G.R. No. L-28235. January 30, 1971
JOSE G. LOPEZ, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, REPARATIONS COMMISSION, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND/OR ANY OF THEIR AUTHORIZED AG…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, taken by petitioner Jose G. Lopez, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing Civil Case No. 67513 thereof.
Sometime in 1964, a conditional contract of purchase and sale was
entered into between the Reparations Commission and petitioner Lopez, whereby
the former awarded the M/V JOLO LEMA to Lopez in consideration of the total sum
of $174,900, payable on installments, as provided in Republic Act No. 1789, and
subject to the condition that the title to and ownership of the vessel shall remain
with the Commission until full payment of the stipulated price. After registering the vessel with the
Philippine Fisheries Commission and securing therefrom
the requisite license in his name, as a fishing vessel, on July 21, 1966, Lopez
entered into a contract with one Tomas Velasco, authorizing the latter to
supervise and manage the M/V JOLO LEMA in – according to Lopez – only one
“legal fishing venture along and within Philippine waters and for no other
purpose.” On September 19, 1966, the vessel was, however, apprehended,
searched and then seized by the Collector of Customs of Davao,
at Batjak, Sasa, Davao, and Seizure Identification proceeding No. 25/66 was
instituted against said vessel for smuggling into the Philippines 1,408 sacks
of Indonesian copra and 86 sacks of Indonesian coffee beans, in violation of
section 2530(a) and (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
While the seizure proceeding was pending hearing before the customs
authorities, on November 11, 1966, the Reparations Commission served upon Lopez
a written notice to the effect that, pursuant to paragraph No. 4 of the Terms
and Conditions of the contract between them, the same was rescinded for using
the vessel in freight (smuggling) instead of fishing, failure, despite repeated
demands, to make the first payment without interest and to pay the first
installment with interest, due, respectively, on August 28, 1965, and August
28, 1966, and failure to post the requisite insurance coverage, in violation of
said contract; that the present possession by the government, through the
Bureau of Customs, of the M/V JOLO LEMA was considered by the Commission as a
repossession of the vessel on its behalf; and that the payment already made, as
well as the overdue amounts under said contract have been forfeited by way of
rentals for the use of the vessel.
Apparently anticipating this move of the Commission, Lopez had,
the day before, or on November 10, 1966, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila Civil Case No. 67513 thereof, against “the Commissioner of
Customs, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and/or any of
their authorized agents or representatives,” for mandamus and
prohibition with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. In his petition therein, as amended on
November 28, 1966, and reamended on December 2, 1966,
Lopez prayed that “judgment be rendered declaring unlawful, illegal and
null and void, as contrary to law, the Seizure Identification No. 25/66 and the
seizure and custody over the subject fishing vessel by the respondents and/or
their representatives and/or their agents”; that “pending trial on
the merits, x x x a
preliminary restraining order and/or preliminary writ of prohibitory and
mandatory injunction be issued restraining and prohibiting the respondents
and/or their representatives and/or their agents from further seizure and
custody of said fishing vessel, and/or the Reparations Commission, or its
representatives and/or agents, from seizing and taking into their custody said
fishing vessel, and instead, all the respondents shall release the custody and
deliver the subject fishing vessel” to Lopez; and that, thereafter, said
writs be made “permanent and perpetual.”
Upon the filing of the original petition in said Civil Case No.
67513, or, on November 10, 1966, Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, as Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, issued a “restraining or status quo order, ”
subject to such action as may be taken by the judge presiding the branch to
which the case may eventually be assigned through raffle. On November
22, 1966, the Reparations Commission filed a motion to dismiss,
upon the ground of failure of the petition to allege a cause of action against
said Commission. Subsequently, the
Commissioner of Customs filed a “motion to dismiss with opposition to the
petition for a writ of preliminary injunction,” upon the ground that, in
view of the aforementioned seizure proceeding, arising from the involvement of
the M/V JOLO LEMA in the smuggling of Indonesian agricultural products into
the Philippines, the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction to
try and decide the case, pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court, dated
November 29, 1966, in Pacis v. Averia,
G.R. No. L-22526. In due course
thereafter, Branch XVI of said court, presided over by Hon. Juan L. Bocar, Judge, issued an order, dated January 26, 1967,
denying the writ of preliminary injunction sought by Lopez and dismissing the
case, upon the authority of Pacis v. Averia, supra.
