CYGNUZ REALTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. MR. AND MRS. ROMMEL C. SANTOS AND MR. AND MRS. VIRGILIO JUAT RESPONDENTS.
CORALES, J.:
The Antecedents
Cygnuz is the registered owner of two (2) condominium units, i.e., Units 2-A and 6-A, in Casa San Martin Condominium (formerly known as the Belmont South Park Project) located at 3118 Amiguis Street, United Hills Village, Parañaque City and respectively covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 22990 and 22992. On the other hand, Spouses Santos-Juat and Spouses Santos are the respective occupants of the aforesaid units.
On October 19, 2010, Cygnuz filed its complaints[5] for unlawful detainer which were identically worded except as to the defendants’ name, CCT number and condominium unit number, viz.:
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- Defendants’ alleged right to possess the disputed condominium unit is erroneously and falsely predicated upon their alleged purchase over the same from the original developer of the condominium project which was Project Movers Realty and Development Corporation (PMRDC for brevity); but the truth is that defendant Mr. Rommel C. Santos is the son of spouses Eliseo and Aurora Santos who entered into a joint venture agreement with PMRDC and was merely accommodated to stay therein; as such, no purchase ever took place.
- For better appreciation, antecedent facts prior to Plaintiff’s acquisition over the subject unit are hereto laid as follows:
5.1. On 20 March 1991, the original land owner Spouses Eliseo and Aurora Santos entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Project Movers Realty and Development Corporation for the development of the “Belmont South Park” Project located at Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City.
5.2. While the development of the project was on going, a notice of levy was annotated at the titles covering the project on account of an obligation incurred by PMRDC against Monte de Piedad Bank which later became Keppel Monte Bank, Inc.
5.3. On 10 March 2000, PMRDC entered into a contract with Keppel Monte Bank, Inc. denominated as “Dacion en Pago” to pay off the said obligation subject of the Notice of Levy.
5.4. Keppel Monte Bank later sold the same to Knight Gold Properties Inc. and the latter on the other hand, cede, transferred and sold the same to Mr. Jose Ma. Francisco of Cygnuz Asia Realty Corporation.
- Consequently, herein Plaintiff notified the defendants regarding its ownership through a letter dated 26 November 2007 (copy of the letter is hereto attached as Annex “B”) and thereafter proceeded to assert ownership and possession over the property by developing the condominium project which now known as Casa San Martin Condominium Corporation and started introducing improvements.
- Thus, Plaintiff merely allowed the defendants to continuously occupy the said unit for free subject to return upon demand.
- Thereafter, Plaintiff decided to take actual possession of the said unit and demanded from the defendants to vacate the said condominium unit 6-A, but the same fell on deaf ears. Plaintiff referred the case to its counsel, who then prepared the Plaintiff’s final demand letter dated 16 August 2010, copy of which is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex “C”.
- On 01 September 2010, plaintiff through the undersigned counsel, received a letter-response dated 31 August 2010 from the defendants through their counsel, alleging among others their baseless right of ownership and possession over Unit 6-A, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “D”. Plaintiff’s counsel reiterated the demand to vacate in its Reply-letter dated 09 September 2010, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “E”.
- In spite of these repeated demands, defendants refused and to date still refuse to vacate the said condominium unit. ( Underscoring appears in the original text of the complaint)
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In their respective Answers,[6] respondents claimed that they have better possessory right over the subject properties. According to them, on June 5, 1996, their parents, Spouses Eliseo and Aurora, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement[7] with the original developer of the condominium, Project Movers Realty and Development Corporation (PMDRC), and in consideration thereof, the latter assigned[8] to their parents the rights over the units covered by CCT Nos. 1405 (Unit 2A), 1406 (Unit 2B) and 1421 (Unit 6A). Since then, they have been in open and continuous possession of the condominium units in the concept of an owner and not by mere tolerance of Cygnuz. Respondents also argued that the complaints against them failed to allege the essential elements of unlawful detainer particularly the tolerance since the beginning of the possession.
The Ruling of the MeTC and the RTC
In its August 31, 2011 Decisions,[9] the MeTC dismissed the complaints for unlawful detainer. It held in this wise and disposed the case as follows:
For one, the court believes that the evidence failed to establish that indeed the stay of the defendants on the premises was merely tolerated by the plaintiff. This is so because plaintiff apparently recognized that defendants may have at least a rightful claim of title or possession over the property. In its letters to the defendants (Exhibit B and C) plaintiff even mentioned that the issue of ownership thereof was discussed by the parties for a while and defendants were even invited to consider purchasing the property from it. In fine, the right of the defendants to stay on the premises in question is premised not entirely on plaintiff’s tolerance. This is because plaintiff could have directly asked the defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy thereof had it felt that defendants have absolutely no right at all over the disputed premises. The prior ruling of this court to the contrary (i.e., that the complaint is sufficient in form, etc., to make out an ejectment case is now accordingly modified.
