ALBERTO DE JOYA, AS ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (VICE JOSE B. LINGAD) AND PEDRO PACIS, AS ACTING COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, PETITIONERS, VS. JUAN T. DAVID AND THE HONORABLE COURT …

Original action for certiorari and pro­hibition, with preliminary
injunction, to dissolve a similar writ issued by the Court of Appeals in CA –
G. R. No. 34220-R, entitled “Juan T. David vs. Jose B. Lingad,
et al.,” and to restrain the said Court from hearing said case, as well as
from enforcing t h e writ of preliminary injunction therein issued.

On May 28, 1962,
a shipment of thirty-six (36) crates, the contents of which were described in
the corresponding bills of lading as “stone grinders,” arrived at Manila
aboard the “SS MENTOR.” Soon thereafter, that same day, without the
customs permit required therefor, the cargo was
unload­ed shipside unto the barge or lighter “M/L Davao”
and then towed by tugboat “DB-18,” headed for the Estero-Dead
End of Cristobal Street, Pandacan,
Manila.  Before reaching this destination, a combined
team of operatives of the Manila Police Department and the Bureau of Customs
swoop­ed down on the barge and inspected the contents of said cases, which
turned out to be, not “stone grinders,” but highly dutiable goods,
such as “Union” and “Salem”
ciga­rettes, Ban-lon shirts, French veils, etc.  These were ordered seized by the Customs
authorities and held under Seizure Identification No. 6439, for alleged
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 133, in relation to Section 2530 (f) of
the Tariff and Customs Code, and of Section 2530(m)-1 and 5 of the same
Code.  The lighter and the tugboat were,
likewise, seized under Seizure Identification No. 6439-A, for alleged violation
of Section 2530(a) of said Code.  More­over,
on July 31, 1962, Criminal Case No. 65356 of t h e Court of First Instance of
Manila was filed, against fifteen (15) persons,^[1]
for violation of Section 3602 of Republic Act No. 1937, charging them with surreptitiously
and fraudulently taking the goods aforementioned from the “SS MENTOR”
and bringing said goods into the mainland for the purpose of avoiding the
payment of taxes and duties, in the aggregate sum of P1,291,975.61.

On August 1, 1962, Atty. Juan T. David – herein-after referred to
as David – appeared at one of the hearings in connection with the seizure
proceedings, as counsel for one L. Sino, as alleged shipper of the goods, and
S. Y. Chan, as alleged consignee thereof. 
Upon the completion of the evidence for the Government, David moved to
dis­miss the proceedings, but the then Acting Collector of Cus­toms1 – hereinafter referred to as Collector – deferred
his resolution on the motion, until the rendition of the decision on the
merits, and directed the continuation of the hearing for the presentation of
the claimant’s2 evidence.  Soon later, David, filed an ex parte motion for the release, under bond, of the
shipment in question, upon the ground that the same had been in effect stolen
from the Customs’ premises without Chan’ s consent or
knowledge; that the goods were shipped to Manila for transshipment to him at
Singapore; that the shipment included perishable items; and that Chan could not
transship the cargo unless it was released and re-exported under bond.  The Collector denied this motion upon the
ground, inter alia, that Chan’s claim
over the shipment in question had not been satisfactorily established and that,
as regards the perishable nature of some of the goods involved, steps had been
taken for the sale thereof at public auction, pursuant to Section 2607 of the
Tariff Customs Code.  David protested
against the contemplated sale, but the Collector did not heed the protest.  Subsequently, the Collector denied David’s
motion to dismiss.  A motion for
reconsideration of the order to this effect was, likewise, denied on February 17, 1964.

Subsequently, or on March 16, 1964, David instituted Civil Case
No. 56533 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, against Jose B. Lingad and Pedro Pacis, as Acting
Commissioner of Customs and Acting Collector of Customs, respec­tively, as well
as in their personal capacities, for the pur­pose of securing: (1) a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the Collector from hearing Seizure
Identification Proceedings Nos. 643 9 and 6439-A; (2) a writ of mandatory
preliminary injunction, commanding respondents therein to surrender to David
the cargo in question or so much thereof as had not, as yet, been sold, for
transshipment to Singapore or to any foreign port, and to turn over to him the
proceeds of the sale made; and (3) a judgment nullifying the corresponding
warrant of seizure and detention and all other orders issued in connection
therewith, and sentencing the respondents to pay
damages.