Hence, this appeal taken by Lopez directly to the Supreme Court, upon
the ground that only questions of law would be taken up therein.
The main question for determination in this appeal is whether or
not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to interfere with
the Seizure Identification proceeding No. 25/66 pending before the
Commissioner of Customs, on account of the Indonesian agricultural products
smuggled into the Philippines
through the use of the M/V JOLO LEMA. A
similar question was decided by this Court in the negative in the
aforementioned case of Pacis v. Averia,
supra, upon which Judge Bocar relied. In that case, We held:
“The Tariff and Customs Code, in Section 2530 thereof, lists
the kinds of property subject to forfeiture.
At the same time, in Part 2 of Title VI thereof, it provides for the
procedure in seizure and forfeiture cases and vests in the Collector of Customs
the authority to hear and decide said cases.
The Collector’s decision is appealable to the
Commissioner of Customs whose decision is in turn appealable
to the Court of Tax Appeals. An
aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals
directly to this Court. On the other
hand, Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 lodges in the Court of First
Instance original jurisdiction in all cases in which the value of the property
in controversy amounts to more than ten thousand pesos. This original jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property
which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends
to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of
Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
This is precisely what took place in this case. The seizure and forfeiture proceedings
against the M/B ‘Bukang Liwayway‘
before the Collector of Customs of Manila, was stifled by the issuance of a
writ of replevin by the Court of First Instance of Cavite.
“Should Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 give way to
the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code, or vice versa? In Our opinion, in this particular case, the
Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of
Customs. The jurisdiction of the
Collector of Customs is provided for in Republic Act 1937 which took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the
Judiciary Act of 1948. It is axiomatic
that a later law prevails over a prior statute.
Moreover, on grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to conclude
that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the
prerogative to replevin a property which is a subject
of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture
of property for violation of Customs laws could easily be undermined by the
simple device of replevin.
“Furthermore, Section 2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code requires
the Collector of Customs to give to the owner of the property sought to be forfeited
written notice of the seizure and to give him the opportunity to be heard in
his defense. This provision clearly
indicates the intention of the law to confine in the Bureau of Customs the
determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded
against in a seizure and forfeiture case.
The judicial recourse of the property owner is not in the Court of First
Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting administrative
remedies in the Bureau of Customs.”
This view has been repeatedly reiterated by this Court[1]
and We find no plausible reason to depart therefrom
in the case at bar.
Invoking section 5 of Republic Act No. 3512, which provides, in
part, that –
“All powers, functions and duties heretofore exercised by the
Bureau of Customs, Philippine Navy and Philippine Constabulary over fishing vessels
and fishery matters are hereby transferred to and vested in the Philippine Fisheries
Commission x x x.”
Lopez maintains that whatever powers the
Commissioner of Customs had, prior thereto, over seizure identification
proceedings had been transferred to the Philippine Fisheries Commission. This pretense is manifestly devoid of merit. Said section 5 of Republic Act No. 3512
merely transfers to the Philippine Fisheries Commission the powers, functions
and duties of the Bureau of Customs, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine
Constabulary over fishing vessels and fishery matters. Such transfer should be construed in the
light of section 1 of said Republic Act No. 3512, reading:
“It is hereby declared a national policy to encourage, promote
and conserve our fishing resources in order to insure a steady and sufficient
supply of fish, and other fishery products for our increasing population, and
to reduce to a minimum level possible the importation of such produce so as to
help stabilize the national economy by enlarging the office charged with the
development, improvement, management and conservation of our fishery
resources.”
It is clear that the powers transferred to the Philippine
Fisheries Commission by Republic Act No. 3512 are limited to those relating to
the “development, improvement, management and conservation of our fishery
resources.” All other matters, such as those concerning smuggling,
particularly of agricultural products, into the Philippines, are
absolutely foreign to the object and purpose of said Act and could not have
been and were not transferred to the aforementioned Commission. Seizure Identification proceeding No. 25/66
for the smuggling of Indonesian agricultural products into the Philippines
is certainly beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippine Fisheries Commission.
