PEDRO D. DIOQUINO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FEDERICO LAUREANO AIDA DE LAUREANO AND JUANITO LAUREANO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

The present lawsuit had its origin in a relationship, if it could
be called such, the use of a car owned by plaintiff Pedro D. Dioquino by defendant Federico Laureano,
clearly of a character casual and temporary but unfortunately marred by an
occurrence resulting in its windshield being damaged.  A stone thrown by a boy who, with his other
companions, was thus engaged in what undoubtedly for them must have been
mistakenly thought to be a none-too-harmful prank did not miss its mark.  Plaintiff would hold defendant Federico Laureano accountable for the loss thus sustained, including
in the action filed the wife, Aida de Laureano, and
the father, Juanito Laureano.  Plaintiff prevailed in the lower court, the
judgment however going only against the principal defendant, his spouse and his
father being absolved of any responsibility. 
Nonetheless, all three of them appealed directly to us, raising two
questions of law, the first being the failure of the lower court to dismiss
such a suit as no liability could have been incurred as a result of a
fortuitous event and the other being its failure to award damages against plaintiff for the unwarranted inclusion of
the wife and the father in this litigation. 
We agree that the lower court ought to have dismissed the suit, but it
does not follow that thereby damages for the inclusion of the above two other
parties in the complaint should have been awarded appellants.

The facts as found by the lower court follow:  “Attorney. Pedro Dioquino,
a practising lawyer of Masbate,
is the owner of a car.  On March 31, 1964, he went to the office
of the MVO, Masbate, to
register the same.  He met the defendant
Federico Laureano, a patrol officer of said MVO
office, who was waiting for a jeepney to take him to
the office of the Provincial Commander, PC, Masbate.  Attorney Dioquino requested the defendant Federico Laureano
to introduce him to one of the clerks in the MVO Office, who could facilitate
the registration of his car and the request was graciously attended to.  Defendant Laureano
rode on the car of Atty. Dioquino on his way to the
P.C. Barracks at Masbate. 
While about to reach their destination, the car driven by plaintiff’s driver and with defendant Federico Laureano as the sole passenger, was stoned by some
‘mischievous boys,’ and its windshield was broken.  Defendant Federico Laureano
chased the boys and he was able to catch one of them.  The boy was taken to Atty. Dioquino [and] ad­mitted having thrown the stone that broke
the car’s windshield.  The plaintiff and
the defendant Federico Laureano with the boy returned
to the P.C. barracks and the father of the boy was called, but no satisfactory
arrangements [were] made about the damage to the windshield.”^[1]

It was likewise noted in the decision now on appeal: “The
defendant Federico Laureano refused to file any
charges against the boy and his parents because he thought that the
stone-throwing was merely accidental and that it was due to force Majeure.  So he did
not want to take any action and after delaying the settlement, after perhaps
consulting a lawyer, the defendant Federico Laureano
refused to pay the windshield himself and challenged that the case be brought
to court for judicial adjudication. 
There is
no question that the plaintiff tried to convince the defendant Federico Laureano just to pay the value of the windshield and he
even came to the extent of asking the wife to convince her husband to settle
the matter amicably but the defendant
Federico Laureano refused to make any settlement,
clinging [to] the belief that he could not be held liable because a minor child
threw a stone accidentally on the windshield and therefore, the same was due to
force majeure.”^[2]

1.  The law being what it is,
such a belief on the part of defendant Federico Laureano
was justified.  The express language of
Art. 1174 of the present Civil Code which is a restatement of Art. 1105 of the
Old Civil Code, except for the addition of the nature of an obligation requiring the assumption of risk, compels such
a conclusion.  It reads thus:
“Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.” Even under
the old Civil Code then, as stressed by us in the first decision dating back to
1908, in an opinion by Justice Mapa, the rule was
well-settled that in the absence of a legal provision or an express covenant,
“no one should be held to account for fortuitous cases.”^[3] Its basis, as Justice Moreland stressed, is
the Roman law principle major casus est, cui humana
infirmitas resistere
non potest.^[4] Authorities of repute are in agreement, more
specifically concerning an obligation arising from contract “that some
extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his
employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito.^[5] If it could be shown that such indeed was the
case, liability is ruled out.  There is
no requirement of “diligence beyond what human care and foresight can
provide.”^[6]

The error committed by the lower court in holding defendant
Federico Laureano liable appears to be thus
obvious.  Its own findings of fact repel
the notion that he should be made to respond in damages to the plaintiff for
the broken windshield.  What happened was
clearly unforeseen.  It was a fortuitous
event resulting in a loss which must be borne by the owner of the car.  An element of reasonableness in the law would
be manifestly lacking if, on the circumstances as thus disclosed, legal
responsibility, could be imputed to an individual in the situation of defendant
Laureano.  Art.
1174 of the Civil Code guards against the possibility of its being visited with
such a reproach.  Unfortunately, the
lower court was of a different mind and thus failed to heed its command.

It was misled, apparently, by the inclusion of the exemption from
the operation of such a provision of a party assuming the risk, considering the
nature of the obligation undertaken.  A
more careful analysis would have led the lower court to a different and correct
interpretation.  The very word­ing of the
law dispels
any doubt that what is therein contem­plated is the resulting liability even
if caused by a fortuitous event where the party charged maybe considered as
having assumed the risk incident in the nature of the obligation to be
performed.  It would be an affront, not
only to the logic but to the realities
of the situation, if in the light of what transpired, as found by the lower
court, defendant Federico Laureano could be held as
bound to assume a risk of this nature. 
There was no such obligation on his part.