For another, the allegations in the complaint are not really sufficient to make out a case of ejectment because no statement can be found therein as to defendants’ mode of entry into the property. Likewise, the complaint is silent as to defendants’ unlawful withholding of possession thereof from the plaintiff. On the other hand, plaintiff merely alleged in substance that despite demands, defendants, whose stay was merely tolerated by plaintiff, failed to vacate the property which caused prejudice to the plaintiff.
Even the amount being prayed for herein by the plaintiff consisting of its alleged unrealized profits of P5,473,500 is alien to an ejectment case because what may be adjudged therein are only the reasonable rentals of the property. Thus, it is now more apparent that plaintiff is not really only after the mere recovery of possession of the premises via an ejectment suit like this one but through another action for recovery of property which is beyond the jurisdiction of this court. Thus, the court is of the considered view that the instant case must fall for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant case.
This is of course without prejudice to plaintiff’s filing of another action in the proper court to recover possession of the premises.
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The court also takes not (sic) that the table (marked as Annex 5 of the answer) showing a list of PMRDC properties which had been sold to third parties (with the corresponding considerations having been fully paid for prior to the execution sale) seem to convince this court that indeed the subject premises were previously awarded to defendants’ predecessor-in-interest, and which must at least be taken into consideration herein. However, should the plaintiff question the said list, it may do so in an appropriate proceeding but not in this case. In other words, this pronouncement is without prejudice to plaintiff’s right to file an action in the Regional Trial Court to recover the possession over the subject premises.
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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant cases without prejudice. The counterclaim is likewise dismissed for lack of merit. Without costs. (Original text of the decision were all italicized)
On appeal,[10] the RTC, through its May 4, 2012 Consolidated Decision,[11] affirmed the MeTC findings that the allegation of tolerance was not sufficiently established considering that respondents based their right to possess the condominium units on a deed of assignment in favor of their parents while Cygnuz claimed that it is now the real owner of the subject properties. Citing the case of Heirs of Melchor v. Melchor,[12] the RTC emphasized that in an unlawful detainer case, there must be an overt act showing that the petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents’ occupancy and such tolerance should be present at the beginning of the possession. In the absence of evidence showing such fact, the RTC held that the proper remedy for Cygnuz is to file an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. It then disposed the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated August 31, 2011 of Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 77 of Parañaque City for Civil Case No 11-0456 and Decision dated August 31, 2011 of Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 77 of Parañaque City for Civil Case No. 11-0457 dismissing the complaints are hereby affirmed.
Undaunted, Cygnuz filed the instant petition for review with the following assignment of errors:
A. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE RAISED A VALID ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP.
B. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE RESPONDENTS WAS (sic) MERELY TOLERATED TO OCCUPY THE CONDOMINIUM UNITS AND LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THE MODE OF RESPONDENTS’ ENTRY ON THE SUBJECT CONDOMINIUM UNITS TO QUALIFY THE CASES AS UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
C. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID ISSUE AS TO OWNERSHIP, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ASCERTAIN THE VERACITY AND TRUTHFULNESS OF SUCH CLAIM.
D. PETITIONER MAINTAINS THAT THESE CASES ARE STILL FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.
Cygnuz insists that ownership is not an issue in ejectment cases and the MeTC and the RTC should not have considered the unverified deed of assignment[13] and table of properties[14] presented by the respondents without even ascertaining the veracity and truthfulness of the latter’s claim over the subject properties. It argues that assuming ownership was properly raised as an issue, its CCT Nos. 22990 and 22992 have more probative value than respondents’ evidence. Cygnuz further contends that from the allegation in its complaints, the only logical conclusion that could be derived is “respondents were merely tolerated by petitioner from the time it acquired the properties until the demand to vacate”; thus, the complaint should have been treated as an unlawful detainer case and not as accion publiciana.
This Court’s Ruling
The petition fails.
Respondents’ Possession by Mere Tolerance Not Proven
The nature of the action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for.[15] A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.[16]
The foregoing elements were properly alleged in Cygnuz’ complaints. The complaints stated that respondents’ parents were merely accommodated to stay in the subject condominium units by virtue of the joint venture agreement between them and PMRDC; when ownership of the properties was transferred to Cygnuz it purportedly allowed respondents to continuously occupy the units for free subject to return upon demand; respondents remained in possession of the property despite repeated demands to vacate; and the complaints were instituted within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate made on September 9, 2010.
Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the element of tolerance was not sufficiently established by Cygnuz. Aside from its self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records that would prove its claim that PMRDC merely accommodated the stay of respondents’ parents in the subject premises. Worse, the documentary evidence submitted by Cygnuz and some of the allegations in its complaint militate against its claim of tolerance. As early as November 26, 2007, Cygnuz has been demanding respondents to vacate the condominium units which it allegedly owned. Thereafter, the last demand to vacate was made on September 9, 2010. Cygnuz failed to prove that between these periods, there has been an overt act on its part showing permission to possess or tolerance in favor of respondents. The November 26, 2007 demand letters which stated that “for more than three (3) months now, we have been talking about the ownership of the above captioned condominium unit(s) which you are presently occupying” taking in conjunction with Cygnuz’ registration of the properties in September 2009 indicate respondents’ adverse claim over the premises and belie any claim of tolerance. Cynuz’ prayer for unrealized profit also contradicts the existence of possession by tolerance. It must be noted that Cygnuz sought the recovery of P5,473,500.00 as payment for the unearned income during the period of respondents’ actual occupation of the properties. As held in the Melchor case,[17] such allegation implies that Cygnuz never permitted respondents to possess the land.
The ruling in Carbonilla v. Abierra[18] is instructive:
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
xxx In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment cases—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
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A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.
Petitioner failed to prove that respondents’ possession was based on his alleged tolerance. He did not offer any evidence or even only an affidavit of the Garcianos attesting that they tolerated respondents’ entry to and occupation of the subject properties. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. Plaintiff must, at least, show overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor’s permission to occupy the subject property. Thus, we must agree with the CA when it said:
A careful scrutiny of the records revealed that herein respondent miserably failed to prove his claim that petitioners’ possession of the subject building was by mere tolerance as alleged in the complaint. Tolerance must be [present] right from the start of possession sought to be recovered to be within the purview of unlawful detainer. Mere tolerance always carries with it “permission” and not merely silence or inaction for silence or inaction is negligence, not tolerance.
In addition, plaintiff must also show that the supposed acts of tolerance have been present right from the very start of the possession—from entry to the property. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Notably, no mention was made in the complaint of how entry by respondents was effected or how and when dispossession started. Neither was there any evidence showing such details. (Underscoring appears in the original text of the decision; emphasis supplied)
MeTC and RTC Not Duty-Bound to Resolve Issue of Ownership in Unlawful Detainer Cases
It must be emphasized that the sole issue to be resolved in unlawful detainer cases is the question of who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. However, in cases where defendants raise the question of ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the court may proceed and resolve the issue of ownership but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.[19]
Although the issue of ownership has been raised in this case, the MeTC is not duty-bound to make a ruling thereon because the issue of possession could be resolved without touching the question of ownership. As earlier discussed at length, there is no sufficient evidence to prove Cygnuz’ cause of action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance; thus, there is no need for the MeTC to exhaustively discuss the respective claims of ownership of Cygnuz and respondents; otherwise, it would contradict the summary nature of unlawful detainer cases.
It also bears stressing that it was not respondents’ defense of ownership that proved fatal to the case but Cygnuz’ own allegations in its complaints.[20] Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents, the petitioner has the burden of proving the act of tolerance pursuant to the rule that “he who alleges must prove”.[21] In the absence of such evidence, We find no reason to reverse the findings of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the May 4, 2012 Consolidated Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274, Parañaque City in Civil Case Nos. 11-0456 and 11-0457 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Villon, J., Chairperson and [1]Inting, JJ., concur.
[1] Vice Justice Florito S. Macalino, per Office Order No. 224-14-ABR in relation to Office Order No. 227-14-ABR.
[2] Rollo, pages 16-42.
[3] Penned by Presiding Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, ibid., pages 44-50.
[4] Penned by Assisting Judge Bibiano G. Colasito, ibid., pages 272-285 and 279-285, respectively.
[5] See complaints dated October 19, 2010, ibid., pages 67-74 and 75-81, respectively.
[6] See Spouses Santos and Spouses Santos-Juat respective Answer With Counterclaim, ibid., pages 145-157 and 172-184.
[7] Ibid., pages 104-109.
[8] See Deed of Assignment dated June 5, 1996, ibid., pages 158-160.
[9] Supra, at note 4.
[10] See Cygnuz’ Notices of Appeal and Appellant’s Memoranda, rollo, pages 286-287, 288-299, 290-308 and 309-326, respectively.
[11] Supra, at note 3.
[12] G.R. No. 150633. November 12, 2003.
[13] Rollo, pages 158-160.
[14] Ibid., page 110.
[15] See Longino v. General, et al., G.R. No. 147956. February 16, 2005.
[16] See Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285. September 25, 2009; Cabrera v. Getaruela, G.R. No. 164213. April 21, 2009.
[17] Supra, at note 12.
[18] G.R. No. 177637. July 26, 2010.
[19] Corpuz v. Agustin, G.R. No. 183822. January 18, 2012 citing Rivera v. Rivera, G.R. No. 154203. July 8, 2003.
[20] See Jose v. Alfuerto, G.R. No. 169380. November 26, 2012.
[21] See Morales v. Skills International, G.R. No. 149285. August 30, 2006.