G.R. No. L-2717. December 29, 1949
IRINEO FACUNDO, PETITIONER, VS. BIENVENIDO A. TAN ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
PARAS, J.:
Instance of Rizal a special civil action for prohibition (civil case No. 487)
against Lucio M. Tianco, as municipal judge of Rizal City, and Valentin R. Lim.
On April 10, 1948, the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the
filing by Facundo of a bond for P1,000, ordering municipal judge Tianco to
desist from issuing an alias writ of execution in civil case No. 32 of his
court. On April 24, 1948, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a
decision dismissing the petition for prohibition and dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction. On July 29, 1948, Lim filed a motion praying that the
injunction bond for P1,000 filed by Facundo be forfeited in favor of Lim for
unpaid rentals due from Facundo under the decision of municipal judge Tianco in
civil case No. 32. On September 30, 1948, the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
through Judge Bienvenido A. Tan, issued an order (1) holding that Lim was able
to prove, at the hearing held on September 16, 1948, damages amounting to more
than P1,000 suffered by way of uncollected rentals as a result of the writ of
preliminary injunction, (2) ordering the confiscation of the injunction bond,
and (3) directing the bonding company to pay Lim the sum of P1,000. This order
gave rise to the present petition in G. R. No. L-2717 in which the petitioner
Irineo Facundo prays for its annulment.
On April 24, 1946, Irineo Facundo instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal a petition for certiorari and prohibition (civil case
No. 7674) against Jose M. Santos, ex-justice of the peace of Pasay, Ricardo C.
Robles, as justice of the peace of Pasay, and Valentin R. Lim. The court issued
a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing by Facundo of a bond of P1,000.
On June 21, 1946, the court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for
certiorari and prohibition. This decision was, upon appeal of Facundo, affirmed
by the Supreme Court on December 17, 1946, Lim filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a motion dated July 29, 1948, praying for the forfeiture of
the injunction bond in favor of Lim, to cover back rentals due under the
decision of the justice of the peace court in civil case No. 32, which Lim
failed to collect because of the writ of preliminary injunction. On September
30, 1948, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, through Judge Bienvenido A. Tan,
issued an order (1) holding that Lim was able to prove, at the hearing held on
September 16, 1948, damages amounting to more than P1,000, (2) ordering the
confiscation of the injunction bond, and (3) directing the bonding company to
pay Lim the sum of P1,000. This order gave rise to the present petition in G. R.
No. L-2718 in which Facundo prays for its annulment.
On August 4, 1947, Irineo Facundo instituted in the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. No. 1566-R) against Judge Eulalio
Garcia of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Valentin R. Lim, and the
provincial sheriff of Rizal. On August 5, 1947, the Court of Appeals issued a
writ of preliminary injunction, upon the filing by Facundo of a bond for P1,000,
restraining the provincial sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution issued
by the justice of the peace court of Pasay in civil case No. 32. On November 26,
1947, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition for
certiorari and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction. Lim filed a motion
dated July 29, 1948, praying that the injunction bond be forfeited in favor of
Lim to cover unpaid rentals due under the decision in civil case No. 32 which
Lim was not able to collect because of the writ of preliminiary injunction. This
motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on August 10, 1948, without prejudice
to the right of Lim to claim for such damages as might have been caused by the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Upon motion for reconsideration
filed by Lim, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution on September 24, 1948,
requiring Lim to proceed within ten days in accordance with section 20, Rule 59,
of the Rules of Court. On January 21, 1949, the Court of Appeals issued an order
holding that damages had been proved by Lim at the hearing held on November 3,
1948, and ordering Facundo to pay Lim P416.45, representing rentals from August
6, 1947, to December 11, 1947, at the rate of P100 monthly. This order and the
order of September 24, 1948, gave rise to the present petition for certiorari in
G. R. No. L-2767 in which Facundo prays for their annulment.
The contention of the herein petitioner, Irineo Facundo, in all
these three cases is that the claim for damages of herein respondent Valentin R.
Lim had been presented out of time, because they were not filed before the final
termination of the proceedings in which the writs of preliminary injunction were
issued and no award for such damages was included in the final judgments.
In G.R. No. L-783, Brodett vs. De la Rosa,[1] and on January 23, 1947, we laid down the
following pronouncement: “Acting upon the petition of Attorney Luciano de la
Rosa, dated January 14, 1947, in G. R. No. L-783, Brodett vs. De la Rosa,
praying this Court to order the return of the sum of P200 deposited by him on
September 2, 1946, as per official receipt No. 109356, as a cash bond for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in petitioner’s
petition herein; the opposition thereto of respondents’ counsel dated January
16, 1947; and the reply dated January 18, 1947, of said movant; it appearing
that the decision rendered herein under date of December 18, 1946, became final
on January 11, 1947, as appears from the entry of judgment made by the Clerk of
this Court on the last mentioned date; considering that before said final
judgment no application stating and claiming damages, which might have been
suffered by respondents by reason of said writ of preliminary injunction, was
filed; and considering that damages are only recoverable in such cases if the
amount thereof is claimed, proven and awarded in the manner and form and
following the procedure established in Rule 60, section 9, in relation with Rule
59, section 20, namely, through the filing before the trial or, in the
discretion of the court, before entry of final judgment, with due notice to the
adverse party (and his surety or sureties, if any) of an application setting
forth the facts snowing the right to damages and the amount thereof, upon which
application proper hearing should be had, and the amount awarded, if any,
included in the final judgment (See also Somes vs. Crossfield, 9 Phil.,
13, and Santos vs. Moir, 36 . Phil., 350): the Court resolves to grant, as it
hereby grants, the aforesaid petition.”
The rule, therefore, is that a claim for damages suffered by
reason of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction must be filed before
the trial or, in the discretion of the court, before entry of final judgment. It
appearing that respondent Lim sought to recover damages upon the injunction
bonds only on July 29, 1948, when the decisions in the three proceedings in
which the writs of preliminary injunctions were issued had become final, the
herein respondent courts could no longer make any adjudication in favor of
respondent Lim. The latter, however, argues that in his answers to the three
petitions for certiorari and prohibition in which writs of preliminary
injunction were issued, he included allegations regarding the accrual of
damages. That these general allegations had not been intended to, and cannot,
take the place of an application spoken of in section 20 of Rule 59, setting
forth the facts showing respondent Lim’s right to damages and the amount
thereof, is obviously inferable from the total absence in said answers of any
prayer for award of damages upon the injunction bonds.
Upon the other hand, it is undeniable that respondent Lim
suffered damages by way of unpaid rentals, but these damages could have been
properly avoided if the respondent courts required the herein petitioner to pay
or deposit said rentals, because in forcible entry and detainer cases stay of
execution refers only to possession and can be obtained only upon compliance
with the conditions imposed in section 8 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.
Wherefore, the herein three petitions are granted and the
orders of the respondent courts respectively involved therein are set aside,
without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes,
and Torres, JJ., concur.
[1] 77 Phil., 752.