Reference to the leading case of Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring
Corp.^[7]
will illustrate when the nature of the obligation is such that the risk could be considered as having been
assumed.  As noted in the opinion of
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, speaking for the Court: 
“The appellant strongly stresses the precautions taken by it on the
day in question:  that it assigned two of
its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge L-1892; that it assigned
to the task the more competent and experienced among its patrons, had
the towlines, engines and equipment double-checked and inspected; that it
instructed its patrons to take extra precautions; and concludes that it
had done all it was called to do, and that the accident, therefore, should be
held due to force majeure or fortuitous
event.” Its next paragraph explained clearly why the defense of caso fortuito or force
majeure does not lie.  Thus: “These very precautions, however,
completely destroy the appellant’s defense. 
For caso fortuito or force majeure
(which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable’ (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines).
It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee
or to avoid.  The mere difficulty
to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same; ‘un hecho no constituye caso fortuito por
la sola circunstancia de que sou existencia haga mas dificil
o mas onerosa, la accion, dlligente del presente ofensor‘ (Peirano Facio, Responsibilidad Extra-contractual,
p. 465; Mazeaud, Traite
de la Responsabilite Civile, Vol. 2, sec. 1569). 
The very measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of
danger was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.”

In that case then, the risk was quite evident and the nature of
the obligation such that a party could rightfully be deemed as having assumed
it.  It is not so in the case before
us.  It is anything but that.  If the lower court, therefore, were duly mind­ful
of what this particular legal provision contemplates, it could not have reached
the conclusion that defendant Federico Laureano could
be held liable.  To repeat, that was
clear error on its part.

2.  Appellants do not stop
there.  It does not suffice for them that
defendant Federico Laureano would be freed from
liability.  They would go farther.  They would take plaintiff to task for his
complaint having joined the wife, Aida de Laureano,
and the father, Juanita Laureano.  They were far from satisfied with the lower
court’s absolving these two from any financial responsibility.  Appellants would have plaintiff pay damages
for their inclusion in this litigation. 
We are not disposed to view the matter thus.

It is to be admitted, of course, that plaintiff, who is a member
of the bar, ought to have exercised greater care in selecting the parties
against whom he would proceed.  It may be
said that his view of the law that would consider defendant Federico Laureano liable on the facts as thus disclosed, while erroneous, is not bereft of
plausibility.  Even the lower court,
mistakenly of course, entertained a similar view.  For plaintiff, however, to have included the
wife and the father would seem to indicate that his understanding of the law is
not all that it ought to have been.

Plaintiff apparently was not entirely unaware that their
inclusion in the suit filed by him was characterized by unortho­doxy.  He did attempt to lend some color of
justification by explicitly setting forth that the father was joined as party
defendant in the case as he was
the administrator of the inher­itance of an undivided property to which
defendant Federico Laureano could lay claim and that
the wife was likewise proceeded against because the conjugal partnership would
be made to respond for whatever liability would be adjudicated against the
husband.

It cannot be said that such an attempt at justification is
impressed with a high persuasive quality. 
Far from it, None­theless, mistaken as plaintiff apparently was, it
cannot be con­cluded that he was prompted solely by the desire to inflict need­less
and unjustified vexation on them. 
Considering the equities of the situation, plaintiff having suffered a
pecuniary loss which, while resulting from a fortuitous event, perhaps would
not have occurred at all had not defendant Federico Laureano
borrowed his car, we feel that he is not to be penalized further by his
mistaken view of the law in including them in his complaint.  Well-worth paraphrasing is the thought
expressed in a United States Supreme Court decision as to the existence of an
abiding and fundamental principle that the expenses and annoyance of litigation
form part of the social burden of living in a society which seeks to attain
social control through law.^[8]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of November 2,
1965 insofar as it orders defendant Federico Laureano
to pay plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00 as damages plus the payment of casts,
is hereby reversed.  It is affirmed
insofar as it dismissed the
case against the other two
defendants, Juanito Laureano
and Aida de Laureano, and declared that no moral
damages should be awarded the parties. 
Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 29-30.

^[2]
Ibid, pp. 36-37.

^[3]
Crame Sy Panco v. Gonzaga, 10 Phil.
646, 648. Cf. Chan Keep v. Chan Gioco, 14
Phil. 5 (1909) and Novo & Co. v. Ainsworth, 26 Phil. 380 (1913).

^[4]
Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v. De la Peña, 26
Phil. 144, 146 (1913).

^[5]
Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657, 661- 662 (1924).  Cf. Yap Kim Chuan v.
Tiaoqui, 31
Phil. 433 (1915); University of Santo
Tomas v. Descals,
38 Phil. 267 (1918); Lizares v. Hernaez, 40 Phil. 981 (1920); Garcia v. Escudero,
43 Phil. 437 (1922); Milian v. Rio
y Olabarrieta, 45 Phil. 718 (1924); Obejera v. Iga Sy, 76 Phil. 580 (1946).

^[6]
Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884
(1955).

^[7]
G.R. No. L-21749, Sept. 29, 1967,
21 SCRA 279.

^[8]
Cf. Petroleum Exploration v. Public Service Commission, 304 US 209
(1938).