REPUBLIC COMMODITIES CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF, RAUL T. CONCEPCION AND REYNALDO A. CONCEPCION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS, VS. SALUSTIANO OCA AND JOHN DOE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

The antecedent events which gave rise to this appeal are largely
a matter of record and substantially undisputed.  The order appealed from was issued by the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XVI) in its Civil Case No. 59754,
finding Raul T. Concepcion and Reynaldo A. Concepcion, president and general manager of the Republic
Commodities Corporation, respectively, in contempt of court and imposing upon
each of them a fine of P100.00.

On March 19, 1965
the Sheriff of Quezon City, in compliance with a writ of seizure regularly issued by
the aforesaid Court in connection with a replevin
case earlier filed by the Republic Commodities Corporation, seized from
defendant Salustiano Oca 16
of the 19 second­hand “Carrier” air-conditioning units described in
the writ.  These units were the objects
of a conditional sale by the said corporation in favor of defendant, who
allegedly de­faulted in the payment of the installments due.

Six (6) days after
the articles were seized, or on March
25, 1965 to be exact, the sheriff, not having actually received any
notice that defendant Salustiano Oca
intended to seek their return, delivered them to plaintiff in accordance with
the provisions of section 6, of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court^[1].  It later turned out that, unknown to the sheriff, defendant Oca
had filed with the lower court the day before, March 24, 1965, and within the 5-day period fixed in the rule
aforecited, a motion for the immediate recall of the order of seizure and at
the same time offered a counter-replevin bond for the
redelivery of the articles to him pursuant to Section 5 of the same Rule.  But because copies of this motion and of the
counter bond were received by plaintiff’s counsel only on the 27th of March 1965,
plaintiff resisted defendant’s plea for redelivery, pointing out that inasmuch
as copy of the counter bond was not served on plaintiff before it received the
seized articles and within the reglementary period of
five days, defendant had already lost his right to demand redelivery.  This opposition notwithstanding, the lower
court granted defendant’s motion in an order dated March 31, 1965. 
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on April 24, 1965.

Plaintiff took no steps to have the order of redelivery and the
denial of their motion for reconsidera­tion reviewed by a higher court; and due
to its continuous refusal and/or
failure to comply, defendant moved on June 29, 1965 that the present appellants^[2] be declared in contempt.  On July 10, 1965, the Court merely issued a
reminder, directing appellants to comply with the March 31 Order.  Plaintiff moved for a reconsideration of this
reminder, but was turned down in an Order dated July 27, 1965, with a warning
of drastic action against appellant’s unless the air-condition­ing units were
redelivered to defendant immediately.  On
August 11, 1965 the lower court declared them in contempt and imposed upon each
of them a fine of P100.  Hence this
appeal.

Appellants’ main argument
is that the lower court had no authority to issue the Order of
redelivery because copy of the defendant’s counterbond
was served on plaintiff’s counsel beyond the period allowed by the Rules and
after the seized articles had been delivered to plaintiff.  The argument in reality involves the
correctness and propriety of the Order, not the authority or jurisdiction to
issue it.  The Order may be erroneous,
but not for that reason may appellants unilaterally disregard it.  Their remedy against such error, or even if
indeed the court’s jurisdiction is involved, is to seek a review by proper
petition before a higher tribunal.

The
theory espoused by appellants that a party may, at his own choice, directly
disobey a court order which said party believes to be erroneous or beyond the
court’s authority is fraught with serious consequences.  This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Enrique Fernando, has had occasion to condemn a similar attitude in another
case:

“x x
x The failure to abide by the orders and processes of judicial x x x agencies x x x gives rise to a serious concern.  It engenders at the
very least the well-founded suspicion that such an attitude betrays an absence
of good faith.  It is indicative of a
belief at war with all that adjudication stands for.

No one may be permitted to
take the law into his own hands. 
No one, much less the party immediately con­cerned, should have the
final say on the validity or lack of it of one’s course of conduct.  Centuries of reliance on the judicial process repel such a notion.  x x x

“x x
x. Such refusal to accord due respect and yield
obedience to what a court or administrative tribunal ordains is fraught
with much graver consequences.  x x x If such a conduct were not
condemned, some other group or groups emboldened by the absence of any reproof
or disapproval may con­duct themselves similarly.  The injury to the rule of law may well-nigh
be irreparable.

Law stands for order, for the peaceful and systematic adjustment of
frictions and conflicts unavoidable in a modern society with its complexi­ties
and clashing interests.  The
instrumentality for such balancing or harmonization is the judiciary and other
agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers. 
When judicial or
quasi-judicial tribunals speak, what they decree must be obeyed; what they
ordain must be followed.  A party dis­satisfied
may ask for reconsideration and, if denied, may go on to a higher
tribunal.  As long as the orders stand
unmodified, however, they must, even if susceptible to well-founded doubts on
jurisdictional grounds, be faith­fully complied with.” (PAFLU vs. Salvador,
G.R. Nos. L-29471 and L-29487, Sept­ember
28, 1968)

We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the points raised by
appellants in their brief, which have to do with the correct interpretation of
the Rules applicable to the order of redelivery, not with appellant’s liability
for contempt by reason of their continued defiance of court authority.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Castro, J., on leave.

^[1]
“SEC. 6.  Disposition of property by officer.  – If within five (5) days after the taking of
the property by the officer, the defendant does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the
surety or sureties there­on, or require the return of the property as provided
in the last preceding section; or if the defendant so objects, and the plaintiff’s
first or new bond is approved; or if the defendant so requires and his bond is
objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved
bond, the property shall be delivered to the plaintiff.  x x x” (Rule
60)

^[2]
Raul T. Concepcion and Reynaldo A. Concepcion, as president and general manager,
respectively, of plaintiff corporation, were the persons called upon to comply
with the said Order of March 31, 1965.