Required to answer the petition, respondents therein1 filed a motion to dismiss and objected to the
issuance of the writs prayed for by David, for the reason that the Court of
First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction over the case; that he had not
exhausted all administrative remedies before coming to court; and that he was
not the real party in interest.

Acting upon this motion, which was opposed by David, said court
of first instance dismissed the case.  A
reconsid­eration of the order to this effect having been denied, David appealed
to the Court of Appeals, in which the appeal was docketed as CA-G. R. No. 34220-R.  He,
also, filed with said Court, on August
31, 1964, a “Motion for Release of the Cargo Involved for
Transshipment without or with Bond; or for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory In­junction and Preliminary Injunction.” David
prayed therein for the appointment of a qualified surveyor, to determine the
present value of the articles in question, so that it may serve as basis for
fixing the amount of the bond, and requested authority to transship the cargo
to any foreign port (not necessarily Singapore), “as the buyer thereof in
Singapore could not be expected to take delivery thereof due to its present
value which has been substantially reduced by the deterioration of some items and the depreciation in value of
others.” David further prayed for an injunction to re­strain the Collector
from hearing the seizure cases.

Without hearing the respondents therein2 a
Division of the Court of Appeals approved, on September 7, 1964, a resolution requiring them to answer
the aforesaid motion and providing that “upon the filing of a bond in the sum
of P5,000.00 duly approved by the Court, a writ of
preliminary injunction will be issued as prayed for.” The writ was issued
on September 8, 1964.

Unaware of said resolution, the Solicitor General filed, on September 8, 1964, an opposition to
David’s motion of August 31, 1964.  Then, upon receipt of notice of the
aforementioned resolution, the Solicitor General filed1 an
“Urgent Mo­tion,” praying that the enforcement of the writ issued on
“September 8, 1964, be held in abeyance pending resolution of the petition
for certiorari and prohibition to be filed with the Supreme Court” by the
Government.  Such
petition – for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, to
restrain the Court of Appeals, pendente lite, from hearing CA-G. R. No.
34220-R and from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by said
Court – which marked the institution of the present case, was filed on
September 15, 1964, by Alberto de Joya, then Acting
Commissioner of Customs, and Pedro Pacis, as Acting
Collector of Customs.  The next day, this
Court issued a resolution restraining the Court of Appeals from hearing CA-G.
R. No. 34220 -R and from enforcing the writ of preliminary Injunction therein
issued.

Two questions are
submitted for our determination, in the present case, namely: (1) the merits
thereof; and, (2) a charge of contempt filed by respondent David.

As regards the merits of this case, it is obvious that the Court
of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
Civil Case No. 56533 thereof, and that neither had the Court of Appeals
jurisdiction over the appeal taken from the decision of said trial Court.  Indeed, in said Case No. 56533 David sought
to obtain possession of the goods which were the object of seizure proceedings
before the Collector of Customs.  We have
already held that such action is beyond the jurisdiction of courts of first
instance.  In Pacis
v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 29, 1966, the following
language was used:

“At issue is the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Cavite to entertain Civil Case No. TM-114, and the existence of therein plaintiff’s cause of action.

“Petitioners would contend that the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs to conduct seizure and forfeiture proceedings of vessels for
violation of the Tariff and Customs Code is exclusive of the Court of First
Instance.  x x x.

“The Tariff and Customs Code, in Section 2530 thereof, lists
the kinds of property subject to forfeiture. 
At the same time, in Part 2 of Title VI thereof, it provides for the
procedure in seizure and forfeiture cases and vests in the Collector of Customs
the authority to hear and decide said cases. 
The Collector’s decision is appealable to the
Commissioner of Customs whose decision is in turn appealable
to the Court of Tax Appeals.  x x x.  This original jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance, when exer­cised in an action for recovery of personal property
which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends
to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of
Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings.  x x
x.

“Should Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 give way to
the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code, or vice versa?  In Our opinion, in this particular case, the Court
of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs.  The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs
is provided for in Republic Act 1937 which took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the Judiciary Act of
1948.  It is axiomatic that a later law
prevails over a prior statute.  Moreover,
on grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to conclude that the
legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative
to replevin a property which is a subject of a
seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code.  Otherwise, actions for
forfeiture of property for violation of Customs  laws could easily be undermined by the
simple device of replevin.

