ARCADIO R. TOLENTINO, PETITIONER, VS. HON, AMADO INCIONG, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND DOMINGO CINCO, RESPONDENTS.

Tolentino versus Inciong

The Case

This is Tolentino versus Inciong, a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction filed directly with the Supreme Court by Arcadio Tolentino, president of the Batangas Labor Union, against Amado Inciong as Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission and against Domingo Cinco, the union member who had complained against him. Tolentino asked the Court to annul the Commission's order of January 30, 1973 directing the union to hold its election of officers, and more urgently, to stop the Commission from enforcing a subpoena citing him, and the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, for contempt. The case matters because it draws the outer boundary of an administrative agency's contempt power: a public official exercises power, not rights, and may not punish as contempt the act of a party who merely seeks a judicial remedy.

Procedural History

Domingo Cinco filed a verified complaint with the then National Labor Relations Commission on December 12, 1972, charging Tolentino with refusing, as union president, to call the election of officers. The Commission issued an order on January 30, 1973 directing the union to hold its election within twenty days under the supervision of the Registrar of Labor Relations. Tolentino moved for reconsideration, and when the motion was not acted upon, he filed a notice of appeal with the Secretary of Labor. On February 26, 1973, the Batangas Labor Union filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch Seven, in Balayan, presided over by Judge Jaime delos Angeles, to annul the January 30 order. The court did not grant the writ ex parte; it set the application for hearing on March 1, 1973, and after hearing, Judge delos Angeles reserved his resolution in view of the intricate legal questions raised. On that same date, within the court premises, Tolentino and Judge delos Angeles were served with subpoenas dated February 28, 1973 issued by Chairman Inciong, requiring them to appear before the Commission on March 2, 1973 to explain why they should not be held in contempt. Tolentino then filed this petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court on March 2, 1973. On March 6, 1973, the Court required the respondents to answer and issued a temporary restraining order. Chairman Inciong instead sent a letter dated March 14, 1973 asserting that the issue was academic and that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over the Commission. The Court expunged that letter from the records on March 22, 1973 and required compliance with its earlier resolution. An answer was eventually filed on April 2, 1973. Both parties were required to submit memoranda; neither did, and the case was deemed submitted for decision.

Facts

The Batangas Labor Union had its own constitution, and its president, Arcadio Tolentino, was accused by a member, Domingo Cinco, of failing to call for the election of officers in November 1972. Cinco's verified complaint reached the National Labor Relations Commission, which set a hearing for January 12, 1973. Tolentino telegraphed the Commission that he had to appear before the then Court of Industrial Relations on that very day, and filed a formal motion to cancel the hearing. He was never informed of the action on his motion. Instead, on January 30, 1973, the Commission ordered the union to hold its election of officers within twenty days from receipt, in accordance with its constitution and by-laws, under the supervision of the Registrar of Labor Relations.

Tolentino received the order on February 5, 1973 and moved for reconsideration on February 8, 1973, arguing that the union, which has a separate and distinct personality from him, was never a party before the Commission, so due process was not observed, and that the subject matter of the complaint was not among those enumerated in the Commission's rules. The motion was never acted upon despite repeated requests. He filed a notice of appeal with the Secretary of Labor on February 20, 1973 and asked that the pre-election conference and the election scheduled for March 3, 1973 be suspended. The Commission, through Chairman Inciong, informed him that the election would proceed as scheduled, and notices of the election were posted at the place of employment.

The union then went to the Court of First Instance of Batangas on February 26, 1973, seeking to annul the January 30 order and to prohibit its enforcement. While that case was pending, and after the trial judge had heard the injunction application and reserved his resolution, Chairman Inciong issued subpoenas dated February 28, 1973 requiring both Tolentino and Judge delos Angeles to appear before the Commission and explain why they should not be held in contempt for trying to use what the subpoena called old society tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered under Presidential Decree 21.

Issues

• Whether or not the case had become moot and academic, given that the union election had already been held and the Commission disclaimed any intention of enforcing the contempt citation.
• Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission, through its Chairman, had the power under Presidential Decree 21 to cite for contempt a party who sought a judicial remedy, and a judge of the Court of First Instance who was hearing that remedy.
• Whether or not the writ of prohibition should issue to annul the contempt subpoenas.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7 of Presidential Decree 21 provides:

The Commission or any member thereof shall have the power to administer oath, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply.

This is the very grant of power on which the Commission relied, and the Court measured the contempt subpoenas against its terms.

Section 10 of Presidential Decree 21 provides:

The President of the Philippines, on recommendation of the Commission and the Secretary of Labor, may order the arrest and detention of any person held in contempt by the Commission for non-compliance and defiance of any subpoena, order or decision duly issued by the Commission in accordance with this Decree and its implementing rules and regulations and for any violation of the provisions of this Decree.

This provision was invoked by the respondents as the source of the power to punish for contempt, and the Court found it could not be stretched to reach the acts complained of.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court refused to dismiss the case as moot. Ordinarily, the plea that a case had become moot and academic would be granted, and had Chairman Inciong made clear that he would quash the contempt citation, the litigation could have been terminated. But he did not retreat from his position; he merely alleged that he would not enforce the citation, and his answer was of the same tenor. The Court therefore proceeded to decide the legal issues presented.

On the second issue, the Court began with a fundamental postulate, quoting its earlier ruling in Villegas versus Subido:

Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. That principle cannot be sufficiently stressed. Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth.

Applying that postulate, the Court held that the Commission's concern that the objectives of Presidential Decree 21 be attained afforded no warrant for exercising a power not conferred by the decree. The competence to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply cannot extend to a judge of the Court of First Instance, and correctly construed, it cannot cover a party to a controversy who took the necessary steps to avail himself of a judicial remedy. The proper step for an administrative official, the Court said, is to seek dismissal of the case before the court on the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers conferred on the agency, not to cite the judge and the party for contempt. There was no contumacious act by the petitioner in seeking judicial remedy, and it would be a reproach to any legal system if an individual were denied access to the courts under these circumstances. The Court also noted that the resort to what it called epithetical jurisprudence, sheltering in the opprobrious term old society tactics, was an implied admission that the actuation was devoid of support in law. As Chief Justice Hughes put it, departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.

On the third issue, the Court held that prohibition lies, and granted the writ.

Doctrine

A public official exercises power, not rights. There is no presumption that an administrative officer is empowered to act; there must be a delegation of authority, express or implied, and in the absence of a valid grant, what the officer does suffers from a fatal infirmity. Neither the dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive is a substitute for the grant.

The contempt power under Section 7 of Presidential Decree 21, which authorizes the Commission to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply, must be construed strictly. It does not extend to a judge of the Court of First Instance, and it does not cover a party who takes the necessary steps to avail himself of a judicial remedy. Seeking judicial relief is not a contumacious act, and access to the courts may not be penalized as contempt.

An administrative agency that believes a matter lies outside its jurisdiction should seek dismissal of the case before the court, not cite the judge or the party for contempt. Departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.

Disposition

The writ of prohibition was granted; the order of February 28, 1973 citing Judge Jaime delos Angeles and Arcadio Tolentino for contempt was declared void and of no force or effect for having been issued beyond the power of Chairman Inciong, and the temporary restraining order of March 6, 1973 was made permanent.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a public official exercises power, not rights, and the contempt power cannot be stretched to punish a party or a judge for seeking a judicial remedy. Examiners use this case on the limits of administrative contempt powers and on the rule that statutory grants of authority are construed strictly and never presumed.