprudent act was the proximate cause of the accident. Eyewitness Cristina testified on direct examination, thus:
“Q : A : At the right side of the street, sir. Q : And you were crossing to the other side, Madam Witness? A : Yes, sir. Q : Did you in fact get across the other side of the street, Madam Witness? A : Q : A : Q : When the second tricycle overtook the first tricycle in front, what transpired after that? A : I and Ate Marina were hit by the tricycle and it even dragged her, sir. x x x Q : A : There is a line on the street and we stopped there, sir. Q : When you first saw the 2 tricycles, Madam Witness, how far were they? A : Maybe about 3 to 4 arms length, sir.”
On cross-examination, Cristina testified, thus:
“Q : Can you determine how fast was the tricycle? A :
It is also undisputed that at the time of the accident, it was drizzling. Under such climatic condition, a driver of a motor vehicle is required to use a greater degree of care, for the reason that the road is slippery. And, there is likewise the fact that appellant was driving with only a student driver’s permit without the assistance or supersivion of a licensed professional driver as required by the statute. Thus, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The provision reads:
“Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.”
Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply to appellant, this should not preclude any possible finding of negligence on his part since the imputed negligent acts were admitted by appellant himself.
Neither can we adjudge the victim and her sister Cristina with contributory negligence from the mere fact that they were crossing the street when the accident occurred. Cristina testified on cross-examination that people usually cross that portion of the street because there is a corner on that place.[11] It was not established that people or pedestrians are prohibited from crossing that portion of the street.
Contributory negligence has been defined as “the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.”[12] To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body.[13] To prove contributory neglience, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.[14] Had the appellant been driving the tricycle in a moderate speed, taking into consideration the presence of pedestrians at that particular portion of the street and the prevailing weather condition at the time, the accident would have been avoided. But due to speeding and overtaking another tricycle, appellant was placed in a compromising situation where he had to choose between hitting a truck coming from the opposite direction or the victims herein. And, for lack of proper discernment, he chose to hit the latter, the reason for which is not hard to imagine. Hence, the trial court is correct in finding appellant as solely responsible for the accident.
Anent the penalty imposed on appellant, we are in full accord with the trial court. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods which has a range of from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. However, if the offender fails to lend on the spot such help as may be in his hands to give to the injured parties, the penalty for the crime is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods which has a renge of six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.[15] In this case, appellant failed to render help to the victim. Appellant simply abandoned the victim at the situs criminis and left posthaste. Hence, the penalty for the crime is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. To fix the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be reduced by one degree, that is, to prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. The minimum period of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the penalty imposed by law for the crime, that is, prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods with a range from seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to eight (8) years and eight (8) months. Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.
Anent the awards in the amount of Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the amount of Php 67,000.00, which is duly supported by receipts, as actual damages representing the burial and funeral expenses, the amount of Php 100,000.00 by way of moral damages, and the amount of Php 50,000.00 as exemplary damages, we find the same proper, reasonable and in keeping with current jurisprudence.[16]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. We hereby AFFIRM in toto the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 8114.
SO ORDERED.
Carandang, Chairperson, and Sorongon, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge Josephine Zarate Fernandez.
[2] T.S.N., December 8, 2005.
[3] Exhibit “M”, at p. 126, RTC Record.
[4] Exhibit “H”, at p. 115, Ibid.
[5] Exhibit “I”, at p. 122, Ibid.
[6] Exhibit “J”, at p. 123, Ibid.
[7] T.S.N., September 6, 2007.
[8] T.S.N., May 12, 2010.
[9] Jason Ivler y Aguilar v. Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro, et al., G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010.
[10] Republic Act No. 4136.
[11] T.S.N., December 8, 2005, p. 11.
[12] Moreno, Philippine Law dictionary, 3rd Ed., p. 210.
[13] Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. and Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83491, 27 August 1990, 189 SCRA 88, 93.
[14] Fuentes v. national Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. L-75955, 28 October 1988, 166 SCRA 752-757.
[15] Article 365 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, supra.
[16] Temistocles Tapdasan, Jr. v. People of the Philippines and spouses Luisito and Juanita Borja, G.R. No. 141344, November 21, 2002, citing Metro Manila Transit Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 298 SCRA 495 (1998).