“Furthermore Section 2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code
requires the Collector of Customs to give to the owner of the property
sought to be forfeited, written notice of the seizure and to give him
the opportunity to be heard in his defense.  This provision clearly indicates the
intention of the law to confine in the Bureau of Customs the determination of
all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in a seizure
and forfeiture case.  The judicial
recourse of the property owner is not in the Court of First Instance but in the
Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting administrative remedies
in the Bureau of Cus­toms. “

Upon the other hand, the
same result would be achieved if said civil case were regarded as an attempt to
review the acts and/or resolutions of the Collector of Customs and the
Commissioner of Customs in the aforementioned seizure proceedings, inasmuch as
such power of review is vested exclusively in the Court of Tax Appeals.1

Again, the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the order of dismissal
of the Court of First Instance because the jurisdiction thereof was involved in
the appeal and because the amount in controversy exceeds P200,000.00.  According to David’s petition in the court of
first instance, the value of the cargo, as determined by the Collector was
“P628,844.87 more or less, ” although
David alleged that such value “has been reduced to less than two-thirds
thereof or P400,000.00,” whereas the taxes due thereon, according to the
information in Criminal Case No. 65356, amounted to P1,291,975.61, or, pursuant
to the decision therein rendered, P1,920,820.48.

It is manifest,
therefore, that the writ of preliminary injunction of the Court of Appeals is
null and void, and that the writ issued by this Court, on September 16, 1964, should be, as it
is hereby made permanent.

The facts relevant to the charge of contempt are: On December 5, 1964, David filed with
this Court an “Urgent Motion for Release of Cargo Involved for
Transshipment, without or with Bond; Or for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.” Required to
comment thereon, the Solicitor General filed an opposition thereto, dated December 21, 1964, stating, inter
alia, that the original manifest did not
disclose that the goods in question were in transit to Singapore,
and that the surrounding circumstances indicated that they were destined for Manila.  On December
29, 1964, David filed a reply to said opposition and a motion to
cite the Collector of Customs for contempt for twice subscribing, under oath,
to the statement, in the original peti­tion for certiorari in the Supreme
Court, that the cargo was destined for Manila,
according to the original Manifest.  On January 26, 1965, petitioners herein
filed a manifestation attaching thereto a copy of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 65356, convicting some of the
accused therein, acquitting the others on the ground of reasonable doubt, and
decreeing the forfeiture to the Republic of all the goods in question.  Said manifestation added, however, that:

“3. x x x upon
verification from the records of Seizure Identification Nos. 6439 and 6439-A,
the original manifest of the M. S. Mentor
issued by the De la Rama Lines, the ship’s local
agent, shows that the ship is ‘bound
for Hongkong to Manila.’ Also under the column ‘Remarks,’
there appears in the handwriting of
Atty. Juan T. David, respondent herein, the words ‘In transit for Singapore,’ which was placed by him during the hearing of the
motion for reconsideration of
the order of the Collector of Customs denying the motion to dismiss Seizure
Identification Nos. 6439 and 6439-A entitled ‘Republic of the Philippines,
versus 36 Crates various articles, S. Y. Chan, claimant.’

“4. That the original manifest mention­ed above was presented in
evidence in said Criminal Case No. 65356 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila.”

On February 3, 1965, David filed a motion to strike out this
manifestation, as well as a counter-manifestation in defense of his integrity,
in view of the implication adverse thereto resulting from the allegation that
he had inserted, in his own handwriting, on the document introduced by him to
prove the claim of his client, the very words on which the claim was
based.  On February 8, 1965, David
charged petitioners herein with contempt of court upon the ground that they had
maliciously made the above-quoted statement in their Manifestation of January
25, 1965, as well as statements of similar import in their petition for
certiorari in this case dated September 14, 1964, and in their aforementioned
opposition, dated December 18, 1964, knowing that said statements were not
true.

The record shows that the copy of the manifest, presented in
evidence in the seizure identification proceedings, stated that the “SS
MENTOR” is “bound from Hongkong to
Manila,” and that, under the column “Remarks,” there appears, in
the handwriting of David, the words “In Transit for Singapore,” which
were written by him during the hearing of his motion for reconsideration of the
order of the Collector denying the motion to dismiss said proceedings.