It is urged that, pursuant to section 2530 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, which provides:
“Property subject to forfeiture under tariff and customs
laws. – Any vessel or aircraft,
cargo, articles and other objects shall, under the following conditions, be
subject to forfeiture:
“a. Any vessel or aircraft, including cargo, which
shall be used unlawfully in the importation or exportation of articles into or
from any Philippine port or place except a port of entry; and any vessel which,
being of less than thirty tons capacity shall be used in the importation of
articles into any Philippine port or place except into a port of the Sulu sea where importation in such vessel may be authorized
by the Commissioner, with the approval of the department head.
“xxx xxx xxx
the M/V JOLO LEMA is not subject to forfeiture,
inasmuch as Davao
is a port of entry. This is neither the
time nor the place to pass upon the merits of this contention. Suffice it to say that, if petitioner feels
it is a good defense, the proper place to set it up is in Seizure Identification
proceeding No. 25/66. If the
Commissioner of Customs overrules such defense and decrees the forfeiture of
the vessel, Lopez may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, whose decision may,
in turn, be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
In other words, said section 2530 does not justify interference by the
Court of First Instance in Seizure Identification proceeding No. 25/66. In the language of Ponce Enrile
v. Vinuya, et al.2:
“Respondents, however, notwithstanding the compelling force of
the above doctrines, would assert that respondent Judge could entertain the replevin suit as the seizure is illegal, allegedly because
the warrant issued is invalid and the seizing officer likewise was devoid of
authority. This is to lose sight of the
distinction, as earlier made mention of, between the existence of the power
and the regularity of the proceeding taken under it. The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau
of Customs, is vested with exclusive authority.
Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence
a taint of illegality may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said is
that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may
oust it of such jurisdiction. It does
not mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested with
competence when clearly in the light of the above decisions the law has not
seen fit to do so. The proceeding before
the Collector of Customs is not final.
An appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to the
Court of Tax Appeals. It may even reach
this Court through the appropriate petition for review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues
raised is thus indicated. Certainly a
court of first instance is not therein included. It is devoid of jurisdiction.”
Lastly, petitioner argues that the Reparations Commission may not
unilaterally rescind its conditional contract of purchase and sale in his favor
and that the Commission must first seek a judicial declaration of rescission of
said contract. Well-settled is, however,
the rule that a judicial action for the rescission of a contract is not
necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for
violation of any of its terms and conditions.
“x x x The
validity of the stipulation cannot be seriously disputed. It is in the nature of a facultative resolutory condition, which in many cases has been upheld x
x x.”3
The contract of conditional sale in favor of Lopez expressly
grants the Reparations Commission the option to rescind the contract in the
event of non-compliance by Lopez with the provisions thereof. Paragraph No. 4 of the Terms and Conditions
of said contract explicitly provides:
“Should the Conditional Vendee fail to pay any of the yearly
installments when due, or utilize the goods for any illicit purpose or for
purposes other than that for which the goods have been procured, or otherwise
fail to comply with any of the terms and conditions of this contract, or with
any of the applicable provisions of the Reparations Law and/or of the Rules and
Regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, then the Conditional Vendor is hereby
given the option to either rescind the contract upon notice to the Conditional
Vendee, in which case all sums already paid by the Conditional Vendee shall be
forfeited as rentals in favor of the Conditional Vendor, and also that the
Conditional Vendee shall deliver to the Conditional Vendor the property subject
of this contract or to sue for specific performance in which case the whole
amount remaining unpaid under this contract shall immediately become due and
payable, and in either case whether the suit is for rescission or specific
performance, the Conditional Vendee shall be liable to pay the Conditional
Vendor in the concept of liquidated damages equivalent to 10% of the total
procurement value of the goods.”
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against petitioner, Jose G. Lopez.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Villamor, and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., no part.
[1] De
Joya v. Lantin,
L-24037, April 27, 1967; Romualdez v. Arca,
L-20516, November 15, 1967.
Papa v. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968; Diosamito
v. Balanque, L-30734, July 28, 1969; Ponce
Enrile v. Vinuya,
L-29043, January 30, 1971.
2 L-29043, January 30, 1971.
3 Ponce Enrile
vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, L-27549, September 30, 1969; Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., L-11897,
October 31, 1964; De la Rama Steamship Co., Inc. vs.
Tan, L-8784, May 21, 1956; Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao, 43 Phil. 873.