JOSE MA. LEDESMA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. FELIX VILLASEÑOR, MOVANT AND APPELLANT.

Felix Villaseñor, in his capacity as special
administrator of the estate of his deceased father, Eusebio Villaseñor, filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (Civil Case No. 5662) to enjoin the Register of Deeds of the same
province from registering a deed of sale by which the deceased conveyed to Jose
Ma. Ledesma two lots registered in his name, to wit,
Lofs No& 2532-C and 2533-B of the Cadastral Survey
of Bago, Negros Occidental.
The reason given for seeking injunctive relief was that the deed of sale was
fictitious and that the signature of the vendor was forged. The court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo. The vendee,
Ledesma, who had not been impleaded as a party-defendant, intervened in the case. On
October 3, 1960 the court
lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition.

Two days later, on October 5, Ledesma filed his own
petition in the cadastral record of said lots, asking that the Register of Deeds
be ordered to register the aforementioned deed of sale. The ground alleged in
the petition was that Civil Case No. 5662 had been dismissed and the preliminary
injunction issued therein had been dissolved. On the same day the court, without
notice either to the Register of Deeds or to appellant, and solely on the basis
of the allegations in the petition, issued the corresponding order for
registration. In compliance therewith the Register of Deeds cancelled the two
certificates of title in the name of the deceased Eusebio Villaseñor and issued new
ones in Ledesma’s name. On October 8, 1960, again upon Ledesma’s petition, the court ordered the cancellation of
the certificates thus issued and the issuance of still new ones, also in his
name.

Villaseñor moved for reconsideration of the two
orders and then perfected this appeal upon their denial.

Appellant claims that the lower court erred in issuing the orders appealed
from because: (1) appellee failed to give notice to
appellant or to furnish him copy of the petition; (2) appellee should have filed the same in Civil Case No. 5662
and not in the cadastral proceeding; (3) the court had no power to order the
Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale in question when the same was
being contested as fictitious, nor to order the issuance of titles in the name
of the supposed buyer; and (4) if, as appellee points out, the Register of Deeds had improperly
refused to register the deed of sale, the proper remedy should have been a suit
for mandamus.

We are of the opinion that the lower court did commit the error attributed to
it. To be sure, when the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 5662
was dissolved in the same order which dismissed appellant’s petition the
obstacle to the registration of the deed of sale was removed. The effect of the
dissolution was immediate and would not be stayed even if an appeal had been
perfected from the order of dismissal (Watson vs. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 480; Sitia Teco vs.
Ventura, 1 Phil. 497). But that is
only as far as the Register of Deeds was concerned, his duty under the
circumstances—if the document was on its face registrable—being administrative and ministerial. The
lifting of the injunction, however, or even the dismissal of the petition, was
no authority for the court in the cadastral proceeding to issue the orders
complained of without notice to the Register of Deeds or to appellant,
considering that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3662 was not yet final. The
court knew of the pendency of that case and of the
fact that the relief sought therein by appellant was precisely to prevent
registration. Irrespective of the propriety or impropriety of the remedy
pursued, that is, whether or not mandamus should have been resorted to, the
least that the court a quo should have done was to afford appellant
proper notice and hearing, so that he could reiterate his objections to the
registration and present evidence to substantiate them and/or call the court’s
attention to the fact that the question had not yet been definitely settled in
the civil action since the order dismissing it was not yet final.

It is one thing for the Register of Deeds, in the exercise of his ministerial
duties under the law, to register an instrument which in his opinion is registrable, and quite another thing for the court itself to
order the registration. The former does not contemplate notice to and hearing of interested parties such as are required in a
judicial proceeding nor carry with it the solemnity and legal consequences of a
court judgment. The court a quo, in anticipating the action of the
Register of Deeds, unnecessarily took the matter out of his hands and at the
same time preempted the question of registration still pending in the civil
action filed by appellant.

The orders appealed from are hereby set aside with cost against appellee.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.