It appears, however, that said insertion was made by David with
the authority of the hearing officer of the Bureau of Customs, so that the
copy of the manifest, covering the shipment in question and therein introduced
in evidence, may conform with the original manifest, which formed part
of the evidence introduced in the criminal case; that the Solicitor
General was not aware of this circumstance when he made the derogatory
averments upon which the charge for contempt is based, because the only records
then available for his examination were those of the Bureau of Customs, which
showed the addition handwritten by David; and that the records of the criminal
case, to which the original manifest had been attached, were not
available for examination at that time, said records being then in the
possession of the Judge a quo, pending preparation of his decision therein.

It is, likewise, worthy
of note that the Solicitor General revealed the foregoing circumstance
to this Court, even before the formal charge for contempt under consideration had been preferred by
David on February 8, 1965. Indeed, on Feb­ruary
4, 1965, the Solicitor General had filed an amended Manifestation
stating, inter alia,

“That, subject to verification from the records of Criminal
Case No. 65336, respondent Juan T. David, who is a lawyer of S. Y. Chan the
claimant-consignee of the goods in question in the Bureau of Customs Seizure
Identification Case Nos. 6439 and 6439-A, was allowed by the Hearing Officer
to insert the words ‘In transit for Singapore’ in Exhibit ‘A’ of said
seizure proceedings, in order to reflect the information stated under the
column remarks in the original copy of the general (original) manifest
submitted in evidence in said criminal case;

“That upon examination made of the records of said criminal
case, it was found that:

“(a) Exhibit ‘A’ of the criminal case is the original copy of the
general manifest mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof and that Exhibit ‘A’ of the
criminal case contains the printed words ‘In transit for Singapore’
under the column remarks; consequently, the original manifest stated in
paragraph 3, as corrected by Atty. Juan T. David, accurately reflects the
information stated in Exhibit ‘A’ of the criminal case; and

“(b) Exhibit ‘CC’ of the criminal case, which is the original copy
of Annex 6 of Respondents’ (herein petitioners) Memorandum, Civil Case No.
56533, also contains the printed words ‘In transit for Singapore’ under the
column remarks; however, the photostat copy of said
Exhibit CC, which is Exhibit J, Seizure Proceedings No. 6439 and 6439-A (Also
Annex 6 of Respondents’ Memorandum, Civil Case No. 56533) does not show
such printed words.” (Underscoring supplied.)

Everything considered, we are of the opinion that the derogatory
statements assailed by David had been made in good faith, and inasmuch as
petitioners herein have seasonably made of record additional facts, formerly
unknown to them, showing that David had acted above board, the explanation
submitted by said petitioners is believed to be satisfactory.

WHEREFORE, the charge of contempt should be, as it is
hereby, dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals is nullified and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this
Court made permanent, with costs against respondent Juan T. David. Writ
granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Dizon,
and Fernando, JJ.,
took no part.

^[1]
Arturo Jacinto y Yuson, Pablo Delgado y Enriquez,
Cecilia David y del Rosario, Falconeri Tatoy y Tumbaganan, John Charles Liptrot, Richard A. Browne, Leopoldo
Navarro y Largo, Juanito Nabuab
y Victoriano, Santiago Esguerra
y Magno, Benigno Delfin y de Mesa, Sofio Bunao y Melga, Cri­santo Arzalud y Camagun, Jose Acuña y Diaz, Kewalran Navalrai Alwani, alias “Kelly,” and Eufracio
Santos.

2 Teotimo
A. Roja

3 S. Y. Chan.

4 Petitioners
herein.

5 Petitioners
herein.

6.On September 8,
1964.

7 Section 7, Rep. Act ll25; Sec.
2402, Rep. Act 1937; Commissioner of Customs v. Encarnacio,
95 Phil., 439; Millarez v. Amparo,
et al., 97 Phil., 282; NAMARCO v. Judge Macadaeg,
L-10030, Jan. 18, 1956; Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines v.
Manuel Manahan, et al., L-12096, April 30, 1959; Pacis,
et al. v. Averia, et al., L-22526, Nov.
29, 1966; and Auyong Hian
(Hong Whua Hang) v. Court of Tax Appeals, et
al., L-25181, Jan. 11, 1967.